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Abstract 
 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry was privatised in 1989 and is characterised 
by a series of regional monopolies. The majority of consumers currently have no choice in their 
supplier. The industry is regulated by Ofwat to guarantee the best value for customers whilst 
enabling the companies to undertake their activities. The motivation of this thesis is to examine 
the effectiveness of regulation. 
The aim is to examine five research questions. Firstly, has regulation encouraged convergence 
amongst the efficiency scores? Secondly, have the 1999 and 2004 price reviews been effective 
in improving efficiency? Thirdly, is there a capex bias in the industry? The final two aims come 
from a methodological perspective: firstly, to allow for the incorporation of environmental 
variables within the measurement of efficiency and secondly, to incorporate the long asset life 
of capital by incorporating capital as an intertemporal factor of production.   
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is employed to measure efficiency which is a                      
non-parametric technique that creates a linear frontier over the data. Convergence is examined 
by drawing from the growth literature to examine 𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence. A    three-stage DEA 
model is applied to examine the influence of environmental variables and to obtain an 
environmental adjusted DEA efficiency score. Finally, the intertemporal nature of capital is 
incorporated through a dynamic DEA model.  
This thesis reports that whilst regulation has produced limited improvements in the average 
efficiency, regulation has been effective in encouraging the least efficient firms to catch up 
with the frontier companies. Ofwat’s tightening of the price review in 1999 has produced 
significant improvements in efficiency, whereas the 2004 price review was relatively lax and 
had no significant influence. Finally, the thesis highlights that the current regulatory framework 
induces a preference towards capital expenditure which can have implications on the 
consumer’s bill.  
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1. Motivation and Research Questions 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry provides an essential service to 
households and non-households. The industry is characterised by a series of regional natural 
monopolies. The majority of consumers currently have no choice in their supplier. The industry 
was privatised in 1989 to encourage investment within an industry with deteriorating quality. 
Privatisation created ten local Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSCs) and 29 Water only 
Companies (WoCs). Littlechild (1988) highlighted that the firms have unrivalled monopoly 
power due to the capital intensive nature of the industry and the lack of substitutability of the 
services offered. Firms may exploit their monopoly power by increasing prices or reducing 
quality. Littlechild (1988) highlighted that, due to the ‘monopoly par excellence’, privatisation 
would require a permanent regulatory body and so Ofwat (Office of Water Services) was 
formed. The role of Ofwat is to protect the interest of customers by ensuring that water 
companies carry out their functions effectively whilst ensuring that they can finance their 
functions. Ofwat also promotes efficiency and facilitates the introduction of competition. 
The industry is regulated under price-cap regulation based on 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝐾, where 𝑅𝑃𝐼 is the retail 
price index and 𝐾  is a company specific allowed increase in prices. The 𝐾  factor is 
decomposed into 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝑄 − 𝑋 where 𝑋 is an efficiency component to reduce prices and Q is 
a positive component to allow for high prices for quality improvements.  
Littlechild (1988) highlights that the success of the 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝐾  system is dependent upon 
choosing the ‘right level’ of 𝐾. 𝐾 reflects the quality expenditure and the scope of productivity 
improvements, but the potential productivity improvements are unknown to the regulator and 
2 
 
therefore have to be estimated. If 𝐾 is too large then the regulated companies will earn excess 
profits, which will undermine the support of price-cap regulation and it is not in the best interest 
of customers. On the other hand, if 𝐾 is too small companies may not be able to finance their 
operations.  
As the industry is characterised by a series of natural monopolies and the majority of consumers 
currently have no choice of suppliers, it is essential that Ofwat acts in the best interest of 
customers to encourage efficiency and to ensure that monopolies do not abuse their power. 
This thesis is motivated from two perspectives. Firstly it examines whether regulation has been 
effective in encouraging technical change and convergence. Secondly, the thesis is motivated 
from a methodological viewpoint to develop the measurement of efficiency, which is an 
intrinsic component of the price review.  
The remainder of this chapter outlines the five research questions which this thesis aims to 
address. Section 1.3 will outline the contributions of the research to the current literature and 
finally, section 1.4 provides a route map of the thesis.  
1.2 Research Questions 
 
To examine the effectiveness of regulation and the measurement of efficiency this study aims 
to answer five main research questions which are outlined overleaf.  
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Research Question 1: Did the 1999 and 2004 price review improved efficiency? 
This research question arises to examine whether the regulation has been effective in improving 
efficiency. 
Research Question 2: Did the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry exhibit 
convergence in terms of efficiency performance in the period 1997- 2011? 
The objective of this question is to examine whether the regulatory framework has been 
effective in encouraging convergence within the efficiency scores towards the frontier.  
Research Question 3: How can the measure of efficiency using DEA incorporate                      
non-discriminatory factors to allow differences in the local environment? 
This question arises from a methodological perspective to incorporate environmental variables 
within the measurement of efficiency using DEA, which makes the implicit assumption of 
homogeneity.   
Research Question 4: How should long life and indivisible capital stock be treated in the 
measurement of efficiency? 
This question arises to address the incorporation of capital within the measurement of 
efficiency. The question leads to treatment of capital as an intertemporal and a quasi-fixed 
factor of production though a dynamic DEA model. 
Research Question 5: Is there a capex bias within the industry? 
 This question arises to examine whether there is a preference towards capital expenditure 
(capex) instead of operating expenditure (opex) in the industry, which is highlighted by Ofwat.  
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1.3 Contributions of the Research  
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine whether regulation has been effective in encouraging 
improvements in efficiency and technical change. At the top level this thesis examines whether 
the 1999 and 2004 price reviews have significantly improved efficiency. The 1999 price review 
was the first and only price review to date to assign an industry average negative 𝐾 factor. On 
the other hand, the 2004 review imposed a 𝐾  factor greater than the initial factor at 
privatisation, which was considered as lax. This thesis finds that the regulatory tightening in 
1999 significantly improved efficiency but that the 2004 price review has had no impact.   
The second contribution is to statistically determine if efficiency has converged within the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. To determine whether relative efficiency has 
converged, beta- and sigma-convergence (𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence) is estimated. The results find 
convergence within the industry for variable costs, with the initial least efficient firms 
improving at a faster rate than the most efficient firms. The results for total costs indicate that 
the least efficient firms are growing at a faster rate; however, the dispersion of efficiency does 
not significantly decrease. The chapter finds limited evidence that the 2004 price review 
increased the speed of convergence. 
To account for firm heterogeneities amongst firms, fixed effects are incorporated to measure 
conditional convergence. The measurement of conditional convergence highlights the 
differences within companies’ operating conditions through differences in company specific 
steady state efficiency scores. The chapter highlights the importance of controlling for non-
discretionary variables within the measurement of efficiency.  
To account for these heterogeneities, the third contribution is to incorporate differences within 
the firms’ operating environments within the measurement of efficiency using DEA. The basic 
DEA model assumes homogeneity and therefore assumes that all firms operate within the same 
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environment and compares the level of inputs and outputs. Environmental variables are 
incorporated through a three-stage approach introduced by Fried et al (1999). The approach 
allows for the incorporation of several environmental variables whilst determining the impact 
of the variables upon the excess levels of inputs. The model adjusts the inputs for the influence 
of the environmental variables to obtain an efficiency score when controlling for differences 
within firms’ operating characteristics. The results indicate a significant difference in the 
efficiency scores once controlling for the differences in firms’ operating characteristics with a 
substantial number of companies appearing to be relatively efficient due to operating within a 
favourable operating environment.  
The fourth contribution of the thesis is to model capital as an intertemporal factor of production 
through dynamic DEA. The industry is characterised by long-life assets whose useful life 
expand over several periods and cannot be adjusted to their optimal value instantaneously. The 
model takes into account decisions made today to influence future production. The thesis 
highlights the need to incorporate the intertemporal effects as the optimal capital value reported 
by the static model is underestimated because model does not take into account future 
production.  
The final contribution examines the presence of a capex bias, which is the preference of capex 
solutions instead of opex solutions through examining the over-utilisation of capital and 
variable inputs. Dynamic DEA reports a persistent over-utilisation of capital and an 
improvement in the efficiency of variable inputs over the period. The capex bias may be present 
due to the Averch-Johnson effect if the rate of return on capital is greater than the cost of capital 
or due to the nature of the industry building for future demand.  
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1.4 Dissertation Structure  
 
The dissertation is organised as follows:  
Chapter 2 provides the contextual background for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry. It provides an overview of the restructuring of the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry, from thousands of bodies undertaking water and sewerage in the 1940s, to 
privatisation and the current structure. The chapter outlines the motivation for privatisation and 
the introduction of economic regulation. An outline of the price-cap regulation is provided and 
a detailed outline of the determination of the allowed price increase.  
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the theory of efficiency and the different 
techniques which can be applied for its measurement.  The thesis examines efficiency through 
the measurement of DEA and therefore the chapter provides a detailed outline of the 
measurement of efficiency using DEA.  
Chapter 4 outlines the data used within the thesis for the measurement of efficiency for the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. The data permits efficiency to be examined 
at different levels within the structure of the industry and the chapter provides a detail 
discussion of the choice of specification to measure efficiency. A review of the choice of 
variables used for the measurement of efficiency both within the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry and other water industries is drawn upon to inform the choice of input, 
output and environmental variables used within the thesis. Detailed definitions of the variables 
are provided alongside some descriptive statics.  
Chapter 5 estimates the presence of 𝛽- and 𝜎- convergence of the WaSC efficiency scores over 
the period examined. 𝛽-convergence is present if those companies with an initial low level of 
efficiency grow relatively faster. 𝜎-convergence examines whether the dispersion of efficiency 
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has reduced over time. The chapter incorporates heterogeneities amongst firms through a fixed 
effects model and examines whether the 2004 price review influenced the speed of 
convergence.  
Chapter 6 incorporates environmental variables within the measurement of efficiency through 
a three-stage approach to incorporate the influence of the differences in the operating 
environment of the WaSCs. The second stage regresses the environmental variables upon the 
over-utilisation of inputs to determine their influence. Alongside environmental variables, 
regulatory dummy variables are included to determine the impact of the 1999 and 2004 price 
reviews.   
Chapter 7 measures dynamic DEA by incorporating the intertemporal nature of capital within 
the estimation of efficiency as an input into today’s production and an output into tomorrow’s 
production process. Capital is incorporated as a quasi-fixed input which is held fixed for the 
estimation of static efficiency. This, therefore, allows overall efficiency to be decomposed into 
a static and dynamic component. The chapter examines the over-utilisation of capital and 
examines the issue of the perceived capex bias. 
Finally, chapter 8 summarises the key aspects and findings of the research and outlines the 
main conclusions derived. 
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2. The Water and Sewage industry in England and Wales: Past, Present, 
Future  
2.1 Introduction 
 
The nature of the industry, which is characterised by a series of regulated regional monopolies, 
has motivated this study to examine whether the regulatory regime has been effective in 
encouraging technical change and convergence. This chapter will provide the contextual 
background of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry, outlining the background 
of the industry and the regulatory tools for determining the price limits.  
The industry was privatised in 1989 creating a series of local monopolies whereby households 
and non-households using less than five million litres of water a year in England and fifty 
million litres a year in Wales currently have no choice in their supplier. The firms are natural 
monopolies due to the capital intensive nature of the industry and lack of substitutability of the 
services offered. To ensure that firms do not exert their monopoly power the industry is subject 
to economic and quality regulation. Economic regulation is undertaken by Ofwat to act as a 
proxy for competition and to ensure firms are competitive whilst being able to finance their 
functions. The industry is regulated under price cap regulation, firms are allowed to increase 
their prices by 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝐾.  𝑅𝑃𝐼 is a measure for the rate of inflation and 𝐾 is a company specific 
composite term reflecting the scope for efficiency gains and higher costs for investment to 
improve quality. 
Firstly, this chapter traces the evolution of industry, from its early consolidation with thousands 
of bodies to the restructuring of the industry creating ten Regional Water Authorities (RWA), 
through to privatisation. Section 2 will provide a brief outline of the motivations for the 
privatisation of the industry and the floatation of the industry. Section 3 will provide an outline 
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of the current structure of the industry and the introduction of price cap regulation. The tools 
to determine the level of 𝐾 within the periodic review and their mechanisms to encourage 
economic efficiency are outlined in section 4. Finally, section 5 examines some important 
features of the 2014 price review for the elimination of the capex bias and the facilitation of 
the introduction of competition within the industry.  
2.2 History of the industry pre-privatisation  
 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry was developed in the nineteenth century 
as a mixture of municipals and small private undertakings. In 1945, there were more than 1,000 
bodies involved in the supply of water and around 1,400 bodies responsible for sewerage and 
sewage disposal (Ofwat, 2008). Due to the subtantial number of bodies involved, water 
resources planning was highly localised with little co-ordination at either a regional or national 
level. Ofwat (2008) state that the consolidation was required to provide better planning, to 
control pollution and meet the increasing demands for water. The water act in 1973 established 
ten RWA’s in 1974 which were responsbile for the whole water cycle within their catchment 
area; both water and sewerage activities. The 1973 Water Act transferred the control of 
investment from local authorities to the central government. The RWAs operated under a cost 
recovery base, with capital investment expenditure requirements meet by the central 
government and from revenues. Alongside the RWAs there were 29 statutory Water Only 
Companies (WoCs) which operated under private ownership. Within the areas where WoCs 
operated the RWAs undertook the sewerage activities whilst the WoCs undertook water 
activities. The RWAs were substantially larger than the WoCs, the RWAs covered around 75% 
of the country (Saal and Parker, 2001).  
10 
 
The industry was privatised under the 1989 Water Act. Beesley (1994) states that the water and 
sewerage industry was privatised against a legacy of neglect. During the 1980s the quality of 
service deteriorated and in general the industry suffered from heavy underinvestment (Hunt 
and Lynk, 1995). Ofwat (2008)  state that the 1985 river quality survey showed that for the first 
time since surveys were undertaken in 1958 the river quality deteriorated. Some 903km of the 
40,000km of rivers surveyed reported a net deterioration in quality. In 1988, 742 out of 6,407 
sewerage treatment works failed their discharge permit requirements. As a result of this lack 
of investment, a series of European Commision (EC)  Directives were breached due to pollution 
incidents. Ofwat (2008) state that the government recognised the need for significant capital 
investment as a result of the decision by the EC to start prosecution proceedings against the 
government for non-compliance with two EC directives in the mid 1980s.  
The government had to increase investment through either increased borrowings, increased 
taxation or through a progamme of privitization. Ofwat (2008) state that the government was 
relcutant to increase borrowing or taxation and privatisation was considered as a policy to 
promote efficiency following the privatisation of British Telecom and British Gas in 1984 and 
1986 respectively.  
The 1989 Water Act provided the mechanism for privatisation within the industry. The ten 
RWAs became publicly quoted as Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSCs). The WoCs were 
re-established as normal public limited liability companies. To ensure that the flotation of the 
privatisation of the WaSCs would attract investors, the government cancelled all of the long 
term debt owned by the water and sewerage companies at a total cost of £4.9bn (in 1989 prices) 
and provided a cash injection of £1.5bn  known as the “green dowry” (Saal and Parker, 2001). 
In addition provisions were made for capital tax allowance of £7.7bn to ensure that companies 
were not disadvantaged with companies who had built up capital allowances over time              
(Ofwat, 2008).   
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Sawkins (2001) highlight that the private sector successor of the RWAs face an ‘unrivalled’ 
degree of monopoly power due the ownership and control of water and sewerage networks and 
lack of subsituability of the services they offer. The ownership and control of water and 
sewerage networks cause high barriers to entry in the industry due to the large networking costs 
involved in the distribution of water. The water mains and sewers are highly capital intensive 
and for this reason it is not feasible to have multiple networks throughout England and Wales. 
Alongside the physical infeasibility is it also economically infeasible as the value of service for 
water or sewerage activities is very low incomparison to the cost of infrastructure and 
distributing water and sewerage.  
Littlechild (1988) highlights that monopoly power may be exerted by increasing prices, 
reducing quality or quality of service, allowing for environmental deterioration or allowing for 
efficiency to decline. Littlechild (1986) report that due to ‘the natural monopoly par excellence’ 
privatisation would require a permanent regulatory settlement. The 1989 Water Act provided 
the Secretary of State the responsibility of drinking water quality (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 
DWI). The National Rivers Authority (NRA) now the Environment Agency (EA) and National 
Resources Wales (NRW) would manage pollution and the environment and finally the water 
act defined the duties of the Director General of Water Services as the economic regulator, 
Ofwat.  
2.3 Current structure of the industry  
 
Within the post-privatised struture of the industry there are two types of firms: WaSCs and 
WoCs. WaSCs undertake both water and sewerage activities whilst WoCs only undertake water 
activities. WaSCs and WoCs are vertically integrated companies; for water services a single 
company extracts, treates, distributes and retails the water, whereas for sewerage activities a 
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given company collects, treats and disposes of the sewage. The WaSCs provide all services 
within their geographic area and the WoCs provide the clean water operations only; the 
collection and treatment of dirty water is undertaken by a WaSC. The firms are therefore 
characterised as natural monopolies where only one firm deliveres either water or sewerage 
activities or both within a specific region. As previously highlighted natural monopolies arise 
due to high barriers to entry into the industry; due to the large networking cost involved in the 
distribution of water. To ensure firms do not abuse their monopoly power the industry is 
regulated by Ofwat.  
There are two well-rehearsed forms of price control: price-cap regulation or rate of return 
regulation. Rate of return regulation determines a fair return on investment; the Rate of Return 
(ROR), otherwise known as the cost of capital by Ofwat. The revenue requirement (RR) shown 
in equation 2.1 is the amount each company needs to collect to finance its operating expenditure 
and capital programme whilst earning a return on previous capital investment through the rate 
of return and paying tax. The ROR is multiplied by the rate base to obtain the return on capital 
for investors.  The rate should be high enough to attract investment whilst ensuring a fair price 
for customers. Once the revenue requirement is decided the regulator determines a tariff 
structure to recover aggregate costs.  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝑂𝑅 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 (2.1) 
On the other hand, price-cap regulation determines the allowed percentage increase in prices 
under the 𝑅𝑃𝐼 − 𝑋 framework of Littlechild (1983) and Beesley and Littlechild (1989). A 
regulated company has an annual price cap based on the previous year’s allowance plus an 
inflation allowance (𝑅𝑃𝐼)  less a company specific efficiency target (𝑋) . The annual 
percentage difference between the revenue requirement and the base year revenue expected 
from customers is the price limit. The main distinction between the two approaches is that 
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prices are fixed under price-cap regulation and prices change as costs change under rate of 
return regulation. 
Littlechild (1983) and Beesley and Littlechild (1989) highlight the advantages of 𝑅𝑃𝐼 − 𝑋 
compared to rate of return regulation. Firstly, prices under 𝑅𝑃𝐼 − 𝑋 are fixed, and therefore 
firms have greater incentives for production efficiencies as they are able to retain any profits 
they earn during the period. Once the price is fixed, companies aim to maximise profits by 
minimising costs. At a future date the price limit is revised, which is expected to fall due to the 
efficiency savings. Helm and Rajah (1994) state that the efficiency savings are likely to yield 
long-term benefits for the customers if the price review period is long enough and the regulator 
refrains from intervening. Although rate of return regulation is less effective in providing 
incentives, it does allow for the regulator to adjust prices more quickly and therefore prices are 
cost-reflective. Secondly, firms experience an incentive to over-invest in capital under rate of 
return regulation known as the Averch-Johnson effect.  
Averch and Johnson (1962) demonstrate that firms which are regulated by rate of return 
regulation have an incentive to deviate from the cost minimising proportion of inputs if the 
allowed rate of return is greater than the cost of capital, specifically with regards to                           
over-capitalisation. The disproportionate level of inputs arises when firms only earn the return 
on capital and not on operating expenditure and therefore prefer capital based solutions. 
Overall, Beesley and Littlechild (1989) highlight that operating and capital expenditure would 
be lower under a price cap regulation than under an annual rate of return regulation. However, 
as a result of the incentive to minimise costs, Cowan (2002) highlights that firms using price-
cap regulation have an incentive to cut quality. To ensure that companies are minimising costs 
whilst maintaining environmental and drinking water quality standards the industry is regulated 
by the DWI, EA and NRW.  
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The privatisation programme in the UK in the 1980s was underpinned by price-cap regulation 
using the 𝑅𝑃𝐼 − 𝑋  methodology of Littlechild (1983) and Beesley and Littlechild (1989). 
Ofwat extended the price-cap regulation of 𝑅𝑃𝐼 − 𝑋  to 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝐾  in which the company 
specific  𝐾  factor is decomposed into two elements a positive 𝑄  factor to allow for price 
increases due to higher costs from tightening quality standards by the DWI, EA and NRW and 
a negative 𝑋 factor for efficiency change. Ofwat undertakes a price review every five years, 
known as the price review, to determine the level of price increase for each company.  
As well as encouraging efficiency, Ofwat has to ensure that firms are able to finance the their 
functions, mainly through a reasonable return on capital which is unique to the water sector1. 
They are also responsible for the interest of customers and to facilitate, but not promote, 
effective competition.  
The 𝐾 factor is determined through the revenue requirement which is the sum of the operating 
expenditure, capital charges and return on capital. The return on capital is calculated as the 
product of the cost of capital determined by Ofwat and the rate base, the Regulatory Capital 
Value (RCV). The RCV is a regulatory tool which permits a rate of return on the investments 
made by the company’s owners. The RCV is the value placed on companies 200 days after 
privatisation and is rolled forward based on the amount of capital expenditure in each period 
less the depreciation charges. 
To determine the scope of efficiency improvements (𝑋) Ofwat employs yardstick competition. 
Yardstick competition, also known as comparative efficiency, was formulised by Shleifer 
(1985) in which the price of a regulated company is dependent on the costs of firms in the same 
industry. The paper suggests the use of regression analysis to observe cost differences between 
the companies operating within heterogeneous operating environments. Shleifer (1985) argued 
                                                          
1 Helm and Jenkinson (2003,  p161)  
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that yardstick competition would reveal the cost-minimising potential of each firm and 
secondly the comparison of costs of similar firms would provide a set of ‘yardsticks’ of 
performance which could infer any firm’s attainable cost levels.  
Littlechild’s (1986) report to the Department of Environment highlights that the privatisation 
of the industry creates ten monopolies, therefore providing the opportunity to make regulation 
more effective by making comparisons of the companies. The set of ‘yardsticks’ are difficult 
to determine due to information asymmetries between the regulator and the companies and  
accounting for heterogeneities amongst companies.  Ofwat undertakes comparative efficiency 
through a series of functional level regression, which are outlined in section 2.7.2.  
Within the measurement of comparative efficiency an important feature is the number of 
available comparators. To obtain valid estimates of the heterogeneities within the industry 
sufficient degress of freedom are required. Therefore, a lack of comparators can undermine the 
robustness of yardstick competition. Cowan (2003) states that the boundaries of the WoCs are 
rather arbitary and mergers between them might be expected to produce efficiency gains.  
However, under section 32 of the Water Industry Act 1991, mergers between water companies 
must be assessed by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) previously the 
Competition Commission (CC) where the turnover of each water enterprise exceeds £10m. In 
practice, any merger within the industry would be referred to the CC (Ofwat, 2008).   
The CMA examines the trade off between whether the reduction in the number of comparators 
within the industry will effect Ofwat’s ability to undertake yardstick competition and the 
potential efficiency gains as a result of the merger. The MMC will allow the merger if they 
believe there is potential for considerable efficiency gains which are  passed onto the customers 
through lower prices and the impact on Ofwat’s ability to undertake yardstick competition is 
minimal.  The number of WoCs within the industry has decreased from 29 after privatisation 
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to eight, and these have been due to a series of mergers either between two WoCs or a WaSC 
and a WoC. The mergers and the dates are shown in table 2.1. There have been no mergers of 
two WaSCs within the industry. In 1996, the MMC rejected the bid of Wessex Water and 
Severn Trent for the acquisition of South West Water as the price reductions would not be 
enough to compensate the loss of the comparator (Cowan, 2003) 
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 Table 2.1: Mergers and acquisitions in the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry 
Date New Company Companies Involved
March 1993 North East Water Newcastle and Gateshead
Sunderland and South Shields
September 1993 Severn Trent Severn Trent Water
East Worcester
March 1994 Essex and Suffolk Essex Water
Suffolk Water
March 1994 Three Valleys Colne Valley
Lee Valley
Rickmansworth
April 1994 South East Water Eastbourne
Mid Sussex
West Kent
July 1994 Bournemouth and West Hants Bournemouth & District
West Hampshire Water
April 1996 Sutton and East Surrey Water East Surrey Water
Sutton and District Water
April 1996 Northumbrian Northumbrian
North East 
April 1997 Dee Valley Chester Waterworks
Wrexham Water
January 1999 South East Water Mid Southern
South East
April 2000 Anglian Harlepool
Anglian
April 2000 Yorkshire Yorkshire
York Waterworks
April 2000 Northumbrian Northumbrian
Essex and Suffolk
October 2000 Three Valleys Three Valleys
North Surrey
December 2007 South East South East
Mid Kent
April 2013 South Staffordshire South Staffordshire
Cambridge 
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2.4 Regulation 
 
The 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝑄 − 𝑋 price cap was driven by the large on-going requirements for companies to 
improve the quality of service. The initial 𝐾 factors after privatisation were set by the Secretary 
of State for a period of 10 years. Upon privatisation the weighted industry average allowed 
increase in prices was 3.7% above the rate of inflation. Sawkins (1995) states that several 
finance directors within the industry believed the initial 𝐾 factor was generous for political 
reasons; to ensure the success of privatisation. Within the first two years of privatisation 
companies’ profits were exceeding forecasts, so Ofwat announced that it would review price 
limits for all companies in 1994 (Ofwat, 2008). The 1994 price review under the control of 
Ofwat instead of the government introduced new tighter price caps in line with the publically 
announced criteria (Sawkins, 1995). Since 1994, Ofwat has undertaken the review for the price 
limits, known as price reviews, every 5 years2. Table 2.2 shows the K factors for the final 
determinations in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 for the industry average and the average 
for WaSCs and WoCs. Since 1989, the 𝐾  factor has led to an increase in prices with the 
exception of the 1999 price review. The increase in capital expenditure and resulting operating 
expenditure has offset the scope for efficiency savings. The 𝐾 factor has decreased until the 
2004 price review; the industry average 𝐾 factor in 2004 was higher than the initial value set 
at privatisation. Regulation tightened once again in 2009 saw a substantial fall in the 𝐾 factor, 
where the companies’ average price increase was 0.5% higher than 𝑅𝑃𝐼. 
Companies can appeal to the Competition and Market Authorities (CMA) if they believe the 
final determination does not allow for their firm to finance their functions. Companies can also 
                                                          
2 Prices are set for the year starting the 1st of April.  
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appeal with regards to interim adjustments to the 𝐾  factor and amendments to company 
licenses.  
 
Price Review Allowed K Factors  
Price Limits 1989 (1990/91–
1999/00) 
Weight Industry average of 3.7. WASCs had a 
weighted average of 3.9 and 1.9 for WOCs 
PR94 (1995/96–2004/05) Weighted average K factor of 0.9 for 10 years 1.0 
for WASCs and -0.4 for WOCs. For the first 5 
periods of the review 1996/96–1999/00 K factor 
1.4 for the industry and 1.5 for WASCs and 0.6 for 
WOCs  
PR99 (2000/01–2004/05) Industry Weighted average    -2.1. The WASC 
industry average of -2.0 and -2.8 for WOCs  
PR04 (2005/06–2009/10) Industry weighted average for 4.2. WASCs average 
of 4.3 and 3.1 for WOCs   
PR09 (2010/11–2014/15) Industry weighted average of 0.5. WASC average 
0.5 and 0.3 for WOCs  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Final Determination 𝐾 factors  
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2.5 Environmental Regulation 
 
The industry is regulated by the DWI for drinking water quality and NRW and EA for 
environmental quality. The 𝐾 factor in the majority of the price reviews has been positive, 
therefore indicating that the increased expenditure for quality improvements has outweighed 
the scope for efficiency improvements. Since privatization the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry has delivered £98 billion of investment (Ofwat, 2012). This investment has 
improved standards of customer service, increased the stability of supply and delivered 
improvement to drinking water quality and the environment. The main drivers of capital 
expenditure were the adoption of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) which 
increased quality standards for the minimum standard of wastewater treatment and disposal of 
sludge. The DWI imposes increasing tight quality standards within the industry. There have 
been other quality drivers such as the Habitats Directive, Bathing Water Directives. Although 
firms have to comply with quality standards, Ofwat assesses company’s investment plans to 
ensure that the company’s capital expenditure for quality is efficient.  
2.6 Determining Required Revenue  
 
Ofwat’s determination of prices is set by a five year price cap which is determined by the price 
review. Ofwat’s determination is based on a building block approach to determining the 
“required revenue” whereby there is individual assessment of: 
 Operating Cost 
 Capital charges (i.e. depreciation) 
 Return on capital 
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The annual percentage difference between the revenue requirement and the base year revenue 
expected from customers is the price limit. The following sections will consider the assessment 
of operating and capital expenditure within the price review.  
2.6.1 Capital Expenditure  
 
The level of capital expenditure is influenced by the quality standards imposed by the DWI, 
EA and NRW. To control the level of capital expenditure companies provide investment plans; 
Asset Management Plan (AMP). Ofwat challenges the AMP to ensure that firms are providing 
quality improvements at the best value for customers. Customers pay for capital expenditure 
over the life of the asset through capital charges. The capital charges are the sum of the Current 
Cost Depreciation (CCD) and Infrastructure Renewal Charge (IRC). CCD is the depreciation 
of non-infrastructure assets which are above ground assets based upon the asset life. IRC is an 
annualised cost of maintaining underground assets charged to the profit and loss account. The 
IRC is a fifteen year average of the infrastructure renewal expenditure.   
Companies finance previous capital investment through a return on capital. The return on 
capital is comprised of the company’s RCV and the cost of capital determined by Ofwat. A fair 
return on capital is required to attract investment within the industry; the cost of capital has to 
be low enough to avoid firms earning windfall gains whilst high enough to attract investors.  
Ofwat determines the cost of capital by applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
which is crossed checked with the Dividend Growth Model (DGM)3 (Ofwat, 2009) alongside 
discussions with firms, other regulators, consultants and shareholders. The CAPM considers 
the cost of debt and equity, risk-free rate and the equity beta value which measures the 
                                                          
3 The 1994 price review used both the CAPM and DGM model.  
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company’s exposure to systematic risk.  To reflect the limited access to capital Ofwat includes 
a small company premium. The assumed cost of capital over price reviews is shown in table 
2.3. The cost of capital reduced significantly in the 1999 price review, which contributed 
towards the negative K factor in the price review.  
 
Price Review Cost of Capital-Post Tax Small Company Premium  
1994 5%–6% 0.75% 
1999 4.25%–5.25% 0.4%–0.75% 
2004 4.2%–5.3% 0.75% 
2009 4.5% 0.1%–0.4% 
 
2.7 The assessment of operating and capital expenditure 
 
The level of operating and capital expenditure companies are allowed is subject to an efficiency 
challenge by Ofwat. Ofwat analyses the scope for efficiency savings to determine the 𝑋 factor 
within the price setting to stimulate companies to reduce costs without reducing the level of 
service to customers and the environment. The methodology for determining the efficient level 
of operating and capital expenditure until and including 2009 price review is outlined. This is 
followed by a brief assessment of the approach used in 2014 price review to overcome the 
capex bias and to facilitate the introduction of competition.  
The approach for determining efficient expenditure until and for the year 2009 analyses 
efficiency savings for operating and capital expenditure separately. Ofwat (1994) states that 
they find no convincing evidence that high operating expenditure can be explained by low 
Table 2.3: Cost of Capital  
23 
 
capital expenditure and vice versa. Ofwat analyses the scope of efficiency savings for opex and 
capex into two components: firstly, a component for continuing efficiency which assumes that 
all companies can reduce costs by a given percentage, and secondly, a catch-up efficiency 
assumption based on firms relative efficiency to encourage inefficient firms to catch up to the 
frontier companies.  
2.7.1 Continuing Efficiency 
The continuing efficiency component is based on the director’s judgement of the amount in 
which the frontier company can improve. Table 2.4 reports the continuing efficiency 
percentage for operating expenditure, capital maintenance and capital enhancement assumed 
within the price review. Ofwat (2004) highlights that the efficiency targets have reduced over 
the price reviews which are as a result of the reduced scope for overall efficiency gains.  
Table 2.4: - Continuing efficiency assumptions  
Price Review Opex 
Continuing 
Efficiency 
Capital Maintenance 
continuing efficiency 
assumption 
Capital Enhancement 
continuing efficiency 
assumption 
1994 2% a year  
1995–00 
1% a year  
2000-05  
1% 1% 
1999 1.4% a year  1.4% 2.1% 
2004 Water 0.3%  
Sewerage 0.5%  
0.5% Water 
0.6% Sewerage 
0.74% Water 
0.88% Sewerage 
2009 0.25% 0.4% 0.4% 
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2.7.2 Catch-up Factor- Econometric Models  
 
The catch-up efficiency assumption is derived through the application of yardstick competition 
to determine the company’s relative efficiency to the frontier company. Opex efficiency is 
examined through a series of functional level econometric models. Capital maintenance 
efficiency is examined through both econometric models and a cost base challenge. Efficient 
capital enhancement expenditure is determined through cost base models.  The catch-up factor 
assigns larger efficiency challenges to those firms which are deemed as inefficient to encourage 
catch-up to the frontier. Ofwat’s 1994 assessment of efficiency was analysed separately for 
water and sewerage activities at both the activity and functional level through a series of single 
year cross-sectional regression and unit cost models. The models have been refined over the 
reviews and the capital maintenance models were used until 2004 whilst the opex models were 
utilised until the 2009 review.  
Operating Cost Efficiency Models 
For water, four econometric models are used for four functional areas which are: 
1. Water distribution 
2. Resources and treatment  
3. Power 
4. Business activities  
For waste, the functional break down is: 
1. Network 
2. Business activities 
3. Large Sewage Treatment Works (LSTW) 
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4. Small Sewage Treatment Works (SSTW) 
5. Sludge disposal 
These are modelled by regression with the exception of SSTW and sludge disposal which are 
analysed by unit cost analysis. 
Capital Maintenance Efficiency Models  
Water Service Models: 
 Water resources and treatment  
 Water distribution infrastructure  
 Water distribution non-infrastructure  
 Water management and general  
Sewerage Service Models: 
 Sewerage infrastructure  
 Sewerage non-infrastructure  
 Sewage treatment  
 Sludge treatment and disposal  
 Sewerage management and general  
 
Within the econometric models actual expenditure is regressed on a series of explanatory 
variables to predict the efficient level expenditure for a given firm. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the cost drivers, such as the amount of distribution input alongside 
differences in the operating characteristics. The unit cost model derives the predicted costs 
based upon the industry average unit cost. The actual modelled costs and predicted costs are 
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summed to the activity level to obtain the relative efficiency for water and sewerage activities. 
The modelled costs exclude third party services, service charges, local authority rates and 
exceptional items which are deemed as uncontrollable by Ofwat.  Post modelling adjustments 
are made to account for Company Specific Factors (CSF) which are expected to increase costs 
and are considered as material4. Average efficiency is calculated as the ratio of modelled costs 
divided by predicted costs. To obtain a measure from the frontier, Ofwat applies Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), which shifts the regression downwards to the frontier 
company. The relative efficiency of a firm is therefore calculated as the distance of the firm’s 
actual costs to the frontier. Ofwat determines the frontier company based on the companies’ 
relative efficiency alongside other criteria such as the firm’s size and whether they operate 
under any special characteristics to ensure that it is a suitable benchmark. To determine the 
efficiency challenge for operating and capital expenditure firms are banded A–E based on their 
distance from the chosen frontier company and firms close a proportion of the distance.  
 
 
                                                          
4 The qualifying threshold for CSF’s to be accounted for is 1% of total modelled operating expenditure for each 
service. Ofwat (2008) state small claims that are not material will be offset by other small benefits.  
Table 2.5: PR04 Catch-up Factor Banding and Efficiency calculation  
Annual 
Percentage
0 0 0
A 0-5% Lower 0-5% 60% of 2.5 1.5 0.3
Upper 5-10% 60% of 7.5 4.5 0.9
B 5-15% Lower 10-15% 60% of 12.5 7.5 1.5
Upper 15%-20% 60% of 17.5 10.5 2.1
C 15-25% Lower 20%-25% 60% of 22.5 13.5 2.7
Upper 25%-30% 60% of 27.5 16.5 3.3
D 25%-35% Lower 30%-35% 60% of 32.5 19.5 3.9
Upper 35%-40% 60% of 37.5 22.5 4.5
E 5%-45% Lower 40%-45% 60% of 42.5 25.5 5.1
Frontier or better
Band Half Bands Assumed catch-up
(five-year total) %
Mid Point x catch-up
assumption
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Table 2.5 shows the banding and efficiency assumptions for opex at the 2004 price review. 
Ofwat then divides the bands into half-bands and takes the mid-point of each half-band as 
representative of all companies within the band. The efficiency challenge is determined based 
on closing a proportion of the efficiency gap to the frontier company. The proportion of the 
gap in which firms have to close is based on Ofwat’s assumption of the catch-up factor.  In the 
2004 price review firms, efficiency targets for opex were based on the catch-up assumption of 
closing 60% of the gap to the frontier company for base operating expenditure to determine the 
annual percentage reduction in opex which is shown in table 2.5. The same methodology was 
applied for capital maintenance, although the banding and catch-up factor percentages differ. 
The catch-up assumptions for each price review are reported in table 2.6. It is important to note 
that from 2004 onwards, Ofwat reduced the residuals by 10% and 20% for water and sewerage 
services respectively to account for underlying errors in the models.  
 
 
Price Review Operating 
Expenditure 
Capital Maintenance Capital Enhancement  
1994 25-35%    
1999 60% Between 40% and 
50% 
75% 
2004 60% 40% Econometric 
Benchmark 
50% Cost Base 
Benchmark 
75% 
2009 60% N/a N/a 
Table 2.6: Comparative Efficiency Catch-up 
factor  
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2.7.3 Catch-up Factor- Cost Base  
 
In additional to the application of econometric models Ofwat analyse firms’ relative capital 
maintenance and capital enhancement efficiency through a cost base assessment. The cost base 
is a set of capital unit cost estimates for standardised projects or units of work typical for the 
water industry; standard costs. Companies provide audited estimates for the cost base and 
companies are compared in order to gauge their relative efficiency. Benchmark firms are 
chosen for standard costs or groups of standard costs based on their relative efficiency 
alongside other factors to ensure that the firm is a suitable benchmark. A company’s efficiency 
challenge is calculated based upon closing a proportion of the gap between the benchmark 
company and the company’s standard costs. The proportion in which companies have to close 
the gap is known as the catch-up factor, displayed in table 2.7. The cost base was introduced 
in the 1994 price review and continued to be used until the 2004 price review. 
 
 
Price Review Capital Maintenance Capital Enhancement 
1994 50% 50% 
1999 50% 75% 
2004 40% For Econometric 
Models 
50% Cost Base Models 
75% 
 
Table 2.7: Cost Base Catch-up Factor 
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2.7.4 Capital Incentive Scheme 
 
The assessment of firms’ capital expenditure in the 2009 price review was based on menu 
regulation; the Capital Incentive Scheme (CIS), rather than econometrics and unit cost analysis. 
The motivation was to encourage truth telling and to incentivise companies to put forward 
challenging and efficient business plans. Ofwat establishes an independent baseline of what an 
efficient firm should spend and firms put forward their capital programmes. The ratio of the 
company’s bid and Ofwat’s independent base is the CIS ratio, and depending on the ratio, firms 
are given incentives to reduce costs below their bid. The matrix in figure 2.1 shows the 
incentive rates; the lower the CIS ratio (the company’s bid is lower than Ofwat’s) the more 
attractive the incentive rates are for the given firm to deliver the given capex programme at a 
lower cost. The varying incentive rates encourage firms to submit realistic and challenging 
bids. The incentive rate is decomposed into an efficiency incentive and an additional income. 
The additional income is a fixed amount which depends on the CIS ratio. The greater the 
challenge firms set themselves, the higher the additional income, irrespective of whether they 
meet the challenge. If the baseline is above 100, the business plan is greater than Ofwat’s 
baseline. This additional income is negative and therefore penalises those companies whose 
baseline is higher than Ofwat’s assessment. The efficiency incentive is a symmetric treatment 
of over and under spend of actual expenditure relative to the allowed expenditure. If a firm 
under-spends it keeps a proportion of the amount but if it overspends it is penalised by a 
proportion of this additional cost.  
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Source: Ofwat (2009) 
2.8  Industry going forward 
2.8.1 Capex Bias  
 
Efficiency within previous price reviews has been examined for opex and capex separately. In 
the 2014 price review, Ofwat undertook a Total Operating Expenditure (totex) approach, 
examining opex and capex together in order to eliminate a perceived capex bias. The perceived 
capex bias is the view that WaSCs and WoCs have an inappropriate preference for expenditure 
on capital expenditure over day-to-day operating expenditure. If the capex bias does exist this 
is important for the regulator as companies may not be spending customers’ money in the most 
efficient way. Incentives are used within the industry to encourage companies to generate 
Figure 2.1: CIS Matrix 
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outcomes that customers and society needs, want and are willing to pay for and to do so 
efficiently (Ofwat, 2011a).  
Ofwat (2011b) have highlighted some potential drivers of the capex bias. The first potential 
driver is the difference between the strength of financial incentives between operating and 
capital expenditure. The second is the return on capex; capital expenditure is remunerated 
through the RCV which earns a rate of return whereas opex is recovered from the customer 
within the year pounds for pound. The Averch-Johnson effect shows incentives to                     
over-capitalise if the rate of return is greater than the cost of capital. 
There are other potential drivers that are considered including financing and ownership where 
the RCV is symbolised as company growth. To overcome the potential capex bias, within the 
2014 price review Ofwat assess efficient expenditure for operating expenditure and capital 
expenditure together, known as totex, to equalise the incentive rates. To overcome the potential 
bias generated by companies earning a return on capital, Ofwat have introduced a Pay As You 
Go (PAYG) Rate, whereby firms earn a return on a fixed proportion of totex.  
 
2.8.2 Retail Competition 
 
Moving forward, the aim of the regulatory programme is to encourage the introduction of 
competition for retail activities for all non-household consumers from 2017. Ofwat has 
facilitated the introduction of downstream retail competition through introducing separate price 
controls for retail and wholesale elements of the production process. Entrants can apply for 
either a retail licence, which allows the licensee to purchase a wholesale supply from an 
appointed company and supply the premises of its customers, or a combined supply licence 
which enables the licensee to introduce water into a supply system and supply the customers.  
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With regards to the wholesale price limits, Ofwat intends to set separate price controls for water 
and sewerage activities. The price controls differed previously as Ofwat proposed to set 
controls that limit each company’s total wholesale revenue rather than charges. This gives the 
companies more responsibility and accountability for the wholesale charges they will have to 
publish going forward.  
The proposed retail price limit is set using the industry Average Cost To Serve (ACTS) with a 
glide path down to the lowest ACTS within the industry. The ACTS is calculated as the total 
retail costs divided by the number of retail customers. Ofwat has also introduced other 
incentives to incentivise companies to increase the amount of water traded.  
2.9 Summary  
This chapter has outlined the contextual framework of the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry. The water and sewerage industry has developed from thousands of bodies 
undertaking water and sewerage to the consolidation of the industry into ten RWAs and 29 
WoCs.  
The privatisation of the industry attracted much needed capital investment to improve 
deteriorating quality standards. The privatisation of the natural monopolies resulted in the 
introduction of the regulatory framework for both prices and quality standards. Ofwat sets 
prices under price-cap regulation based on 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝑄 − 𝑋. The level of efficient expenditure is 
determined through yardstick competition and menu regulation. The approach is designed to 
encourage both continuing efficiency improvement and catch-up to the frontier.  
If regulation has been an effective tool the industry should experience productivity 
improvement and convergence towards the frontier. The privatisation and regulation of the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry has inspired a large body of literature that 
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examines the effectiveness of regulation and privatisation. This study will examine whether the 
industry has converged and will examine the effectiveness of the 1999 and 2004 price reviews. 
Finally the study will examine the presence of the capex bias. The following chapter will 
outline the methodology employed for the measurement of efficiency.  
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3. Economic Efficiency: The Theoretical Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework and the different 
techniques for the measurement of productivity and efficiency. Chapter 2 provided the 
contextual framework and the motivation for measuring performance. The measurement of the 
performance of a firm is a relative concept examined either across an industry or a period of 
time. Performance is measured by either productivity or efficiency; this chapter will define the 
two concepts and extensively review the measurement of efficiency. Within the measurement 
of efficiency the unit of analysis is referred to as a DMU, Decision Making Unit. This term 
allows for flexibility, whereby a DMU may refer to firm or a set of departments of a firm.  
Koopman (1951) defined a producer as efficient if it maximises outputs given inputs. This 
chapter outlines the economic background of efficiency and different techniques for the 
measurement of efficiency. Technical efficiency examines the relationship between inputs and 
outputs. Economic efficiency is outlined estimating either a cost or revenue. The measurement 
of economic efficiency requires the availability of input prices and behavioural assumptions 
with regards to cost minimisation or revenue maximisation. Economic efficiency can be 
decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency examines the correct 
combinations and inputs and outputs given input and output prices.  
Section 3.6 outlines several methodologies for the measurement of efficiency; a cost function, 
SFA (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and DEA. The thesis employs three extensions on the basic 
DEA model to measure efficiency. The technology of DEA is based on the seminal work of 
Farrell (1957) and elaborated by Charnes et al (1978) and Banker et al (1984). DEA is 
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employed to estimate convergence, the influence of environmental variables and dynamic 
efficiency. An extensive introduction of DEA is outlined in section 3.6.5. 
3.2 Theory of Efficiency  
 
The concept of efficiency is derived from the basis of the microeconomic theory of the firm. 
The conventional neoclassical theory treats the firm as a black box which transforms resources 
into saleable goods. The transformation of inputs into outputs is described by a production 
function or production possibility set. The conventional neoclassical theory of the firm assumes 
that a firm is operating in a perfectly competitive environment. Firms seek to maximise profits 
by maximising revenue and minimising costs simultaneously. In the long run, the competitive 
equilibrium leads to all firms earning normal profits. In the short run it is possible for some 
firms to make abnormal profits. The existence of abnormal profits will attract other firms to 
enter the market, which drives down prices until all firms are making normal profits.  
In the long run, classical microeconomic theory assumes that any deviation from the optimal 
position is due to statistical noise. Given the same inputs if the level of outputs produced differ 
between two firms this leads to the conclusion that some relevant inputs that are not equal for 
both firms have been neglected (Ray, 1988). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) notes that these 
arguments are strong and although firms attempt to optimize they do not always succeed. In 
response to this, techniques have been developed where the producer’s behaviour is unchanged 
but success is not guaranteed. Within these techniques, the deviation from the maximum 
attainable profit may not just be due to noise; instead it may also be due to efficiency.  
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Koopman (1951) defined a producer as efficient if it maximises outputs given inputs. 
Efficiency is measured as the ratio of the observed output to the maximum attainable output 
given the level of inputs, or the ratio of observable inputs to the minimum attainable input level 
to produce a given output. The optimal level of inputs and outputs are defined by the production 
possibility technology. This section will expand on the definition of efficiency outlining the 
definition of Debreu (1951), Farrell (1957) and Koopman (1951) and outline the definition of 
production possibility technology.  
Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) define the measure of technical efficiency known as Farrell 
measure as: 
“one minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows the 
production of given outputs, a value of one indicates technical efficiency and a score less than 
unity indicates the severity of technical inefficiency.”  
Koopman (1951) define technical efficiency as: 
 “a producer is technically efficient if an increase in an output requires a reduction in at least 
one other output or an increase in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input requires 
an increase in at least on other input or a reduction in at least one output.” 
The Farrell measure of efficiency examines the radial contraction of inputs to the production 
possibility set or the radial expansion of outputs to the production possibility set. Koopman’s 
(1951) definition is stricter, measuring the reduction of inputs to the production possibility set; 
this incorporates both radial and non-radial reduction of inputs or expansion of outputs. The 
difference between the measures will be extended upon in the examination of slacks in section 
3.6.5.4. When examining the measurement of efficiency, the Farrell definition is utilised unless 
stated otherwise.  
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The measurement of efficiency compares the actual level of inputs or outputs relative to the 
optimal level indicated by the respective frontier. The frontier can be denoted by the production 
function for a one output multiple input case and can be extended to multiple outputs through 
the Production Possibility Set (PPS). A production function defines the relationship between 
inputs and outputs. For a given level of inputs, the production function defines the maximum 
attainable level of output that can be produced. Mas-Colell et al (1995) assume a firm has 𝐽 
inputs to produce a single output. The technical possibilities of the firm can be summarised 
using the production function: 
 
                                              𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑥)                                  (3.1)         
 
Where 𝑞 represents the output and 𝑥 represents an 𝐽 by 1 vector of inputs; 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝐽)
′ 
for this part of the analysis, we assume that the inputs are controllable by the firm. The 
properties of the production function outlined by Mas-Coelell et al (1995) will be discussed 
briefly as they underpin the economic analysis of measuring efficiency. The properties are: 
 Non-negativity – The production function is finite, non-negative and is a real number.  
 Weak Essentiality –  The production of output is impossible without one input 
 Nondecreasing in x –  Additional units of inputs will not decrease the output produced. 
More formally if 𝑥0 ≥ 𝑥1 then 𝑓(𝑥0) ≥ 𝑓(𝑥1) 
 Concave in x – A linear combination of 𝑥0 and 𝑥1 will produce an output that is no less 
than the same linear combination of 𝑓(𝑥0)  and 𝑓(𝑥1) . Formally 𝑓(𝜃𝑥0 +  (1 −
𝜃)𝑥1) ≥  𝜃𝑓(𝑥0) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑓(𝑥1)  where 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 . Concavity implies that all 
marginal products are non-increasing.  
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Note that these properties are not exhaustive, nor are they universally maintained. Mas-Colell 
et al (1995) assume that producers are on the frontier and therefore, the producer is efficient.  
The production function examines the one output and multiple inputs case. This can be 
extended to multiple inputs and multiple outputs through a production possibility set (PPS). 
The PPS describes all input and output combinations that are technologically feasible (Varian, 
1992). 
The production possibility set can be outlined following Fare and Primont (1995).  We can 
consider an input vector 𝑥 =  (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐽) used to produce an output vector 𝑦 =  (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑅) in 
a technology involving 𝑁 production units.  The technology set is defined as: 
      𝑇 =  {(𝑥, 𝑦) |𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦}       (3.2) 
The set contains all input-output vectors (𝑥, 𝑦) such that 𝑥 can produce 𝑞. 
The production technology 𝑇 can be represented as either an input or output set. The input set 
𝐿(𝑦)consists of all input vectors 𝑥 that can produce a given output vector 𝑦.  
       𝐿(𝑦) =  {𝑥|(𝑥, 𝑦)𝜖 𝑇}        (3.3) 
Given the basic assumption of the production technology, the following properties of the input 
sets can be derived:  
1. 𝐿(𝑦) is closed for all 𝑦; 
2. 𝐿(𝑦) is convex for all 𝑦; 
3. Inputs are said to be weakly disposable if 𝑥 𝜖 𝐿(𝑦) then, for all 𝜆 ≥ 1, 𝜆𝑥 𝜖 𝐿(𝑦); and  
4. Inputs are said to be strongly disposable if 𝑥 𝜖 𝐿(𝑦) and if 𝑥∗ ≥ 𝑥 then 𝑥∗𝜖 𝐿(𝑦).  
The output set 𝑃(𝑥), also known as the production possibility set, is the subset of all output 
vectors 𝑦  that can be produced using the input vector 𝑥. 
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         𝑃(𝑥) =  {𝑦|(𝑥, 𝑦)𝜖 𝑇}         (3.4) 
The properties of the output can be summarised for each 𝑥 the output set 𝑃(𝑥) is assumed to 
satisfy: 
1. 0 𝜖 𝑃(𝑥); nothing can be produced from a given set of inputs (i.e., inaction is possible);  
2. Non-zero output levels cannot be produced from zero level of inputs;  
3. 𝑃(𝑥) satisfies strong disposability of outputs: if 𝑞 𝜖 𝑃(𝑥) and 𝑞∗ ≤ 𝑞 then 𝑞∗ 𝜖 𝑃(𝑥); 
4. 𝑃(𝑥) satisfies strong disposability of inputs: if 𝑞 can be produced from 𝑥, then 𝑞 can 
be produced from any 𝑥∗ ≥ 𝑥; 
5. 𝑃(𝑥) is closed; 
6. 𝑃(𝑥) is bounded; and  
7. 𝑃(𝑥) is convex.  
Given the production possibility set, Farrell (1957) measures input-orientation technical 
efficiency by examining the radial contraction of inputs given the amount of outputs whilst 
remaining within the feasible set. The Farrell input technical efficiency measure of DMU 𝑛 is 
defined in equation (3.5) by Fare and Lovell (1978) and Fare et al (1985).  
                𝜃𝑛 = min{𝜃|𝜃𝑥 𝜖 𝐿(𝑦)}                 (3.5) 
𝜃 is the proportional reduction of inputs whilst remaining within the input set, which is the 
measurement of Farrell input-orientation efficiency. Technical efficiency can be measured 
under output-orientation, which considers the radial expansion of outputs holding inputs 
constant whilst remaining within the feasible set. The Farrell output technical efficiency for 
DMU 𝑛 can be defined in equation 3.6. 
              𝜙𝑛 = max{𝜙|𝜙𝑦 𝜖 𝑃(𝑥)}              (3.6) 
40 
 
𝜙 is the proportional expansion of outputs whilst remaining within the output set, which is the 
measurement of Farrell output-orientation efficiency.  
3.3 Economic Efficiency 
 
Technical efficiency has been outlined, which examines the use of inputs and outputs relative 
to the production possibility set. However, producers have to make decisions given input and 
output prices.  Economic efficiency can be measured through the utilisation of price data and 
the specification an economic objective. Economic efficiency can measure cost efficiency and 
revenue efficiency. Cost efficiency makes the assumption that firms aim to minimise costs 
given input prices. Cost efficiency is measured as the ratio of minimal feasible costs and actual 
costs.  
Revenue efficiency assumes firms aim to maximise revenue given output prices. Revenue 
efficiency is measure as the ratio of maximum feasible revenue and actual revenue. Farrell 
(1957) proposed that economic efficiency can be divided into two components, the first being 
technical efficiency as discussed above while the second component is allocative efficiency. 
Allocative efficiency for input orientation examines the combination of inputs which produces 
a given quantity of outputs at the lowest cost. For output-orientation, allocative efficiency 
determines the combination of outputs to maximise revenue. 
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3.3.1 Cost Function  
 
Economic efficiency under input-orientation can be measured through the estimation of a cost 
function, whereby firms aim to minimise costs. The cost minimisation problem of a firm can 
be written in equation 3.8 where 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑥) is the production technology.  
                𝑐(𝑤, 𝑦) = min
𝑥
𝑤′𝑥     𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑥) = 0                 (3.8) 
Here 𝑤 =  (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛)′  is a vector of input prices. The problem searches over all 
technically feasible input-output combinations to find the input quantities to produce the output 
vector 𝑦 at the lowest cost. The cost function satisfies the following properties (Coelli et al, 
(2005) 
1. Non-negativity: Costs can never be negative  
2. Non-decreasing in w:  An increase in input prices will not decrease costs. If 𝑤0 ≥ 𝑤1 
then 𝑐(𝑤0, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑐(𝑤1, 𝑦) 
3. Non-decreasing in q:  It costs more to produce more output. If 𝑦0 ≥ 𝑦1  then 
𝑐(𝑤, 𝑦0) ≥ 𝑐(𝑤, 𝑦1) 
4. Homogeneity:  Multiplying all input prices by an amount 𝑘 > 0 will lead to a 𝑘-fold 
increase in costs. 𝑐(𝑘𝑤, 𝑦) = 𝑘𝑐(𝑤, 𝑦) for 𝑘 > 0.  
5. Concave in w: 𝑐(𝜃𝑤0 +  (1 − 𝜃)𝑤1, 𝑦) ≥  𝜃𝑐(𝑤0, 𝑞) +  (1 − 𝜃)𝑐(𝑤1, 𝑦)  for all     
0 ≤  𝜃 ≤ 1.  
Farrell (1957) demonstrate the cost minimisation problem by assuming that a firm has two 
inputs 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, produces one output 𝑦 and assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), depicted 
in figure 3.1. If a firm exhibits CRS any proportional increase or decrease in inputs, the outputs 
will increase or decrease respectively in the same proportion. 𝑆𝑆′ shows the firm’s isoquant, 
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the optimal combination of inputs to produce a given amount of output which is assumed to be 
known. Farrell (1957) assumes that the firm uses inputs at point p; therefore it is technically 
inefficient as the firm could use fewer inputs to produce the same level of outputs.  
Technical efficiency is measured by the amount in which inputs can be proportionally 
contracted and still produce the same level is output, measured by the distance QP. The 
technical efficiency score of the firm is calculated by ratio OQ/OP, which takes a value between 
0 and 1. If a firm lies on the frontier it is technically efficient and therefore has an efficiency 
score of 1. Alongside the measure of technical efficiency, one can measure the extent in which 
firms use the correct combination of inputs given their input prices; allocative efficiency. 
Farrell (1957) notes that the line AA’ shows the ratio of prices, and given the input prices the 
cost minimising point of production is 𝑄′.  
Allocative efficiency measures the degree of inefficiency from using the wrong combination 
of inputs, measured by the ratio OR/OQ. The allocative efficiency score also takes a value 
between 0 and 1, where a score of 1 indicates that the firm is utilising the input resources in the 
optimal combinations. Comparing the technical efficient level of inputs 𝑄  and the cost 
minimising level of inputs 𝑄′, to achieve allocative efficiency input 𝑥1 should be increased and 
𝑥2 should be decreased. Therefore input  𝑥1 is underutilised whereas 𝑥2 is over-utilised. Cost 
efficiency (CE) is calculated as the ratio of actual costs and optimal costs given the input prices. 
This is measured as 𝑤𝑥∗/𝑤𝑥, where 𝑤 are the input prices, 𝑥 is the actual inputs and 𝑥∗ is the 
optimal inputs at point 𝑄′. Alternatively, cost efficiency is calculated as the ratio OR/OP. The 
product of technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) is equal to cost efficiency 
(CE), 𝐶𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸 × 𝐴𝐸 . Farrell (1957) does highlight that the measure is not “entirely 
conclusive” as the level of technical efficiency may change as the combination of inputs alter. 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Revenue Function 
Economic efficiency under output-orientation is measured through a revenue function whereby 
firms aim to maximise revenue given the level of inputs. The revenue maximisation problem 
can be written as: 
            𝑟(𝑝, 𝑥) =  max
𝑦
𝑝′𝑦    𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑥) = 0           (3.9) 
Where 𝑝 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑀)′ is a vector of output prices over which the firm has no influence 
and 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑥)  is the production technology. The revenue function satisfies the following 
properties: 
1. Non-negativity: Revenue can never be negative  
Fig. 3.1: Input-Orientation 
Q 
𝑥1/𝑦 
𝑥2/𝑦 
A 
A’ 
Q’ 
P 
R 
S 
S’ 
Source:  Farrell (1957) 
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2. Non-decreasing in p:  An increase in output prices will not decrease revenue. If 𝑝0 ≥
𝑝1 then 𝑟(𝑝0, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑟(𝑝1, 𝑥) 
3. Non-decreasing in x: If 𝑥0 ≥ 𝑥1  then (𝑝, 𝑥0) ≥ 𝑟(𝑝, 𝑥1)  : An increase in inputs 
producers more output.  
4. Homogeneity:  Multiplying all output prices by an amount 𝑘 > 0 will lead to a 𝑘-fold 
increase in revenue. 𝑟(𝑘𝑝, 𝑥) = 𝑘𝑟(𝑝, 𝑥) for 𝑘 > 0.  
5. Convex in p:  𝑟(𝜃𝑝0 +  (1 − 𝜃)𝑝1, 𝑥) ≥  𝜃𝑟(𝑝0, 𝑥) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑟(𝑝1, 𝑥)  for all         
0 ≤  𝜃 ≤ 1.  
 
Farrell (1957) demonstrates the measurement of efficiency applying a revenue function in 
figure 3.2 if we assume that a firm is producing two outputs 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 from a single input 𝑥. 
Assuming again for completeness that the firm has constant returns to scale, we can depict the 
technology by a single production possibility curve (ZZ’) which shows the optimal 
combination of outputs given inputs. If the firm produces at point 𝐴 it is technically inefficient, 
as it could produce additional outputs given the level of inputs. The technical efficiency of the 
firm A is measured by OA/OB; this is the radial expansion of outputs, given inputs to the 
production possibility curve. DD’ shows the output price ratio, given inputs the firm maximises 
revenue at 𝐵′. Allocative efficiency is the degree of inefficiency from producing the wrong 
combination of outputs, measured by OB/OC. Comparing the technical efficient level of 
outputs 𝐵 and the revenue maximising level of output 𝐵′, to obtain allocative efficiency the 
output level 𝑦1 should be increased and 𝑦2 should be decreased. Finally, we can calculate the 
revenue efficiency (RE) as the ratio of actual revenue and maximum revenue  𝑝𝑦∗/𝑝𝑦 where 
𝑝 is the price of outputs, 𝑦 is the actual outputs and 𝑦∗is the optimal outputs at point 𝐵′, or 
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measured by the ratio OA/OC. Revenue efficiency can be decomposed into technical and 
allocative efficiency 𝑅𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸 × 𝐴𝐸.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Technical Change  
 
Coelli et al (2005) note that technology changes within an industry can be considered when 
efficiency is measured over time. This can be shown through the movement of the production 
function. When technology within the industry is increased, the industry-wide production 
function will be shifted outwards this is shown in figure 3.3. Alternatively, the industry can 
experience technological regression whereby the frontier shifts inwards. If panel data is used, 
which measures variation across time and firms, efficiency changes can be broken down into 
Fig. 3.2: Output-Orientation  
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Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
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individual firm changes and also changes in technology within the industry which is explored 
in section 3.6.5.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Efficiency and Productivity 
 
The performance of a firm can be measured by the concepts of efficiency and productivity. As 
previously defined, the efficiency of a producer is calculated as the ratio of observed output 
and the maximum potential output for the given inputs, known as output-orientation. On the 
other hand efficiency can be examined under input-orientation which examines the ratio of the 
observed inputs and the minimum potential inputs to produce a given amount of outputs             
(Fried et al, 2008). The optimal values are determined either through the production possibility 
Fig. 3.3: Technology Shift 
Inputs 
Outputs 
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Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
47 
 
set, by measuring technical efficiency or through an economic (cost, revenue or profit) 
function, measuring economic efficiency. 
Productivity is calculated as the ratio of inputs and outputs produced by a firm:  
                𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠⁄                           (3.10)      
The higher the value of the productivity measure, the more productive a firm is; the firm is 
more productive in converting inputs into outputs. A firm can increase the measure of 
productivity through either decreasing the number of inputs for a given number of outputs or 
increasing the level of output given inputs. When a firm uses numerous inputs or produces 
numerous outputs, aggregation techniques have to be employed to measure productivity. 
Productivity can be calculated including all factor inputs, denoted as total factor productivity 
or alternatively calculations of productivity may only take into consideration some of the 
factors of production, denoted as partial factor productivity e.g. labour productivity. The 
difference between efficiency and productivity is the former examines the ratio relative to the 
optimal amount.  
Coelli et al (2005) note that the terms productivity and efficiency are usually used 
interchangeably. In order to distinguish the difference between them they consider a simple 
production process where there is one output and one input. In figure 3.4, FF’ is the production 
frontier, Coelli et al (2005) consider points B and C which are both technically efficient points. 
If we draw a ray from the origin going through both points we can calculate the productivity 
ratio. The ray will show the ratio 𝑦/𝑥 or outputs/inputs; if the firm moves from point B to point 
C its productivity is increased. The ray going through point C is tangential to the production 
function and this is the maximum possible productivity. The movement from point B to C 
exploits scale economies, which is the increased efficiency due to firms producing at their 
optimal size. This shows that a firm can be technically efficient but not necessarily at the 
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maximum obtainable productivity level. This section has outlined two concepts for the 
measurement of the performance of a firm. Efficiency is the main concept to be examined 
within this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 The Measurement of Efficiency  
 
The measurement of efficiency involves the comparison of the firm’s actual performance with 
the optimal performance located on the relevant frontier. Within most industries the true 
frontier is unknown; therefore an empirical estimate is required, known as the best practice 
frontier (Fried et al, 2008).  The following section will outline the several techniques to measure 
efficiency. The techniques can be characterised as parametric and non-parametric. DEA is 
representative of a non-parametric frontier and a cost function and SFA are parametric 
approaches. This chapter will outline the concepts of a cost function, SFA and DEA, for the 
Figure 3.4: Productivity vs. Efficiency 
Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
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measurement of efficiency. The thesis employs three extensions of DEA to measure 
convergence, the inclusion of environmental variables and dynamic DEA. The chapter will 
therefore provide a detailed outline of the basic DEA model.  
3.6.1 Parametric deterministic frontier  
 
The production function or isoquant has been assumed to be known. In some engineering or 
physical production processes it is possible to determine the exact functional form of the 
production function. However, in most industries the exact production function is unknown. 
An approximation of the production or cost function is specified through an algebraic 
(functional) form between the dependent and explanatory variables. Through the estimation of 
the functional form, efficiency can be analysed through the deviation of actual costs from the 
optimal costs.   
Cobb-Douglas Function Form  
The Cobb-Douglas functional form of the production function is widely used to represent the 
relationship of inputs and outputs, developed by Cobb and Douglas (1928). The Cobb-Douglas 
form is: 
      𝑇𝐶 = 𝛼0 ∏ 𝑌𝑟
𝛼𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
∏ 𝑊𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
         (3.11) 
Taking logarithms  
     ln 𝑇𝐶 = ln 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
ln 𝑌𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
      (3.12) 
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Where, 𝑇𝐶 is total costs, 𝑌𝑟 is the rth output, 𝑊𝑗 is the price of the jth input and 𝛼0, 𝛼𝑖and 𝛽𝑗 
are parameters to be estimated. The Cobb-Douglas cost function is homogeneous of degree one 
in input prices if ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 = 1. Linear homogeneity implies a proportional increase of all input 
prices and results in the same proportional increase in costs. Linear homogeneity restriction is 
imposed within the estimation of a cost function. The restriction of the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function is that the first order approximation exhibits constant elasticity of scale. To overcome 
this disadvantage, more flexible functional forms have been developed, such as the translog 
functional form.  
Translog Functional Form  
Christensen et al (1973) developed the translog (transcendental logarithmic) production 
function, which is a second-order Taylor expansion as a local approximation of the “true” 
underlying production function. The translog cost function is specified as:  
ln 𝑇𝐶 =  𝛿 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑗
ln 𝑊𝑗 +  ∑ 𝜒𝑟
𝑟
ln 𝑌𝑟 +
1
2
∑ ∑ γjvln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑣
𝑣𝑗
+  ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑗𝑟 ln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑌𝑟
𝑟𝑗
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑟,𝑧
𝑧
ln 𝑌𝑟 ln 𝑌𝑧
𝑟
             (3.13) 
Where TC is total costs, 𝑌𝑟is the rth output, 𝑊𝑗 is the price of the jth input. To impose linear 
homogeneity in input prices, the following restrictions are imposed on the parameters:  
       ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑗
= 1 ,    ∑ 𝛾𝑗,𝑣
𝑗
= 0 , ∑ 𝜅𝑗,𝑦
𝑗
= 0          (3.14) 
 
In addition, symmetry restrictions are imposed on the second-order parameters: 
          𝜉𝑟,𝑧 = 𝜉𝑧,𝑟 ,  γjv = γvj,  𝜅𝑗𝑟 = 𝜅𝑟𝑗           (3.15) 
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The tranlog cost function allows for variable returns to scale and the estimation of the typical 
U-shaped average cost curve. The translog cost function has been applied within the empirical 
literature within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry by Saal and Parker (2000), 
Saal and Reid (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) to examine efficiency and the presence of 
economies of scale.  
Quadratic Cost Function 
The translog cost function does not easily allow for the incorporation of zero values. To allow 
the researcher to incorporate zero values for sewerage for WoCs Saal et al (2011) employ a 
quadratic cost function which is specified as:  
𝑇𝐶𝑛 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑅
𝑟=1
 𝑌𝑟 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑊𝑗 + 
𝐽
𝑗=1
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑟
𝑅
𝑚=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
𝑌𝑟𝑌𝑚 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑙𝑊𝑗𝑊𝑙
𝐽
𝑙=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+  ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑟𝑗𝑌𝑟𝑊𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
                    (3.16) 
Where 𝑇𝐶 is the total cost, 𝑌𝑟 is the quantity of output 𝑟 and 𝑊𝑗 is the price of input 𝑗. Other 
functional forms have been applied within the measurement of costs functions. Diewert (1971) 
proposed the generalised Leontief cost function.  
The functional form can be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) or Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).  
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3.6.2 Concept of Regression Analysis for Measuring Efficiency  
 
The functional forms for the cost functions can be estimated through OLS or Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). The first technique considered for measuring efficiency is OLS. 
OLS is applied by Ofwat within their measurement of efficiency through a series of linear 
regressions of explanatory variables on costs. OLS is a parametric technique which aims to 
measure efficiency through the estimation of the average cost functions through a linear 
regression. In respect to efficiency analysis, OLS aims to identify the relationships between the 
industry’s costs and their associated cost drivers. As OLS measures an average cost function, 
this means that some companies will be more efficient whilst others less efficient than the 
average. The degree of efficiency is measured through the residuals, which show the difference 
between actual costs and estimated costs. The technique of using OLS for measuring efficiency 
and standard OLS differ in the assumption of the residuals. In traditional OLS it is assumed 
that the residuals are due to statistical noise, whereas in this case the residuals are assumed to 
be due to inefficiencies. 
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In figure 3.5, the OLS regression line is the estimated costs function. Any firm that is above 
the regression line is classified as inefficient, as for a given output level their actual costs are 
higher than the estimated costs. A firm below the regression line is classified as efficient, as 
for a given level of output their actual costs are lower than the estimated costs. The level of 
efficiency is shown by the vertical line going up to the regression line. The standard 
benchmarking technique is to benchmark against the industry best, whereas OLS benchmarks 
against the industry average. A benchmark company within the industry can be established by 
employing Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) shown in figure 3.6. COLS shifts the 
regression line downwards until it intersects with the most efficient firm within the industry, 
which is assumed to be 100% efficient. In this case, firm A is the most efficient, therefore all 
firms that are not on the frontier are considered as inefficient.  
Fig. 3.5: OLS efficiency measurement  
Output 
Cost 
A 
OLS regression line  
B 
C 
Source: Authors Illustration  
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If we compare the results from OLS and COLS, we can see that COLS always produces larger 
inefficiency scores. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) noted that the simplicity of COLS comes 
with problems, COLS is obtained by a parallel shift of the OLS regression. This implies that 
the structure of the best practice production technology is the same as the industry average. In 
practice the structure of the production technology is likely to differ between the best in the 
industry and the average, and therefore COLS does not bound the data as closely as possible 
since the parallel shift is required. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6: Correct Ordinary Least Squares  
Output 
Cost 
A 
OLS regression line  
B 
C 
COLS Frontier 
Source: Authors Illustration 
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3.6.3 Measuring Cost Function Using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
 
The deterministic cost function is typically estimated alongside the cost share equations which 
are derived from the translog cost function.  The estimation of both the translog cost function 
and cost share equation allows for additional information to be utilised. As the errors between 
the translog and costs share equations are correlated a more efficient estimation can be obtained 
using Zellner (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). A translog cost function with 
one output (𝑌) and three inputs is shown in equation (3.17) where 𝑊 is a 1 by 3 vector of input 
prices.  
ln 𝑇𝐶 = 𝛼1 +  𝛽𝑟 ln 𝑌 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗
3
𝑗=1
ln 𝑊𝑗 +
1
2
𝜌𝑟𝑟 ln 𝑌 ln 𝑌 +
1
2
∑ ∑ λlvln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑙
3
𝑙=1
3
𝑗=1
+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑟
3
𝑗=1
ln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑌           (3.17) 
The cost share equation is obtained by taking the derivative of the cost function with respect to 
input prices  
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝑊𝑗
=  
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝑊𝑗
𝐶
. Shephard’s lemma states that the quantity demanded of the jth 
input is 𝑋𝑗 =
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑊𝑗
, substituting the result 
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝑊𝑗
=  
𝑊𝑗𝑋𝑗
𝐶
=  𝑆𝑗 where 𝑋𝑗 is the quantity of 𝑗 used 
and 𝑆𝑗 is the cost share for input 𝑗. The cost share equations follow: 
𝑠1 =  
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝑊1
=  𝛾1 + ∑ 𝜆1𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑗 +
3
𝑗=1
𝜃𝑟,1 ln 𝑌 +  𝜀1 
𝑠2 =  
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝑊2
=  𝛾2 + ∑ 𝜆2𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑗 +
3
𝑗=1
𝜃𝑟,2 ln 𝑌 + 𝜀2 
                     𝑠3 =  
𝜕 ln 𝐶
𝜕 ln 𝑊3
=  𝛾3 +  ∑ 𝜆3𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑗 +
3
𝑗=1
𝜃𝑟,3 ln 𝑌 +  𝜀3            (3.18) 
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The cost shares sum to a value of 1; therefore one of the equations must be deleted to ensure 
linear independence and to avoid singularity of the error covariance matrix. The level of 
efficiency is the error term, although this has a two-sided distribution and a true measure of 
efficiency should have a one-sided distribution.  
3.6.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) proposed by Aigner et al (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) 
and Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977) is a frontier approach which extends upon the 
estimation of a cost function to allow for the deviation from the frontier that is not under the 
control of the DMU, the incorporation of noise alongside the measurement of efficiency. SFA 
decomposes the error term into two sections: firstly the traditionally assumed symmetric 
random noise component, and secondly a one-sided inefficient component. The composite of 
the error terms therefore are skewed negatively for the case of the production function and will 
exhibit a negative mean.  The SFA production frontier is written as: 
ln 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑛 − 𝑢𝑛       (3.19) 
Where 𝑦𝑛 is a vector of outputs for firm 𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁, 𝑥𝑛 is a vector of inputs and 𝑣𝑛 is a two-
sided error term component and 𝑢𝑛 is a non-negative disturbance, which represents technical 
efficiency. If a DMU is technically efficient (𝑢𝑛) = 0, the production function takes the form: 
ln 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖       (3.20) 
Coelli et al (2005) note that the frontier can be drawn in figure 3.7 where they plot the inputs 
and outputs of two firms and they note the production frontier exhibits diminishing returns to 
57 
 
scale. Inputs are shown on the horizontal axis and outputs on the vertical. The graph shows that 
firm A uses the input level 𝑥𝐴 to produce output 𝑦𝐴 and firm B uses 𝑥𝐵 to produce 𝑦𝐵.  
  𝑦𝐴
∗ = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐴 + 𝑣𝐴)   𝑎𝑛𝑑                         
𝑦𝐵
∗ = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑥𝐵 + 𝑣𝐵)            (3.21)    
 
The frontier output in equation 3.21 for firm A, which excludes inefficiency lies above the 
deterministic production frontier due to a positive noise effect whereas firm B lies below due 
to a negative noise effect. The observed output of firms A and B; 𝑦𝐴 and 𝑦𝐵 lies below the 
frontier as the sum of the inefficiency term and the noise term is negative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
𝑦𝐴
∗ = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑣𝐴) 
𝑦𝐵
∗ = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑣𝐵) 
𝑥𝑛 𝑥𝐵 𝑥𝐴 
Noise effect 
Inefficiency 
effect 
Noise effect 
Inefficiency effect 
𝑦𝐵 = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑣𝐵 − 𝑢𝐵) 
𝑦𝐴 = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑥𝐴 + 𝑣𝐴 − 𝑢𝐴) 
Deterministic Frontier  
𝑦𝑖 = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑛) 
𝑦𝑛 
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Coelli et al (2005) note that the unobserved frontier; which includes noise is evenly distributed 
above and below the observed deterministic frontier. The observed output tends to lie below 
the deterministic frontier due to the inefficiency component. Input-oriented technical efficiency 
for multiple inputs and outputs can be measured through an SFA input distance function 
introduced proposed by Lovell et al (1994).  
Cost efficiency can be measured through the estimation of a cost function if input prices and 
total cost data are available.  The cost frontier allows the extension of allowing for variable 
inputs and quazi-fixed inputs. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) note that the cost function 
requires behaviour assumptions. The SFA cost function takes the form:  
ln 𝐶𝑛 = ln 𝐶(𝑦𝑛, 𝑤𝑛) + 𝑣𝑛 + 𝑢𝑛        (3.22) 
Here, 𝐶𝑛 is the observed total costs, 𝑦𝑛 is a vector of outputs, 𝑤𝑛 is an input price view, 𝑣𝑛 is a 
two-sided noise component and 𝑢𝑛 is a nonnegative disturbance which represents an individual 
firm’s deviation from the efficient cost frontier; the firm’s cost efficiency.  
SFA is estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) and requires additional distributional 
assumptions for both of the error terms. The two-sided error term 𝑣𝑖  is independent and 
identically normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝑣
2 , 𝑣𝑛~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) . Several 
distributional assumptions have been outlined for the distribution of the one-sided managerial 
inefficiency error term: half-normal, truncated normal, exponential and gamma. The most 
common distributional assumption is half normal distribution proposed by Aigner et al (1977) 
and Mester (1993). The assumption of half normal distribution imposes the restriction that most 
firms are clustered near efficient and that higher degrees of inefficiency are increasingly 
unlikely (Berger, 1993). Stevenson (1980) and Greene (1980a,b) consider the normal-gamma 
distribution, which is a more flexible distribution but it can be difficult to separate the 
inefficiency from the random error.  
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3.6.5 Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
DEA is a non-parametric methodology which employs linear programming to construct a non-
parametric piecewise surface (or frontier) over the data. DEA was developed by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) (CCR). Efficiency is calculated as the distance relative of the DMU 
to the frontier. The level of efficiency is determined by a comparison to a single reference 
DMU or a convex combination of other referent DMUs located on the efficient frontier 
(Charnes et al, 1994). One of the advantages of DEA is it does not require any assumptions 
with regards to the functional form. Instead of specifying a functional form for the cost or 
production function, inputs and outputs are linked through a PPS in equation 3.2. DEA is 
advantageous by incorporating multiple inputs and outputs which are not required to be 
analogous (Cooper et al, 2006). Within the same model, inputs in monetary value can be 
incorporated alongside inputs in physical units.  
On the other hand DEA has a series of limitations. Firstly, DEA measures relative efficiency 
not absolute efficiency, therefore efficiency is relative to the peers within the reference set, not 
a theoretical frontier. DEA assumes that the data is measurement free (Mester, 1996). DEA 
makes the implicit assumption of homogeneity (Golany and Roll, 1989). Homogeneity 
assumes that all firms undertake the same activities and operate in the same environment. 
Several extensions within the literature have been developed to overcome several of these 
limitations; the incorporation of environmental variables and bootstrapping techniques to 
incorporate measurement noise.  
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3.6.5.1 Input-Orientation 
 
DEA can be measured using either an input or output oriented approach. The input-orientation 
approach as described by Farrell (1957) examines the proportional reduction of inputs given 
the amount of outputs whilst remaining within the feasible set. To illustrate input-orientation 
DEA, Coelli et al (2005) assume a case with two inputs and one output. They plot the             
input-output ratios for each input and plot those against each other, then the envelope can then 
be distinguished by creating a convex linear hull around the data. The data points can be 
enveloped within the region enclosed by the frontier with the horizontal line passing through 5 
and the vertical line through 2. This is the piecewise linear production possibility set. In the 
case for input-orientation all points have to be above the frontier, except those firms that are 
efficient and lie on the frontier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.8: Input-Orientation DEA 
Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
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In this case, firm 2 and 5 are efficient as they are on the frontier. The remainder of the DMUs 
are inefficient as they could reduce their inputs and remain within the feasible set. If we 
consider firm 1, its efficiency score 𝜃 is calculated by the radial contraction of inputs to the 
frontier measured by the ratio 01′/01, where the point 1’ is the point that crosses the frontier 
when considering the ray from the origin to point 1. 𝜃 takes a value between 0 and 1, where 1 
represents that the firm is efficient. The radial contraction of inputs to be efficient is given by 
𝜃.  
DEA allows for the measurement of efficiency alongside the assessment of the target inputs or 
outputs and the determination of a firm’s peer group. Charnes et al. (1994) state that the level 
of efficiency is determined by a comparison to a single reference DMU or a convex 
combination of other referent DMUs located on the efficient frontier, known as the peer group. 
The peer group is the set of points on the frontier in which the line connecting the origin and 
the point of consideration intersects. Therefore, for point 1 firm number 2 is its peer group, 
whereas the peer group for firm 3 is 2 and 5. This shows that for point 3 to be at its optimal 
efficiency, the firm’s inputs weights should be a combination of the levels of inputs used by 
firm 2 and 5. 
DEA uses mathematical linear programming to find the set of weights for each firm 
𝜆1, 𝜆2, … , 𝜆𝑛  that maximises efficiency subject to constraints. Using Coelli et al (2005) 
notation, if we assume there are data on 𝐽 inputs and 𝑅 outputs for each 𝑁 firm. For notation 
we say 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑦𝑛 are the input and output vectors respectively. The 𝐽
∗𝑁 input matrix 𝑋 and the 
𝑅∗𝑁 output matrix 𝑌 represent all the data for the 𝑁 firms. The problem involves finding the 
optimal weights to maximise the firm’s efficiency subject to the constraint that the efficiency 
score must be less than or equal to one. Each firm is assigned a best set of weights and the 
values can vary from firm to firm.  
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The mathematical linear programming solution for input-orientation under CRS introduced by 
Charnes et al (1978) (CCR) is shown equation 3.23 which creates an envelope of the data. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆 𝜃 
𝑠𝑡      − 𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0, 
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0, 
                                𝜆 ≥ 0                     (3.23) 
𝜆 is an 𝑁∗1  is a vector of constants 𝜃 is a scalar which is the efficiency score for the 𝑛𝑡ℎ firm. 
Farrell (1957) measure of efficiency 𝜃 takes a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 
indicates a point on the frontier and indicates that the firm is technically efficient. The problem 
is solve 𝑁 times until each firm has a value of  𝜃. Coelli et al (2005) denote that in the problem 
above, the 𝑛𝑡ℎ  firms seeks to radially contract the input vector 𝑥  whilst remaining in the 
feasible set. This is done by choosing optimal weights for each firm; we note that the weights 
may be different for each firm within the data. The feasible set here is determined by the 
observed decision making units within the sample and is a piecewise linear isoquant. The linear 
contraction assigns weights to inputs and outputs (𝑋𝜆, 𝑄𝜆), which is a projection point but 
remains within the feasible set (Coelli et al, 2005). 
The optimal value of 𝜃 is independent of the units in which the inputs and outputs are measured 
provided that the units are the same for each firm. If we multiply each unit of input by a constant 
the solution obtained will be the same, known as the unit invariance property.  
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3.6.5.2 Output-Orientation 
 
Output-orientation measures technical efficiency as proportional expansion of outputs to the 
frontier whilst holding input levels the same.  Figure 3.9 depicts the production possibility for 
two outputs. Firms operating within the PPS are inefficient as the level of output is lower than 
the maximum attainable set. When using output-orientation, efficiency is calculated as the 
radial expansion in outputs to the frontier measured by the ratio 𝑂1′/𝑂1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.9: Output-Orientation DEA 
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Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
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Output-orientation DEA is calculated using the linear programme in figure 3.24 which 
maximises 𝜙 and 𝜆. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜙𝜆  𝜙 
𝑠𝑡   − 𝜙𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝑥𝑛 −  𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
                                       𝜆 ≥ 0                          (3.24) 
 
Here 1 ≤ 𝜙 < ∞ and 𝜙 is the proportional increase in outputs to achieve the highest level of 
efficiency for the 𝑛𝑡ℎ firm when all inputs are held constant. Therefore, 1/𝜙 is the technical 
efficiency score which is bounded between 0 and 1. 
The decision of whether efficiency is examined under input or output-orientation depends on 
if input or outputs are easier to vary within the chosen industry.  Input-orientation is assumed 
for the measurement of efficiency for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry by 
Thanassoulis (2000a,b), Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) as the 
demand level faced by suppliers is exogenous, and therefore inputs are easier to vary. 
3.6.5.3 Variable Returns to Scale  
 
The model considered above is assumed to have Constant Returns to Scale (CRS), which 
assumes that firms are producing at their optimal level. A firm is operating under CRS if a 
proportional increase in inputs results in the same proportional increase in outputs. Increasing 
Returns to Scale (IRS) indicates that outputs increase by more than the proportional increase 
in inputs whereas Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) is the situation when outputs increase by 
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proportionally less than the increase in inputs. Coelli et al (2005) highlight that CRS is only an 
appropriate assumption when all firms are operating at an optimal scale. However, it can be 
argued that some firms may not be working at their optimal level due the presence of imperfect 
competition, government regulations, constraints on finance etcetera and therefore may be 
subject to scale inefficiencies. The use of VRS does not assume that the firm is operating at its 
optimal size and therefore scale efficiencies are not taken into consideration when determining 
the level of technical efficiency. The measure of efficiency using CRS combines both technical 
and scale efficiencies, therefore the difference between the efficiency measured under VRS 
and CRS is attributed to scale efficiencies. Scale efficiency measures the impact of the scale 
size on productivity, either the firm is too large and is operating under DRS or the firm is too 
small and is operating under IRS. The use of VRS has been suggested by many authors 
including Afrait (1972), Fare et al (1983) and Banker et al (1984).  
The use of VRS can be shown graphically in figure 3.10 when considering a firm that produces 
one output using one input. The graph shows both the CRS and the VRS frontiers. If we 
consider point B, under CRS the technical efficiency ratio of this firm is give by 𝑃𝐵𝑐/𝑃𝐵, 
whereas under VRS the technical efficiency is 𝑃𝐵𝑣/𝑃𝐵. Therefore the difference in these ratios 
is due to scale efficiencies which is 𝑃𝐵𝑐/𝑃𝐵𝑣 . As stated previously, the CRS ratio can be 
decomposed into technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Therefore 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆 × 𝑆𝐸, 
where 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆 and 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆 denotes technical efficiency under CRS and VRS respectively, and SE 
denotes scale efficiency. 𝑆𝐸 takes a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 indicates that 
the DMU is scale efficient, whereby 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆.  
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Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), known as BCC note that CRS linear programming can 
easily be transformed to allow for VRS by adding the constraint: 𝐼1′𝜆 = 1 to equation 3.1 to 
produce the equation 3.25. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆  𝜃 
𝑠𝑡             −𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝐼1′𝜆 = 1 
                                         𝜆 ≥ 0                          (3.25) 
 
Fig. 3.10: CRS and VRS 
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Source: Coelli et al (2005) 
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Here, 𝐼1 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones. Coelli et al (2005) note that this approach creates a convex 
envelope which is tighter than that produced by CRS. VRS produces technical efficiency scores 
that are greater or equal to those produced by CRS. The constraint  𝐼1′𝜆 = 1 is the convexity 
constraint. The convexity constraint prevents any interpolation points constructed by the DMU 
being scaled up or down to form a reference point as scaling is not possible under VRS 
(Thanassoulis, 2001). The VRS assumption ensures that firms are only benchmarked against 
those that are of a similar size, where under CRS a firm may be benchmarked against a firm 
which is substantially smaller or larger. If the firm is smaller, then the 𝜆 weights are greater 
than 1, and if the firm is larger, then the 𝜆 weights are less than 1. 
Tone (2001) provides of four sets of properties in which an efficiency measurement should 
satisfy: 
 Unit Invariance: The measure should be invariant with respect to the units of data  
 Monotone: The measure should be monotone decreasing in each slack in input and 
output  
 Translation Invariant: The measure should be invariant under parallel translation of the 
coordinate system applied (Ali and Sieford, 1990; Pastor, 1996) 
 Reference set invariant: The measure should be determined only by consulting the 
reference set of the DMU concerned 
The CCR and BCC DEA models satisfy the properties of being monotone and reference set 
invariance. The CCR and BCC radial measure of efficiency are unit invariant, therefore 
multiplying the inputs by a constant does not alter the efficiency score. However, any input 
slacks, which will be discussed next, are not unit invariant. The CCR and BCC model are not 
translation invariant, therefore adding a constant to an input will skew the efficiency scores.  
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3.6.5.4 Slacks 
 
The Farrell (1957) measure of technical efficiency examines the radial contraction of inputs, 
whereas Koopman (1951) provides a more strict definition of technical efficiency whereby a 
firm is technically efficient if it operates on the frontier and exhibits zero slacks. The problem 
of slacks arises due to the parts of the frontier that run parallel to the axis. This can be shown 
in figure 3.11 obtained from Coelli et al (2005) where we have the piecewise linear function 
which is made up of point C and D. If we consider firm A, which has an efficiency ratio of 
0𝐴′/0𝐴. However it can be questioned whether point 𝐴′ is an efficient point as the amount of 
input 𝑥2 used can be reduced whilst the same level of output is being produced. This is known 
as an input slack. Output slacks can also occur when multiple inputs and multiple outputs are 
considered within the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coelli et al 2005) 
Fig. 3.11: Input Slacks 
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Slacks can be incorporated within the radial measure of efficiency developed by Banker et al 
(1984) for input-orientation and variable returns to scale. In equation 3.26, 𝑠𝑖
− and 𝑠𝑟
+ represent 
the input and output slacks respectively and 𝜀 is a non-Archimedean small positive number. 
The model identifies the DMUs radial efficiency 𝜃 alongside the non-radial efficiency or slacks 
(∑ 𝑠𝑖
−𝐽
𝑗=1 +  ∑ 𝑠𝑟
+𝑅
𝑟=1 ).  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃 + 𝜀 (∑ 𝑠𝑖
−
𝐽
𝑗=1
+  ∑ 𝑠𝑟
+
𝑅
𝑟=1
) 
𝑠𝑡   ∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑛 + 𝑠𝑛
− =  𝜃𝑥𝑛0
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑦𝑟𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ 𝑠𝑟
+ = 𝑦𝑟0  
∑ 𝜆𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
= 1 
𝜆𝑛 ≥ 0;    𝑠𝑛
− ≥ 0;   𝑠𝑟
+ ≥ 0   
                                𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽      𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅     𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁                  (3.26) 
 
One of the desirable properties is that the DEA model is unit invariant, therefore the efficiency 
scores are independent of the unit of measurement. However, Lovell and Pastor (1995) 
highlight that the Banker et al (1984) model is unit invariant with regards to the radial 
component although the slack component is not. The slack component therefore depends on 
the unit of measurement, multiplying the inputs by a fixed constant will change the slacks.  
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Charnes et al (1985) developed the additive model of DEA to incorporate both input and output 
slacks. The dual of the Charnes et al (1985) is shown in equation 3.27 where 𝑠𝑗0
−  and 𝑠𝑟0
+  
represent the input and output slacks for the DMU under evaluation. A DMU is efficient if 
𝑠𝑗0
−∗ = 𝑠𝑟0
+ = 0, therefore the firm exhibits zero input and output slacks.  
max 𝑍 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗0
− +
𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑠𝑟0
+
𝑅
𝑟=1
 
𝑠𝑡     ∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑛 + 𝑠𝑗0
− = 𝑥𝑗0
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
∑ 𝜆𝑛𝑦𝑟𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
− 𝑠𝑟0
+ = 𝑦𝑟0 
∑ 𝜆𝑛 = 1
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
𝜆𝑛 ≥ 0 
𝑠𝑖0
− , 𝑠𝑟0
+ ≥ 0 
                                      𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽      𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅     𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁                    (3.27) 
The additive model determines the inefficiency for each input and output and therefore can 
discriminate between efficient and inefficient DMUs. However, it does not provide an 
efficiency score of 𝜃 which takes a value between zero and one (Tone, 2001). The CCR and 
BCC radial efficiency model is not translation invariant; however, the additive model has the 
desirable property that the results are translation invariant. Tone (2001) develops a slack based 
model, which examines the reduction of input and output slacks. The model provides an 
efficiency score for radial and non-radial efficiency which is unit invariant and monotone 
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decreasing with respect to input excess and output shortfall. Within this thesis dynamic DEA 
measures cost efficiency. Radial efficiency is employed for the measurement of 𝛽-convergence 
and 3-stage DEA to incorporate environmental variables whilst not violating the unit invariance 
property. 
3.6.5.5 Dimensionality  
 
DEA is referred to as a deterministic technique for the measurement of efficiency. The 
efficiency score is measured relative to an estimate of the true (but unknown) production 
function. Estimates are obtained from a finite sample, therefore the measurement of efficiency 
are sensitive to sampling variation (Kneip et al, 1998). A well-known potential issue with 
regards to DEA is the ‘curse of dimensionality’ and the rate of convergence5. Banker (1993) 
shows consistency of the input efficiency estimator 𝜃𝑉𝑅𝑆 with inputs 𝐽 = 1 and outputs 𝑅 ≥ 1. 
Korostelev et al (1995) analysed the rate of convergence of the estimated frontier to the true 
frontier for the one input case. Kneip et al (1998) examined the rate of convergence for the 
multivariate case where 𝐽 and 𝑅 are greater than one: 
           𝜃𝑉𝑅𝑆(𝑥, 𝑦) − 𝜃(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑂𝑝 (𝑛
−
1
𝐽+𝑅)            (3.28) 
Simar and Wilson (2008) note that the convergence rate for CRS has not been established yet, 
but imagine that its convergence rate would be faster if the production possibility set exhibits 
constant returns to scale. The rate of convergence depends on the dimensionality of the 
problem; the number of inputs and outputs. Simar and Wilson (2008) state that for a given 
sample size, as the number of inputs and outputs increase the number of DMUs lying on the 
                                                          
5 Convergence here refers to the statistical properties of the DEA estimator and its rate of convergence to the 
true frontier.  
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frontier will increase. As a result of the well-known ‘curse of dimensionality’, several authors 
have stated rules of thumb for the number of DMUs required for a given number of inputs and 
outputs. Golany and Roll (1989) establish a rule of thumb that the number of units should be 
at least twice the number of inputs plus outputs. Bowlin (1998) establishes a rule of thumb of 
three times the number of inputs plus outputs. However, given these rules Wheelock and 
Wilson (2003) and Wilson (2004) have found cases for several thousand DMU and nearly all 
the DMUs lie on the frontier. The rule of thumb will be used as a guide alongside the number 
of DMUs which make up the frontier to determine whether there is a dimensionality issue.  
3.6.5.6 Non-Discretionary Variables 
 
WaSCs operate under different operating characteristics which are outside of managerial 
control, known as non-discretionary or environmental variables. DEA makes the implicit 
assumption that DMUs are homogeneous. Ray (1988) states that for a given level of inputs, 
conceptually there is a maximum amount of output that can be produced given the level of 
technology.  Ray asks what causes a firm to produce less than the maximum. Within the 
analysis of efficiency, the difference between the actual output and maximum attainable output 
is attributed to managerial inefficiency. However, other factors may be present which influence 
the amount of outputs that can be produced which are not under control by the firms; these are 
defined as non-discretionary variables. If the true production function takes the form: 
         𝑦𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑥𝑡, 𝑧𝑡)              (3.29) 
Here, 𝑦𝑡 is the level of outputs, 𝑥𝑡 the level of inputs and 𝑧𝑡 is a vector of non-discretionary 
variables. If non-discretionary variables are not incorporated within the analysis then the 
production function is specified as: 
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       𝑦𝑡 = 𝑝(𝑥𝑡)             (3.30) 
Production function (3.30) implicitly makes the assumption that firms operate within 
homogeneous environments and that non-discretionary variables do not impact the production 
function. If two firms 𝑡  and 𝑠  have identical bundles of controllable inputs (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑠)  but 
produce different levels of outputs (𝑦𝑡 ≠ 𝑦𝑠). The difference in the output level is interpreted 
as differences in efficiency. However if the true production function is (3.29) then the level of 
outputs should not be equal unless the environmental variables are equal (𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧𝑠). If (𝑧𝑡 ≠ 𝑧𝑠) 
and the true production function (3.29) is measured as (3.30) the efficiency scores will be 
biased depending upon the relationship of the environmental variables. The exclusion of non-
discretionary environmental variables can make those firms that operate in a favourable 
environment appear relatively efficient whilst those operating in an unfavourable environment 
appear relatively inefficient.  
Implicit within the measurement of efficiency, DEA assumes that DMUs are homogeneous 
(Golany and Roll, 1989). Homogeneity assumes that the DMUs undertake the same activities, 
have access to the same inputs and finally operate within similar environments. Theoretically, 
it is important to ensure that non-discretionary variables which influence the production 
function are incorporated within the analysis. As DEA assumes homogeneity, the following 
section outlines one approach to incorporate non-discretionary variables within the 
measurement of efficiency through DEA.  
Quality can be incorporated within the measurement of efficiency by a quality-adjusted 
measure of output. Saal and Parker (2000) employ a quality-adjusted measure of output for the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry due the large changes in quality standards 
imposed since privatisation. A quality-adjusted measure of output (𝑌𝑄)  is calculated by 
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multiplying the level of output (𝑌) by a quality index (𝑄) which takes a value between 0 and 
1 as shown in equation 3.31.  
𝑌𝑄 = 𝑌 × 𝑄        (3.31) 
The application of a quality-adjusted measure of output implicitly makes the assumption that 
an improvement in the measure of quality requires additional inputs. A quality-adjusted 
measure of output is applied within the measurement of 𝛽-convergence in chapter 5. Chapter 
6 provides a more in-depth discussion of the inclusion of environmental variables for the 
measurement of efficiency. These advanced techniques are not employed within the 
measurement of 𝛽-convergence due to the issue of dimensionality6. 
3.6.5.7 Bootstrap DEA 
 
DEA is a deterministic frontier, and therefore does not take into account noise, and all 
deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiency. DEA does not account for random 
noise such as measurement error. Instead, it assumes that there is no noise within the data, and 
given this Coelli et al (2005) state that the DEA frontier is biased downwards and therefore the 
efficiency scores are biased upwards. Simar and Wilson (1998,2000a) use bootstrapping to 
provide a statistical foundation for DEA models and to adjust for the non-parametric bias. 
Coelli et al (2005) denote bootstrapping in its simplest form, which involves generating 
thousands of ‘pseudo samples’ from the observed data set. ‘Pseudo estimates’ are then obtained 
from the ‘pseudo samples’. An empirical distribution is then derived from these pseudo 
estimates. The distribution is used as an approximation of the true underlying sampling 
                                                          
6 The measurement of 𝛽-convergence requires separate frontier for each time period. The three-stage DEA 
employs a meta-frontier, pooling all DMUs for all time periods under a common frontier, improving the 
dimensionality issue.  
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distribution of the estimator. DEA bootstrapping can cause biases and inconsistency problems 
due to the one-sided nature of the inefficiency distribution. Simar and Wilson (2000a) provide 
a solution to this problem in which they propose estimating a bias-corrected, non-parametric 
kernel estimate of the density of the inefficiency score and the drawing the pseudo samples 
from this density. Coelli et al (2005) also state that if the data for a whole industry or population 
is available, and assumed to be “noise-free”, then there is no point in using bootstrapping as 
the DEA frontier obtained must be the true frontier. They also note that bootstrapping is a good 
technique to analyse the sensitivity of DEA. The quality of the bootstrap approximation 
depends upon the number of bootstraps and the sample size, as both tend towards infinity the 
approximation becomes exact (Simar and Wilson, 2000b). Simar and Wilson (2000b) through 
Monte Carlo simulations report that the performance of bootstrap DEA for a one input one 
output VRS model is low in small samples7. Bootstrap bias adjusted DEA efficiency scores are 
not examined within this study to avoid biases generated by the small sample size.  
 
3.6.5.8 Malmquist Productivity index 
 
Efficiency can be examined over time through the application of a Malmquist productivity 
index. This technique can be employed using DEA and SFA techniques. The concept of the 
Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index is drawn from the work of Fare et al (1994). 
The Malmquist TFP index measures the productivity change over two periods by calculating 
the ratio of the distance from the frontier for the two times periods relative to the industry 
frontier. We can consider an input-orientation approach where period 𝑡  technology is the 
                                                          
7 This width of the estimated 95 percent confidence  intervals decreases as the sample size increases, becoming 
small when the sample size equals 400   
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reference frontier and the Malmquist TFP index between period 𝑠 and the base period 𝑡 is 
denoted by: 
 
                 𝑚0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) =  
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠)
                (3.32)       
 
We note that 𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠) is the distance period and 𝑠 is away from period 𝑡. If 𝑡 = 𝑠 then the 
efficiency score obtained will be the same as using a one-period data set. Fare et al (1994) note 
that the TFP calculation can be separated into efficiency change and technical change denoted 
as: 
 
                  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =  
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠)
              (3.33)    
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
              𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =  [
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)
∗  
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠)
]
1
2                 (3.34) 
 
Efficiency change measures improvement in the efficiency score. Technical change measures 
the extent to which the firm catches up with new technology. Fare et al (1994) introduced a 
Malmquist index under VRS to incorporate scale economics, but Ray and Desli (1997) 
questioned the validity of the model to incorporate technical change alongside scale change. 
Scale change is calculated by comparing the CRS and VRS technology. Coelli et al (2005) 
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highlight that the main criticism is that if there is scale change, then the true production 
technology must exhibit VRS.  
3.6.5.9 Panel Data  
 
In the presence of panel data there are several approaches that can be used to evaluate 
efficiency: separate frontier, meta-frontier or window analysis. Separate frontiers can be 
estimated for each time period and this allows for technical progress and regress. The evolution 
of the efficiency over time can be examined through the Malmquist index.  
On the other hand, an alternative approach is to pool the data and estimate a Meta-frontier. This 
approach makes the assumption of unvarying best-practice technology. Figure 3.12 depicts 
three frontiers for different time periods. The points 𝐴1, 𝐵1 and 𝐷1 make up the frontier in 
period 1. The bold frontier is the meta frontier which envelopes all of the DMUs for all time 
periods. The measurement of efficiency for 𝐶1 against the frontier for period 1 is 
𝑂𝐶1
𝑂𝐴1
, where 
against the meta-frontier the efficiency score is 
𝑂𝐶1
𝑂𝑊
. It can be seen that under technological 
progress, where the frontier is expanding over periods, the measurement of efficiency in year 
1 under the meta-frontier will be lower in comparison to the separate frontier. This approach is 
frequently utilised to overcome the issue of dimensionality but treats each firm for each time 
period as a separate DMU.  
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An intermediate approach known as window analysis estimates a sequence of overlapping 
pooled panels which consist of a few time periods of arbitrary length. Figure 3.13 depicts 
window analysis for eight time periods. The length of the window is a pre-specified length and 
the window is rolled forwards for each period.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Window 1 x x x x
Window 2 x x x x
Window 3 x x x x
Window 4 x x x x
Window 5 x x x x
Time Period 
Figure 3.12: Meta-frontier 
Source: Portela et al (2011) 
Figure 3.13: Window Analysis 
79 
 
The advantage of this approach is to allow higher degrees of freedom whilst allowing for the 
technological process and regress. One of the drawbacks of the approach is that the beginning 
and end periods are not tested as frequently as the other periods.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the theory of efficiency and outlined several alternative approaches 
to measuring efficiency. The approaches can be divided into those which are parametric (OLS, 
SUR, SFA) and those which are non-parametric (DEA). SFA has the advantage of allowing 
the measurement of efficiency whilst incorporating noise within the estimation. On the other 
hand, DEA has the advantage of not requiring assumptions with regards to the functional form. 
The chapter goes on to provide a comprehensive review of DEA theory. Basic DEA models 
for input and output-orientation and constant and variable returns-to-scale considerations are 
outlined. Detailed methodology for the measurement of 𝛽-convergence, three-stage DEA and 
dynamic DEA is outlined within their respective chapters. The following chapter will outline 
the data used for the study and examine the industry specification for measuring efficiency 
within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. 
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4. ‘Garbage in, garbage out’: The data  
4.1 Introduction 
One of the key considerations within empirical economics is the choice of data. No matter how 
powerful the statistical technique tool, “garbage in equals garbage out” (Coelli,et al. 2005). The 
previous chapter outlined the theory of efficiency and the measurement of efficiency through 
the application of DEA. The choice of data employed for the measurement of efficiency is an 
essential component for the measurement of efficiency. This chapter outlines the data used for 
the measurement of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry.  
There are several key questions to guarantee an appropriate choice and reliability of the data. 
What variables should we use? Do the variables capture the production process? How reliable 
is the data? Are there measurement errors or outliers? This chapter addresses these questions, 
firstly by considering the choice of industry specification. The choice of input and output 
variables are discussed drawing from Ofwat’s choice of variables and those applied within the 
academic literature. The data is obtained from published data from the industry June Return 
(JR), company’s limited accounts and the DWI annual reports. Finally, the chapter will present 
a description of the data used within this study of efficiency.  
4.2 Specification   
 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry is characterised by two distinctive types 
of firms, WaSCs and WoCs which undertake two distinctive activities: water and sewerage. 
WaSCs undertake both water and sewerage activities whereas WoCs only undertake water 
activities. The breakdown of the WaSC’s activities is displayed in figure 4.1. The figure depicts 
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the two separate activities undertaken by WaSCs: water and sewerage and their function 
activities; distribution, resource and treatment and business activities for water services. 
Accounting separation allows for efficiency to be analysed at the functional level for water and 
sewerage. There are several different specification issues that need to be considered. Firstly, 
should water and sewerage activities be analysed together or separately? Secondly, if water 
and sewerage activities are modelled separately, one has to consider whether efficiency should 
be evaluated at the activity level or at the functional level of distribution, treatment etc. Finally, 
should WaSCs and WoCs be analysed under a common frontier? The following section will 
outline the approach undertaken by Ofwat to evaluate efficiency within the price review 
alongside a review of the methodologies applied within the academic literature to determine 
the preferred industry specification to model efficiency.  
Within Ofwat’s assessment of relative opex efficiency up until and including the 2009 price 
review, Ofwat examined water and sewerage activities separately, which allowed for WaSCs 
and WoCs to be evaluated under a common frontier for water activities. The modelling of water 
and sewerage activities separately does not allow for the incorporation of any cost interactions 
between water and sewerage activities. As water and sewerage activities are evaluated 
separately, efficiency can either be examined at the activity level or at the functional level. 
Ofwat examines efficiency at the functional activity level and sums the predicted and actual 
costs to the activity level to obtain a measure of efficiency for water and sewerage activities. 
This approach allows for an in-depth and detailed analysis of each functional activity, enabling 
the incorporation of detailed environmental variables such as the type of treatment work.   
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Following Ofwat’s specification, several authors have modelled water and sewerage activities 
separately. Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998), Thanassoulis (2000a,b), Bottasso and Conti (2003), 
Saal and Parker (2005), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Portela et al (2011) have examined 
water only activities and Thanassoulis (2002) has studied sewerage activities. Modelling water 
and sewerage activities separately allows for efficiency to be examined at either the activity or 
functional level. Thannassoulis (2000a,b) examine the efficiency of WaSCs at the functional 
level for distribution activities. This approach allows for relatively complex activities to be 
modelled using a variety of inputs, outputs and explanatory variables. Meanwhile Bottasso and 
Conti (2003), Saal and Parker (2005), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Portela et al (2011) 
examine water activities at the activity level.  
Saal et al (2011) estimate a four output quadratic cost function and state that it would be 
preferable to model each activity at its functional level, but notes that it is infeasible for two 
reasons. Firstly, there are difficulties with identifying meaningful outputs at each level and 
Figure 4.1: WaSC Activity Breakdown  
Source: Thanassoulis (2000a) 
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secondly even if the data was available they highlight that it would be economically intractable 
to estimate a total cost function for all functional activities.  Saal et al (2011) use a four output 
model to estimate the presence of vertical economics and report significant vertical integration 
economies between network and abstraction and treatment activities for both water and 
sewerage activities. The results conclude that there are substantial cost savings for undertaking 
all components of the value chain for water activities and sewerage activities.  
Stone and Webster (2004) through the estimation of a translog cost function reveal overall 
diseconomies of scope between four outputs: water delivered, equivalent population served 
and the number of water and sewerage properties. The measurement of vertical economies of 
scope between the physical volume of outputs and the connected properties reveal significant 
diseconomies of scope for sewerage and zero economies or diseconomies for water activities. 
There are significant economies of integration between water treatment and sewage treatment. 
The evaluation of efficiency at the functional level does not take into account the cost 
interactions between functional activities.  
Water and sewerage activities can either be modelled separately following the methodology 
from Ofwat or can be modelled under a joint specification. A joint specification for water and 
sewerage activities for WaSCs allows for the incorporation of economies of scope. Saal and 
Parker (2000) estimate the separability of inputs and non-jointness through the estimation of a 
multiple output translog cost function for water and sewerage activities for the WaSCs. The 
test of non-jointness measures whether the cost of producing several outputs would be the same 
if they were produced jointly or separately. The results are not statistically significant and 
therefore imply neither economies nor diseconomies of scope. Alongside the measure of           
non-jointness, Saal and Parker (2000) test the assumption of the separability of inputs between 
water and sewerage activities. The test of separability determines whether it is appropriate to 
evaluate WaSCs costs using an aggregate measure of output and using a single output cost 
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function, or whether WaSCs should be evaluated under a multiple output cost function. The 
test of separability is rejected, therefore implying that it is inappropriate to evaluate WaSCs 
costs without using a multiple output cost function. As well as Saal and Parker (2000), several 
other studies (Lynk, 1993; Hunt and Lynk, 1995; Stone and Webster, 2004) demonstrate the 
significant cost interactions between water and sewerage activities. Alongside the issue of 
incorporating cost interactions between water and sewerage activities, Saal and Parker (2005) 
highlight that there may be cost allocation problems in modelling water and sewerage activities 
separately.  
Ofwat evaluates WaSCs and WoCs under a common frontier for water activities, this approach 
is followed by Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998), Bottasso and Conti (2003), Saal and Parker 
(2005) and Portela et al (2011) who examine water only activities. For the analysis of a multiple 
output function for water and sewerage Ashton (2000a), Saal and Parker (2000), Saal and Reid 
(2004), Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007) and Maziotis et al (2013) only examine 
WaSCs. WaSCs have only been examined due to the difficulties of incorporating WoCs as zero 
producers of sewerage within the translog cost specification and within DEA. Bottasso and 
Conti (2011) and Saal et al (2011) are the only two papers that are known to measure both 
water and sewerage activities for WaSCs and WoCs. Bottasso and Conti (2011) and Saal et al 
(2011) overcome this problem by measuring a Box-Cox transformation and quadratic cost 
function respectively.  
However, WaSCs and WoCs are two different types of firms and therefore may have access to 
different technology, raising the issue of whether WaSCs and WoCs can be pooled under a 
common frontier. Thanassoulis (2000a,b), Saal and Parker (2005) and Bottasso and Conti 
(2011) refer to the issue of the poolability of WaSCs and WoCs under a common frontier. 
Thanassoulis (2000a) measures efficiency at the functional level for water distribution and 
makes reference to the choice of companies which make up the DEA frontier. Thanassoulis 
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(2000a) notes that the WaSCs are substantially larger and account for some 75% of the water 
delivered in England and Wales. Pooling WaSCs and WoCs under a common frontier for the 
measurement of efficiency using DEA, Thanassoulis (2000a) reports that the WoCs make up 
the majority of the frontier. Thanassoulis (2000a) illustrates the problem of pooling WaSCs 
and WoCs in figure 4.2 which shows the two potential frontiers: firstly, the frontier including 
WoCs, and the secondly, the frontier obtained when excluding the WoCs. The graph shows 
that the inefficiency of a specific unit when including WoCs into the frontier is higher than 
when they are excluded. The outer frontier indicates that the production possibilities are higher 
for WoCs than WaSCs. Thanassoulis (2000a) states that one reason the difference arises is 
because WaSCs tend to be more complex companies in comparison to WoCs. Thanassoulis 
(2000a) calculates the correlation coefficient which suggests that once WoCs are removed from 
the frontier the unit cost is reduced, although the relative rankings remain unchanged. The 
paper takes ‘a conservative view’ and excludes WoCs from the calculation of the DEA frontier.   
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Saal and Parker (2005) consider the implication of the poolability of WaSCs and WoCs for 
water only activities using an input distance function. Saal and Parker (2005) estimate the input 
distance function firstly by pooling WaSCs and WoCs and estimating the input distance 
function separately for WaSCs and WoCs. Within the pooled specification, a dummy variable 
is incorporated for WaSCs which indicates that the input requirements for a WaSC are 
substantially higher than those for a WoC. Saal and Paker (2005) demonstrate that the 
technology between the two types of firms differs by testing whether the coefficients are 
significantly different for WaSCs and WoCs. Their results conclude that it is inappropriate to 
assume that the underlying frontier for WoCs and WaSCs is the same. Saal and Parker (2005) 
Source: Thanassoulis (2000) 
Figure 4.2: DEA Frontier WaSCs and WoCs 
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highlight that only water activities are considered and therefore there could be cost allocation 
problems between water and sewerage activities as well as cost complimentarily issues through 
ignoring any cost interactions between water and sewerage activities. Overall, the paper 
highlights that the inappropriate assumption with regards to separability of water and sewerage 
activities may partly explain why WaSC and WoC frontiers differ from one another.   
Portela et al (2011) highlights the issue of poolability by finding significant differences in 
productivity between WaSCs and WoCs. The paper reports that the average meta-efficiencies 
are significantly different for WaSCs and WoCs through the application of a Mann-Whitney 
test. Bottasso and Conti (2003) include dummy variables within their estimation of a cost 
function for water activities. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Porela et al (2011) report that 
WaSCs are associated with cost advantages. On the other hand, as previously highlighted Saal 
and Parker (2005) report that the input requirements for WaSCs are substantially higher.  
Bottasso et al (2011) examine the assumption of poolability and extend upon Saal and Paker 
(2005) by estimating a general cost function for both water and sewerage activities for WaSCs 
and WoCs. The model is a general specification of the composite cost function which applies 
a Box-Cox transformation. Bottasso et al (2011) conduct a likelihood ratio test with the null 
hypothesis that there is a common parameter vector for WaSCs and WoCs tested against the 
alternative that the parameters differ across the two sub-samples. Their results reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the preferred specification is to consider separate parameters for 
the two sub-samples. 
Overall, given the discussion the measurement of efficiency within this thesis is examined at 
the activity level for both water and sewerage activities. This methodology allows for the 
incorporation of cost interactions between both water and sewerage activities and functional 
activities. WaSCs are only considered within the analysis, firstly as DEA does not easily allow 
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for the incorporation of WoCs as a zero producer of sewerage, and secondly to avoid biases 
introduced by pooling WaSCs and WoCs under a common frontier.  
4.3 Choice of Inputs and Outputs  
 
This section will outline the process of determining the input and outputs used for measuring 
efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. The theoretical and 
methodological implications for the choice of input and output variables for measuring 
efficiency through DEA will be outlined. A review of the inputs and outputs used for the 
measurement of efficiency both by Ofwat and the academic literature is presented.  
One of the key components within the measurement of efficiency is the choice of input and 
output variables. Firstly, the choice of variables should be common to all DMUs and represent 
all activities in which the firms undertake. The input variables should capture all resources 
utilised and the output variables should capture all outcomes that have a bearing on the type of 
efficiency being assessed (Coelli et al, 2005). There is a trade-off between the number of inputs 
and outputs included within the measurement of efficiency. The incorporation of additional 
variables allows for additional information to be contained within the analysis. However, as 
previously highlighted within the methodology the inclusion of additional input and output 
variables can lead to the issue of dimensionality. Dimensionality leads to a slower rate of 
convergence and leads to upwards bias in the efficiency scores. To avoid the curse of 
dimensionality, Dyson et al (2001) suggest a rule of thumb of two times the total number of 
inputs and outputs. Bowlin (1998) mentions the rule of thumb that the number of DMUs should 
be three times larger than the total number of input and output variables. To avoid the issue of 
dimensionality with measuring efficiency for the ten WaSCs a maximum of three inputs and 
outputs can be incorporated within the DEA specification. However, the number of DMUs can 
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be increased by applying a meta-frontier or window analysis discussed in the methodology 
chapter.  
The choice of input and output variables for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry 
is led by the level at which the industry is examined, Ofwat’s choice of variables within their 
efficiency analysis and the academic literature.  
Ofwat examines efficiency at the functional level and examine opex and capex separately. The 
2009 econometric models to measure water opex efficiency by Ofwat apply the following cost 
drivers: Distribution Input (DI); average pumping head; household billed water; non-household 
billed water; length of mains; proportion of DI from boreholes; proportion of DI from bulk 
suppliers. CEPA (2014) produce a series of totex models for the estimation of the baseline in 
2014. Three output variables are incorporated: density (number of properties/length of mains), 
length of mains and usage (potable water/connected properties). The cost drivers applied by 
Ofwat for their assessment of sewerage opex in the 2009 price review include the area of 
sewage district, length of sewers, proportion non-residential population, household properties, 
non-household properties, load received from different bands of sewage works, equivalent 
population served and type of treatment. Within their assessment of totex expenditure CEPA 
(2014) use the length of sewers, total load and density as a cost driver.  
It is important to note the distinction between Ofwat’s methodologies and the measurement of 
a cost function. The former is used to predict the level of operating and capital expenditure 
going forwards to determine the price cap, whereas the latter is examining previous costs to 
determine the past level of efficiency. Several of the variables outlined can be considered as 
environmental variables instead of input and output variables.   
The choice of input and output variables is influenced by the academic literature for the 
measurement of efficiency for water and sewerage companies from both English and Welsh 
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studies and international studies. Appendix 1 outlines the input and output variables used 
within a selection of studies.  
4.3.1 Inputs  
The choice of inputs should represent all the resources utilised for the production of the output 
variables. The measurement of cost efficiency analyses the optimal use of physical inputs given 
the input prices and the production possibility set. Technical efficiency examines the radial 
contraction of inputs given the production possibility set. Technical efficiency DEA does not 
require the measurement of units of the inputs and outputs to be analogous. Within the same 
model, DEA allows for one input to be measured as the physical input, such as the number of 
employees, whereas another input can be incorporated in monetary terms (Cooper et al., 2006).  
Inputs can be incorporated as either the physical quantity (Garcia-Sanchez, 2006; Saal and 
Parker, 2005; Saal et al, 2007), the monetary value (Cubbin and Tzanidakis, 1998; 
Thanassoulis, 2000a; Thanassoulis, 2002; Tupper and Resende, 2004; Portela et al, 2011) or a 
combination of both the physical output and monetary value (Picazo-Tadeo et al, 2008) under 
technical inputs. This thesis considers the measurement of cost efficiency, and therefore inputs 
should relate to the total operating costs incurred by the firm. 
In its assessment of efficiency, Ofwat modelled operating and capital expenditure separately 
for the measurement of efficiency within their 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 price reviews. Ofwat 
“has seen no convincing evidence that relatively high operating expenditure can be explained 
by relatively low capital expenditure or vice versa” (Ofwat, 1994, p.30). If operating and capital 
expenditure are incorporated within the same model then it is assumed that there is 
substitutability between the inputs. Thanassoulis (2000a), Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) and 
Portela et al (2011) follow Ofwat’s methodology and examine operating expenditure for the 
measurement of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. On the 
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other hand, Saal and Paker (2000), Bottasso and Conti (2003, 2009), Saal and Parker (2005), 
Saal et al (2011), Maziotis et al (2012a, b), Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007), Saal and 
Reid (2004), Maziotis et al (2013) and Stone and Webster (2004) incorporate capital either 
within the measurement of efficiency through a total or variable cost function.  
Capital can be included within the measurement of efficiency either as a fully controllable input 
or as a quasi-fixed input. A total cost function in equation 4.1 assumes that firms have the 
ability to adjust all inputs in the long term to their optimal level. The cost function can therefore 
be denoted as the decision of the firm 𝑛 to minimise costs subject to this production function, 
where 𝑥𝑛 is a vector of inputs, 𝑤𝑛 a vector of input prices and ?̅? is the exogenous output level. 
                              min
𝑥𝑛≥0
∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛
𝑛
                     (4.1)    
𝑠. 𝑡  𝑓(?̅?, 𝑥) = 0   
However, within the variable cost function in equation 4.2, capital is incorporated as a          
quasi-fixed input, therefore capital is not considered as a control variable and cost minimisation 
is only related to variable inputs. Capital 𝑥𝐾can therefore be incorporated as a quasi-fixed 
factor and 𝑥𝑗
𝑣  denotes the variable factors of production and firms solve the following cost 
minimisation problem: 
                            min
𝑥𝑛≥0
∑ 𝑤𝑛
𝑣𝑥𝑛
𝑣
𝑛
                     (4.2) 
𝑠. 𝑡  𝑓(?̅?, 𝑥𝑣 , 𝑥𝐾) = 0,     𝑥𝑘 = 𝐾  
 
Capital has been incorporated as an input into the production of water and sewerage by Saal 
and Parker (2000) and Saal and Parker (2011). Saal and Parker (2000) state that a total cost 
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function is applied to obtain an overall view of cost efficiency and to eliminate any potential 
biases introduced by cost allocation issues. However, Saal and Reid (2004) and Bottasso and 
Conti (2009) incorporate capital as a quasi-fixed input into the production process as 
technology within the industry is indivisible and associated with a long capital life and 
therefore is difficult to vary. Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) estimate 
a variable cost function for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry and the 
coefficient on the quasi-fixed input implies a tendency of overcapitalisation. This is a common 
finding in the literature of public utilities (Caves et al, 1981 and Cowing and Holtman, 1983). 
Bottasso and Conti (2009) state that overcapitalisation can be interpreted as the Averch-
Johnson effect due to the presence of rate of return regulation alongside the capital intensive 
nature of the industry and the presence of investment to meet future demand.                             
Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) state that the presence of 
overcapitalisation could result in a misspecified total cost function where the assumption is that 
firms can instantaneously vary the level of capital. 
In this study, capital costs are incorporated within the analysis of efficiency as controllable 
input to allow for the measurement of total cost efficiency. The incorporation of capital within 
the measurement of efficiency is extended by the measurement of dynamic efficiency in 
chapter 7.  
The most common inputs within the measurement of efficiency within the English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry are labour, capital and other (Saal and Parker, 2000; Saal and 
Parker, 2001; Stone and Webster, 2004; Erbetta and Cave, 2007; Saal et al, 2007;              
Bottasso et al, 2011; Maziotis et al, 2012a,b; Maziotis, 2013). Other inputs are the remainder 
of costs that are not associated with labour and capital costs. Other costs are therefore 
associated with power costs, materials, customer service, scientific services and other business 
activities. Saal et al (2011) include four inputs within their cost function, decomposing energy 
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into a separate input. Ofwat reports energy expenditure however does not report a measure of 
energy used. Saal et al (2011) employ an energy price index from the department of energy and 
climate change, however to allow for varying energy prices, Saal et al (2011)  employ separate 
price indices based on whether companies are small, medium or large. Energy costs have not 
been considered as a separate input due to the lack of data on energy prices and usage within 
the industry and the issue of dimensionality. The inputs considered are therefore capital, labour 
and other.  
4.3.2 Output Variables  
The choice of outputs used within the literature is partly determined upon which level of water 
and sewerage activities are examined. Cubbin and Tzandakis (1998) determine the output 
variables by regressing their input variable, opex on a set of potential output variables. 
Insignificant variables are dropped one by one until they arrive at a “statistically valid and 
economically meaningful parsimonious specification” (Cubbin and Tzandakis, 1998, pp. 82). 
The choice of outputs can also be determined based on economic and engineering judgement 
of the relevant outputs within the industry.   
 For the measurement of efficiency at the activity level of both water and sewerage activities, 
Stone and Webster (2004), Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007), Bottasso et al (2011) 
and Saal et al (2011) use four outputs, a physical measure of both water and sewerage and the 
number of properties billed for water and sewerage. Garcia and Thomas (2001) and Stone and 
Webster (2004) highlight the advantage of incorporating the number of billed properties 
alongside the measure of the physical amount produced. Saal et al (2011) estimate that the long 
run marginal cost of serving an additional water property is £67.86 and £96.81 for an additional 
sewerage property. They estimate that producing an additional cubic unit of water costs £0.41 
and the long run marginal cost of £48.77 per equivalent person of sewage treatment. This result 
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therefore indicates that serving an additional property is significantly different from the costs 
of an additional unit of the physical output. To allow for the difference in the input requirements 
for the number of properties served and the physical output of water and sewerage, both the 
number of properties and a measure of the physical output is included within the estimation of 
efficiency.  
A summary of the selection of input and output variables is shown are figure 4.3. It should be 
highlighted that the data for the application of DEA for the measurement of 𝛽-Convergence, 
three-stage DEA and dynamic DEA do differ slightly due to technicalities explained within 
their relevant chapters. Inputs have not been assigned a unit of measurement in figure 4.3 as 
chapters 5 and 6 incorporate inputs in monetary terms whereas chapter 7 applies a cost function. 
The cost function incorporates the quantity of inputs given the inputs prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs: 
 Labour  
 Capital  
 Other  
 
WaSCs Water and 
Sewerage 
Activities 
Outputs: 
 Potable Water (Ml/d) 
 Equivalent Population 
Served  (,000) 
 Water Properties (,000) 
 Sewerage Properties 
(,000) 
Figure 4.3: Choice of Inputs and Outputs 
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4.4 Data Description  
 
The data collected is obtained from three sources; the June return published by Ofwat, the 
companies’ limited company accounts and the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) annual 
reports. The data is audited by an independent reporter for Ofwat; therefore the data is 
considered as reliable. This section will provide definitions and descriptions of the data utilised 
within the study. The data requirements vary between the chapters therefore a snap shot of the 
data will be provided within each empirical chapter.  
A panel dataset is available for the periods 1996/97–2010/11 for the WaSCs. Prior to 
privatisation the industry consisted of ten state owned RWAs and 29 privately owned statutory 
WoCs. After the privatisation of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry, the ten 
RWAs became publicly quoted WaSCs and the WoCs were re-established as public limited 
liability companies. After privatisation there was a succession of mergers and acquisitions of 
the WoCs; in 2011 eleven WOCs remained. Table 2.1 outlines the mergers and acquisitions 
within the industry whilst figure 4.4 shows the companies that are within the panel database. 
When there is a merger between a WaSC and a WoC, the WaSC remains within the panel due 
to the size difference between the companies8.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 This is the case for Northumbrian and North East Water, Anglian and Hartlepool Water, Yorkshire and York 
Waterworks and Northumbrian and Essex & Suffolk.  
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4.4.1 Total Costs  
 
Total costs are calculated as the sum of capital costs and operating expenditure. Total operating 
expenditure is obtained from the June Return and is calculated net of third party services, 
exceptional items, doubtful debts, service charges and local authority rates which are deemed 
as non-controllable costs by Ofwat and are not incorporated within their assessment of 
efficiency. Exceptional items are by definition atypical. Third party services relate to costs 
incurred for output produced by other companies. Local authority rates and doubtful debts are 
considered as non-controllable. High levels of doubtful debts are due to the legal and regulatory 
decision of prohibiting the shutting off of water and sewerage activities when bills are not paid. 
Service charges are charged by the EA and NRW for water abstraction. Total costs are 
decomposed into three inputs; labour, capital and other. The trends in total costs and operating 
expenditure are depicted in figure 4.5. There is a slightly downwards trend in the operating 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
Anglian x x x x x x x x x
Dwr Cymru x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Northumbrian Water x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Severn Trent x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
South West x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Southern x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Thames x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
United Utilities x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Wessex x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Yorkshire Water Services LTD x x x x x x x x x x
B&W Hants x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Bristol x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Cambridge x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Dee Valley x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Portsmouth x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
South East Water x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
South Staffs x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Sutton & E Surrey x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Veolia- Central (Three Valleys) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Veolia- East (Tendring Hundred) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Veolia- South East (Folkstone) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Mid Kent x x x x x x x x x x x x
Sembcorp Bournemouth Water x x x x x
Essex and Suffolk x x x x
Mid Southern x x x x
North Surrey Water x x x x
Hartlepool Water x x x
Yorks Waterworks x x x
Chester x
Wrexham x
Figure 4.4: Mergers and Acquisitions 
97 
 
expenditure of -0.63% a year on average over the period. On the other hand, there is an upwards 
trend in total operating expenditure of 1.43% a year on average over the period. This is as a 
result of increasing capital expenditure to meeting quality standards, reducing leakage and 
increasing demand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Labour  
Within the empirical literature, there have been several methodologies for the measurement of 
labour cost and the number of full time employees. Bottasso and Conti (2003, 2009) and Erbetta 
and Cave (2007) obtain labour costs and the number of full time equivalent employees from 
the June return. The employee costs obtained from the June return relate to direct labour costs. 
These costs therefore do not incorporate indirect labour costs associated with head office 
activities. Saal and Parker (2000, 2001), Stone and Webster (2004) and Saal et al (2011) obtain 
labour costs and the number of full time equivalent employees from the companies’ limited 
company accounts which incorporate both direct and indirect labour costs. Figure 4.6 reports 
Figure 4.5: Industry Total and Variable Costs 
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the WaSCs’ average staff costs from the companies’ limited accounts and the employment 
costs from the June return for both water and sewerage activities. The graph indicates that there 
is a substantial difference of around £60m per year between the two measures of labour costs. 
Direct costs make up a small proportion of total operating costs and a small proportion of 
companies total labour costs. Using the June return employment costs will incorporate indirect 
labour costs to other costs which in turn could lead to a misleading result with regards to the 
allocative efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The measurement of staff costs from the companies’ limited accounts is not a perfect measure 
as the accounts may include non-appointed activities. Following Stone and Webster (2004), 
capitalised staff costs are not excluded due to inconsistencies in the reporting in the company’s 
Figure 4.6: Labour Cost Comparison 
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accounts9. However an alternative approach would be to apply a labour wage rate index. This 
methodology does not enable the price of labour to vary amongst companies.   
Overall, although there are several limitations to using the labour costs from the statutory 
accounts, the data provides a better reflection of the proportion of total costs that relate to the 
labour. Labour costs and the number of equivalent employees are obtained from the companies’ 
limited accounts for the accounting year ending 31 March10.  
The price of labour is calculated as the ratio of labour costs and the number of full time 
equivalent employees obtained from the companies’ limited company accounts. This 
methodology allows for the price of labour to vary across time and companies.  
4.4.3 Dŵr Cymru  
 
Dŵr Cymru Welsh Water contracted out the operations of their activities from 2001 to 2010. 
The staff costs and number of equivalent employees reported within their company accounts 
only related to head office activities. Therefore, in order to obtain a comparable measure of 
staff costs and the number of employees, the staff costs were obtained from Dŵr Cymru’s 
annual limited company accounts alongside the accounts for the contracted services. 
In March 2001 Dŵr Cymru Welsh Water contracted out their operations and maintenance of 
water and waste water assets, with the exception of its sewerage network, to United Utilities 
Operational until March 2010. Kelda Water Services undertook the maintenance and operation 
                                                          
9 Anglian, Dwr Cymru, Severn Trent and Yorkshire do not report capitalised staff costs and instead report own 
work capitalised. Own work capitalised relates to the capitalisation of other costs such as materials alongside 
staff costs. The proportion of own work capitalised to staff costs varies substantially over the period causing 
difficulties in estimating the capitalised staff costs.    
10 Northumbrian 2000, Wessex 2000, Thames 2002, Wessex 2002 are reported for December 
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of waste water assets in South Wales and Hereford on behalf of Dwr Cymru on the 1st of April 
2005 until March 2010.  
4.4.4 Capital 
4.4.4.1 Capital Stock 
 
Capital stock can either be measured through a monetary measure or a physical measure, which 
can be proxied by the length of mains. Aubert and Reynaud (2005) highlight that the choice of 
length of mains as a proxy of capital is imperfect. This is because it does not take into account 
all of the capital employed and secondly it does not reflect any depreciation of capital.  
There are two choices of monetary values for the capital stock which can be applied within the 
industry; namely the Regulatory Capital Value (RCV) and the Mean Equivalent Asset (MEA). 
The regulatory capital value measures the financial capital employed by WaSCs and WoCs and 
is a regulatory tool used by Ofwat for the purpose of setting price limits; the data is only 
available at a company level. The RCV was originally determined as the value of the company 
200 days after privatization. This value is rolled forwards based upon the amount of capital 
expenditure less the amount of depreciation.  
The MEA value is the estimation of the replacement cost of tangible fixed assets, reported for 
water and sewerage activities. Companies report both the gross and net MEA value; the gross 
value is the replacement cost of an old asset with a technically up-to-date new asset with the 
same service capacity. The net MEA value is applied to take into account depreciation, which 
reflects the remaining service potential of the capital stock.  
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Stone and Webster (2004) highlight the distinction between the two measures of capital; they 
note that the RCV represents the financial capital employed whereas the MEA value captures 
the quantum of capital inputs into production. Within this study, the measure of capital stock 
used as an input into production is proxied by the MEA value. The RCV value is used within 
the calculation of capital costs to reflect the level of investment made by companies which earn 
a rate of return.   
The MEA estimates are calculated based on an initial assessment of the replacement cost of 
capital and are rolled forwards based on an RPI adjustment, reclassification and an AMP 
adjustment, plus additions less disposals. The AMP adjustment adjusts the MEA value as a 
result of any MEA revaluations which take place periodically. The revaluations of the net MEA 
value results in arbitrary jumps in the measure of capital over time. Saal and Parker (2000, 
2001), Saal and Reid (2004) Stone and Webster (2004), Erbetta and Cave (2007) and Saal et al 
(2011) adjust the MEA value in order to smooth out the series for the revaluations.  
The capital stock is adjusted in order to smooth out the series for any revaluations following 
the methodology employed within the literature. The MEA value for the year ending 2009 is 
used as a starting point. Saal and Parker (2005) highlight that the most accurate choice of MEA 
value should embody all previous revaluations, therefore the most recent MEA revaluation is 
chosen. The 2009 price review was chosen as it was the most recent revaluation within the 
price review; this was also employed by Saal et al (2011). The MEA value is updated going 
forwards and backwards based upon the net investments in 2009 prices. Net investment is the 
sum of disposals, additions, investments and depreciation. Stone and Webster (2004),              
Saal and Parker (2005), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Maziotis et al (2012a,b) average the 
year ending and year beginning MEA value to provide a more accurate representation of the 
amount of capital stock available to the companies in a given year. The MEA values will be 
averaged for the measurement of 𝛽-convergence and the application of three-stage DEA. The 
102 
 
measurement of dynamic DEA will apply the year beginning and year ending value in order to 
explicitly incorporate the level of investment in the capital stock. This methodology is 
consistent with the perpetual inventory method. 
In the accounting policies, Ofwat uses RPI to adjust the MEA value to the current prices. Saal 
and Parker (2000) state that the industry argues that an industry specific Capital Cost Index 
(CCI) prepared for the industry by London Economics is a more accurate movement in capital 
prices. Stone and Webster (2004), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) use 
the Construction Output Price Index (COPI) as data for the CCI was not available. Following 
this methodology, net investment is deflated to 2009 prices using COPI.  
The adjusted and unadjusted MEA values for the average WaSCs are displayed in figure 4.7. 
The adjusted series is smoother than the unadjusted as a result of the impact of the AMP 
revaluations being removed. As highlighted by Stone and Webster (2004) the unadjusted series 
provides a better reflection of the growth of the capital series than the unadjusted series. There 
is a large increase in the unadjusted MEA value in 2011 this was as a result of large AMP 
adjustments by WaSC 7 and WaSC 8 for sewerage activities.   
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4.4.4.2 Capital Costs  
 
 Capital costs are defined as the sum of capital charges (Current Cost Depreciation, CCD and 
Infrastructure Renewal Charges, IRC) and the estimated financing cost of assets employed. 
CCD is the depreciation of non-infrastructure assets, which are above ground assets based on 
the asset life. IRC is an annualised cost of maintaining underground assets charged to the profit 
and loss account. The IRC is a 15 year average of the infrastructure renewal expenditure.  The 
estimated financing cost of assets employed is calculated as the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) multiplied by the capital rate base. Saal and Parker (2000), Stone and Webster 
(2004) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) measure the capital rate base using the MEA value. Saal 
et al (2011) and Cherchye et al (2013) on the other hand measure the cost of capital as the 
product of the WACC and the RCV. The RCV is applied instead of the MEA value for the 
Figure 4.7: Adjusted and Unadjusted MEA 
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calculation of capital costs as it represents the amount spent by the companies instead of the 
replacement cost of capital.  
Within the regulatory control Ofwat determines the cost of capital. The cost of capital should 
be high enough to attract investors and to allow firms to finance their functions. On the other 
hand, if the cost of capital is too high firms will earn windfall profits. Ofwat’s assumptions on 
the cost of capital are shown in table 4.1.   
 
 
Price Review Cost of Capital-Post 
Tax 
Mid-Range Cost of 
Capital 
Small Company 
Premium  
1994 5%–6% 5.5% 0.75% 
1999 4.25%–5.25% 4.75% 0.4%–0.75% 
2004 5.1% 5.1% 0.75% 
2009 4.5% 4.5% 0.1%–0.4% 
 
  
There are three measures of the WACC used within the literature. The first is applied by Saal 
and Parker (2000) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) where the measure is based upon the 
assumptions made by Ofwat on the cost of capital for the price review. Ofwat makes 
assumptions with regards to the risk free rate of capital and the risk premiums associated with 
equity and debt within the water and sewerage industry. Ofwat also makes assumptions with 
regards to small company premiums. The second methodology is considered by Stone and 
Webster (2004) who proxy the risk free rate of interest by the nominal rate of ten-year UK gilts 
Table 4.1: Cost of Capital 
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instead of applying Ofwat’s assumptions with regards to risk free rate of capital. The risk 
premium assumed by Ofwat as the weighted average of the risk premium associated with water 
company equity and corporate debt is added. The tax benefit associated with debt financed is 
subtracted.  
The third measure is applied by Saal et al (2011) who follow the methodology applied by Stone 
and Webster (2004) with regards to proxying the risk free rate of capital by the medium-term 
UK gilt rate. Stone and Webster (2004) apply a risk premium attached for the common risk 
premium for both debt and equity. Saal et al (2011) apply Ofwat’s assumption with regards to 
risk premiums and leverage to calculate a cost of equity and a cost of debt. The cost of equity 
is calculated as a function of the midrange values of Ofwat’s assumption on equity beta and 
equity risk premium including small company premiums and the gilt rate. Similarly the cost of 
debt is calculated as a function of the midrange values of Ofwat’s ex-ante assumptions on the 
debt premium and the gilt rate. The WACC is calculated using the cost of equity and debt 
alongside Ofwat’s ex-ante assumptions with regards to gearing ratios and effective corporate 
tax rates.  
Cherchye et al (2013) apply the WACC of Ofwat as these are used within the regulatory price 
review. The paper notes the robustness of the measurement as the methodology is based on 
discussions with firms, other regulators, consultants and shareholders. The WACC within this 
thesis takes the mid-range point estimate of the assumptions made by Ofwat within their price 
reviews reported in table 4.1.   
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4.4.4.3 Price of Capital  
 
The price of capital is then the cost of capital divided by capital stock. The capital stock is 
measured by the MEA value. 
4.4.5 Other Inputs 
 
Other inputs are calculated as the total operating costs less labour costs and capital costs. Other 
costs therefore include cost for materials, energy, outsourced services etc. As other costs are a 
composite of costs there is no direct measure of an input. Within the literature there are two 
distinct ways of measuring the price and amount of inputs for other costs. Firstly, there is the 
approach adopted by Bottasso and Conti (2009), whom define the price of other inputs as other 
costs divided by the length of mains. Secondly Saal and Parker (2000), Ebretta and Cave (2007) 
and Saal et al (2011) employ a price index for the price of other inputs. Saal and Parker (2000) 
use RPI, whilst Erbetta and Cave (2007) apply a weighted average of the RPI and a real index 
of energy for the industrial sector where the weights are determined by the cost share. This 
approach takes into account the heterogeneous nature of the price index. The price of other 
inputs follows Saal et al (2011) and Cherchye et al (2013) employing a UK price index from 
the Office of National Statistics (ONS) for materials and fuels purchased for the purification 
and distribution of water industry. A measure for the physical amount of other inputs is 
calculated as other costs divided by the price of other costs. Following Erbetta and Cave (2007) 
all costs apart from power costs are deflated using RPI to 2009 prices; power is deflated by an 
energy price index for the industrial sector derived from the Department for Trade and Industry 
(DTI).  
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4.4.6 Output Variables  
 
Four output variables are considered for the measurement of efficiency for water and sewerage 
activities at the activity level: the amount of water delivered, equivalent population served, 
number of water properties and the number of sewerage properties. Garcia and Thomas (2001) 
and Stone and Webster (2004) highlighted the advantage of including both the number of 
properties and the amount of water delivered within a joint specification. The marginal cost of 
producing an extra mega litre of water is substantially different from connecting an additional 
property.  
The average number of water and sewerage properties served for WaSCs are shown in figure 
4.9. The graph shows that the number of properties is relatively stable over time with a slight 
upwards trend. The number of sewerage properties is higher than the number of water 
properties as the WaSCs supply the sewerage properties within the WoCs operating areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Water and Sewerage Properties 
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Figure 4.10 shows the proportion of the water properties in 2011 which are served by WaSCs 
and WoCs. The figure shows that the WaSCs serve the majority of the industry. The proportion 
of the industry served by WoCs has fallen from 22% in 1997 to 18.2% in 2011 due to a series 
of mergers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.7 Physical Output 
 
For the measurement of the physical output of water activities two variables are used within 
the academic literature, either the Distribution Input (DI) or Water Delivered. The latter deducts 
the level of leakage. Ofwat imposes leakage targets on the WaSCs and WoCs, reducing the 
level of leakage by a third since its peak in the mid- 1990’s (Ofwat, 2012). There are substantial 
costs involved with the reduction of leakage which should be incorporated into the 
measurement of efficiency. Saal and Parker (2000) highlight the advantage of using water 
delivered instead of the distribution input as the latter does not take into account leakage which 
Figure 4.10:Water Properties- WaSCs and WoCs 
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could bias the results. The majority of authors employ the use of water delivered (Cubbin and 
Tzanidakis, 1998; Thanassoulis, 2000a; Saal and Parker, 2005; Saal and Reid, 2004; Bottasso 
and Conti, 2003 and Bottasso and Conti, 2009) on the other hand Saal and Parker (2011) use 
the distribution input and account for the proportion of distribution losses as an environmental 
variables within the estimation of their cost function. Erbetta and Cave (2007) used the total 
volume of water delivered but also examined the impact of leakage, as a proxy of the condition 
of assets upon the efficiency scores through a second stage regression. By examining the 
production process the DI is an input into the production process whereas the final desirable 
output for consumers is the volume of water delivered.  
Figure 4.11 depicts the industry average distribution input and water delivered over the period 
1996/97 to 2010/11. The difference between the measures is attributed to leakages. There is an 
average difference over the period of 231ml/day which reduces from 283ml/day to 223ml/day. 
Overall water delivered is used as an output of the production process to incorporate leakage 
whilst it is considered as the output for customers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: WaSC Distribution Input and Water Delivered 
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The physical amount of sewerage is proxied by the equivalent population served. The 
equivalent population served is an estimate of the capacity of the sewerage treatment works 
based on the assumption that one period is equivalent to 60g of biochemical oxygen demand. 
The equivalent population served is applied by Saal and Reid (2004), Stone and Webster 
(2004), Saal et al (2007), Bottasso et al (2011) and Saal et al (2011) use the equivalent 
population served. Meanwhile Erbetta and Cave (2007) and Cherchye et al (2013) use the 
physical measure of waste water returned. The equivalent population served is utilised by 
Ofwat within their assessment of efficiency.  
4.4.8 Environmental Variables  
 
The methodology chapter highlighted the need to control for the impact of environmental and 
operating characteristics beyond the control of management. Saal and Parker (2000) were the 
first to introduce quality into the measurement of efficiency. Appendix 1 outlines the 
environmental variables which have been used for the measurement of efficiency for the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. Given the choice of environmental variables 
used within the literature, six have been incorporated for the measurement of efficiency within 
this study.  
Saal and Parker (2000) highlight the need to control for changes in quality of water and 
sewerage output due to improved quality standards. Water quality is taken into account using 
a quality index which is defined as the ratio of the average percentage of each WaSCs’ water 
supply zones that are compliant with key water quality indicators as defined by the Drinking 
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Water Inspectorate (DWI11). This methodology follows that of Saal and Parker (2000), Erbetta 
and Cave (2007) and Bottasso and Conti (2009). The average quality index for the WaSCs 
alongside the minimum and maximum values is shown in figure 4.12. A value greater than 1 
implies that there has been a quality improvement relative to the average quality in 1997, 
whereas a number less than 1 implies that the quality is lower than the average in 1997. The 
graph indicates an improvement in the average quality throughout the period and a large 
increase in the minimum compliance until 2003.  
 
 
 
Sewerage quality is accounted for by calculating the proportion of the total load receiving 
secondary treatment. Figure 4.13 depicts the range of the sewerage quality index alongside the 
                                                          
11 The average of several key indicators are considered: taste, odour, nitrate, aluminium, iron, lead and 
pesticides  
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average. The graph shows that there is a substantial improvement with regards to sewerage 
quality from 1997 to 2003.  
 
 
 
 
The density of water and sewerage activities is considered to account for the differences in 
costs between operating in a rural and urban area. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Erbetta and 
Cave (2007) report that those firms operating under a higher water network density operate 
under a favourable environment. On the other, hand Saal and Reid (2004) report that higher 
water density results in higher opex costs, and therefore urban areas are unfavourable. The 
evidence for sewerage is mixed with several papers reporting that operating under an urban 
area is favourable whilst others report that it is unfavourable. Erbetta and Cave (2007) do not 
find a statistically significant influence of sewerage density on inputs slacks. Saal and Reid 
(2004) report that a higher sewerage density reduces opex costs, therefore operating in an urban 
area is favourable. Tupper and Resende (2004) regress sewerage density amongst other 
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variables on the reciprocal of the efficiency score.  They highlight that the expected influence 
is negative however report a positive influence. This indicates that operating within a high 
density area is unfavourable, although the impact is insignificant.  
Saal and Parker (2005) and Saal et al (2011) include squared terms for density for water 
activities and both water and sewerage activities respectively. Their results indicate that as 
density increases, costs/inputs are reduced, but this effect is exhausted at a sufficiently high 
level of density. Overall, this indicates that those operating in very rural and very urban areas 
operate under the most unfavourable operating environments. The density of a company’s 
water operations is calculated as the total water population divided by the length of mains. 
Similarly, sewerage density is calculated by the total sewerage population divided by the length 
of sewers. 
The proportion of water abstracted from rivers is included to take into account the differences 
in costs from abstracting from boreholes, rivers and reservoirs. Abstraction from river sources 
has a relatively low abstraction costs but a relatively high treatment costs. However abstraction 
from boreholes requires higher power costs for abstraction and requires less treatment due to 
the high purity of underground water. Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2011) and             
Cherchye et al (2013) find a higher proportion of distribution inputs from boreholes is 
favourable. On the other hand, Saal et al (2007) report a higher proportion of distribution input 
from boreholes increases input requirements. Bottasso and Conti (2003, 2009) and             
Cherchye et al (2013) incorporate the proportion of distribution input abstracted from rivers. 
Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Cherchye et al (2013) report that a higher proportion of 
abstraction from rivers is unfavourable, on the other hand Bottasso and Conti (2009) find that 
the proportion of abstraction from rivers is favourable, although imprecisely estimated.  
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The final environmental variable is the proportion of trade effluent, calculated as the volume 
of trade effluent divided by the volume of waste water returned. This represents the proportion 
of industrial effluent in the total waste water. The higher the proportion of trade effluent one 
expects to incur higher costs, especially with regards to treatment and energy costs due to the 
higher intensity of industrial trade effluent. Saal et al (2007) report that a higher proportion of 
trade effluent requires higher input requirements. Erbetta and Cave (2007) find an insignificant 
relationship between labour, other input slacks and trade effluent but report a negative and 
significant relationship for capital, therefore indicating that a higher proportion of trade effluent 
reduces slacks. This indicates a better performance. 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter has firstly outlined several specification issues and secondly outlined the data to 
be used within the following three chapters for the measurement of efficiency within the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. The majority of the data was obtained from 
the June return and supplementary data was obtained from the companies’ limited accounts 
and the DWI annual reports. The data does differ slightly between each chapter due to differing 
data requirements for each technique, which are outlined in their respective chapters. The 
following chapter will examine the rate of convergence of the efficiency scores within the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage.    
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5. Convergence in Efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
The regulatory price controls are undertaken every five years and operate through the use of  
𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝑄 − 𝑋. The 𝑋 factor is decomposed into two elements: a frontier shift and catch-up 
factor.  The frontier shift is the amount by which Ofwat assumes that all companies can make 
a minimum efficiency saving, the level of technical change. The second component is the 
catch-up factor based on Ofwat’s estimates of inefficiency through yardstick competition. The 
catch up factor is designed to encourage the inefficient firms to catch-up with the most efficient 
company by imposing stricter efficiency targets for the inefficient companies.  
Relative efficiency is determined through a series of COLS regressions at the functional level 
for water and sewerage activities. The predicted and actual expenditure are summed to the 
activity level and the distance to the frontier company is determined. Capital expenditure up 
until the 2004 price review was examined through a combination of COLS functional models 
and standard costs. The efficiency challenge is based on closing a proportion of the efficiency 
gap to the frontier, which is reported in table 2.5. The catch-up factor in 1999 was 60% for 
opex, 50% for capital maintenance and 75% for capital enhancement for the econometric 
models. The catch-up factors for the standard costs are reported in table 2.6. The efficiency 
challenge is larger for those firms who are inefficient to encourage firms to catch up with the 
frontier. Capital expenditure in the 2009 price review was assessed through menu regulation 
using the CIS which is designed to encourage truth-telling within firm’s submissions of 
predicted costs. Companies submit their plan and Ofwat establishes an independent baseline 
which they believe an efficient company would spend. Companies are incentivised to submit 
realistic and challenging plans as they can obtain favourable incentive rates and additional 
income. If firms achieve beyond expectation they receive incentives based upon the level of 
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outperformance. On the other hand any overspend is penalised by a proportion of that 
overspend.  
Overall, if regulation has been an effective tool this should result in productivity improvement 
through a shift in frontier and the catch-up factor should have encouraged convergence of 
efficiency scores towards best practice. A large amount of literature has emerged to examine 
whether privatisation and regulation of the industry has led to productivity improvements. 
Overall, the results indicate that privatisation has not led to an improvement in productivity 
whilst regulation has been effective in encouraging productivity improvement. This chapter 
examines whether the larger efficiency targets for the least efficient companies has resulted in 
the least efficient firms catching up with the most efficient firms, resulting in convergence. 
Cubbin (2005) state that over time we should expect the range of inefficiencies to narrow by 
the extent in which the incentives of regulation are effective. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and 
Saal et al (2007) examine the evolution of efficiency scores over time and report that the 
standard deviation of efficiency scores has decreased.  
This chapter extends upon the literature to estimate the presence of beta- and sigma- 
convergence (𝛽 - and 𝜎 -convergence) in the efficiency scores. The companies’ efficiency 
scores are measured using DEA whilst accounting for changes in quality through a quality-
adjusted measure of output. 𝛽 -convergence determines whether the least efficiency firms are 
improving at a faster than the most efficient firms, whereas 𝜎 -convergence determines whether 
the dispersion of efficiency scores has fallen over time. Finally, a Partial Adjustment Model 
(PAM) is estimated to determine whether firms are converging towards the frontier or whether 
inefficiencies are persistent. If the catch-up efficiency challenge has been effective, one would 
expect to see convergence amongst the firms within the industry towards the frontier.  
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 will review productivity literature 
within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. Section 3 outlines the 
methodologies applied for the measurement of efficiency and convergence. Section 4 will 
describe the data and variables used within estimation. Finally, the empirical results and 
discussions are reported in section 5.  
5.2 Literature review  
The privatisation and regulation of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry has 
spawned a large amount of literature examining whether policy change has been effective in 
improving productivity and efficiency. Productivity and efficiency have been analysed through 
the measurement of cost functions and frontier models, applying both parametric and              
non-parametric approaches. This section will provide a brief overview of the literature 
examining whether privatisation and different price reviews have been effective in encouraging 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, technical change, scale change and efficiency change.  
One of the first paper to examine the impact of privatisation and regulation was Saal and Parker 
(2000). Saal and Parker (2000) examine the impact of privatisation and regulation in the 
English and Welsh water and sewerage industry for the WaSCs over the period 1985–1999 
through the estimation of a multi-output translog cost function. To allow for the effect of 
substantial improvements in quality driven by the DWI and EA, Saal and Parker (2000) model 
a quality adjusted cost function alongside a quality-unadjusted model. Quality is incorporated 
through a quality-adjusted measure of output. These results highlight the importance of taking 
into consideration substantial changes in quality standard within the industry through the 
impact on the interaction term between water and sewerage activities and finding an 
improvement in the quality of one output may reduce the cost of producing the other. The 
multi-output specification allows for the joint production of water and sewerage activities. Saal 
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and Parker (2000) find there are intrinsic links between water and sewerage activities although 
no presence of economies of scope. The impact of privatisation and regulation upon 
productivity is examined. This paper reports an increase in productivity post-privatisation 
however reports that the 1994 price review was the main contributor rather than privatisation. 
The parameter estimates for the 1994 review suggest that after the regulatory review costs rose 
more slowly by 0.5% per annum. 
Ashton (2000a) employs a variable translog cost function to analyse firm-specific cost 
efficiency for the period 1987–1997. The paper finds a moderate level of dispersion in the 
efficiency scores which is described as an indicator of the differences in the operating 
environments and performance within the sector. Ashton (2000b) examines TFP and technical 
change through the estimation of a translog cost function for the period 1989–1997. Their 
results display a TFP productivity growth of -0.046% which has worsened over the period, 
indicating a decline in productivity. TFP is decomposed into economies of scale, technical 
change and changes in the level of outputs.  The measure of technical change over the period 
reports a negligible effect of -0.048%. Overall, the paper concludes that the initial level of 
investment post-privatisation has not influenced the productivity of the industry over the period 
and that privatisation has not improved the level of technical change or productivity growth. 
Bottasso and Conti (2003) examine operating cost efficiency for the WaSCs and WoCs for 
water activities and estimate an SFA cost function to examine the evolution of efficiency over 
the period 1995 and 2001. The model incorporates environmental variables within the error 
term to allow for the environmental variables to directly impact efficiency. Their results find 
that operating cost inefficiency has decreased over the sample period and that inefficiency 
differentials amongst firms has narrowed. Bottasso and Conti (2003) apply a Kruskal-Wallis 
test which rejects the null hypothesis that the median scores for each year are equal and find a 
cost reduction of 5% between 1995 and 2001. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric 
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technique for testing whether the samples originate from the same distribution. They report that 
that standard deviation has reduced from 0.08 in 1995 to 0.03 in 2001, implying convergence 
in the efficiency scores.  
Saal et al (2007) examine productivity growth and efficiency for the English and Welsh water 
and sewerage industry through the estimation of an SFA input distance function for water and 
sewerage activities for WaSCs. The parameter estimate for the time trend indicates that the 
sample average firm has experienced technical change of 1.8% in the mid-year sample. The 
second order term although insignificant indicates that technical change has decreased over the 
period from 2.2% in 1986 to 1.39% in 2000. Saal et al (2007) examine the evolution of the 
efficiency scores over time and they highlight a fall in the mean and median efficiency score 
post-privatisation which might be the result of the particularly lax price review in 1989. 
Efficiency began to improve after 1993 which they highlight may have been due to the 
signalling by Ofwat of its intensions to tighten the regulation of the industry to raise efficiency. 
Over the period 1990 to 2000 the efficiency level for the least efficient firms has improved. 
Saal et al (2007) conclude that the price cap had a positive impact on those firms which were 
inefficient at privatisation. However, the paper reports that the average efficiency score at the 
end of the period was moderately lower than at privatisation. The paper highlights that 
efficiency scores for the average firm are relatively high and therefore substantial gains in 
efficiency may be hard to achieve.  
An index number approach is examined by Saal and Parker (2001) who report that privatisation 
led to an increase in labour productivity, in which majority was after the 1994 price review. 
Overall TFP did not increase significantly; this suggests that the exclusion of capital 
expenditure may leave to overestimated productivity gains. Overall the paper concludes that 
neither privatisation nor the 1994 price review improved productivity. 
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Saal et al (2007) measure TFP for the WaSCs for water and sewerage activities estimating an 
input distance function using SFA.  Saal et al (2007) note that there are substantial differences 
in the average TFP estimates compared to Saal and Parker (2001) due to the increased 
complexity of the methodology in Saal et al (2007).  Both papers find that productivity growth 
was not statistically different after privatisation and that productivity growth rates were lower 
in the 1995–2000 period than they had been before privatisation.  
Saal et al (2007) decompose TFP growth rates into technical change, efficiency change and 
scale change. Technical change is always positive and relatively stable. The average annual 
increase in technical change increased from 1.61% before privatisation to 2.19% for the entire 
post privatisation period. The scale effect has a negative impact on TFP over the whole period, 
which is consistent with the results that WaSCs are characterised by diseconomies of scale.  
Saal et al (2007) highlight that efficiency change trends are the main determinant of the trends 
in the average WaSC TFP growth. The average annual efficiency change decreased from 0.4% 
in the pre-privatised period to -0.16% for the post-privatised period, however the difference is 
not statistically significant. The average efficiency score in 2000 was 98.4% of the level of 
privatisation in 1990. Saal et al (2007) conclude that it would appear that if privatisation and/or 
the imposition of 𝑅𝑃𝐼 + 𝐾 regulation has had an impact on WaSC performance, it has been 
primarily through encouraging faster technical change rather than encouraging firms on 
average to move closer to the industry efficient frontier. However it has been effective in 
encouraging the least efficient firms to catch-up to the frontier.   
The previous studies discussed have examined the impact of privatisation and regulation upon 
efficiency and productivity. Erbetta and Cave (2007), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Saal and 
Reid (2004) examine the influence of the 1994 and 1999 price review. Erbetta and Cave (2007) 
measure cost efficiency and examine the impact of regulation using a two-stage DEA model. 
Within the first stage, the technical and allocative efficiency scores are calculated. Graphing 
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the average efficiency score over time finds an improvement in both the technical and 
allocative efficiency score. The graph indicates that technical efficiency has improved by 
around 5% since the 1999 price review and that the 1994 price reviews has had no effect on 
allocative efficiency. The second stage employs an SFA model to examine the impact of 
environmental variables on the input slacks. Separate regressions are analysed for allocative12 
and technical input slacks for each input. A time trend is included within the second stage 
regression to examine whether the utilisation of inputs has increased or decreased over the 
period. The time trend for technical efficiency input slacks indicates a more intensive use of 
inputs over time. The results also indicate positive technical change for the allocative 
component. Overall, the two time trends represent a more intensive use of inputs offset by an 
improvement in the combination used.  
Erbetta and Cave (2007) examine the impact of the different regulatory price reviews on the 
excess input slacks by including regulatory dummies alongside the environmental variables 
within the second stage regression. The regulatory dummies indicate efficiency improvement 
as a result of the 1994 and 1999 price review for technical efficiency, although the effect of 
1994 price review is not significant.  The regulatory dummies are not significant for allocative 
efficiency. 
Saal and Reid (2004) estimate opex productivity by employing a quasi-fixed variable capital 
translog cost function for water and sewerage activities for the WaSCs. Whilst their results did 
not consider pre-privatisation, their results coincide with those of Saal and Parker (2000) to 
highlight that the 1994 price review improved productivity. However, the paper finds that the 
1999 price review did not bring any improvements in productivity. The paper reports 
                                                          
12 The allocative efficiency slack is measured as 𝑇𝐸. 𝑥 − 𝑥∗.  𝑇𝐸 is the technical efficiency and 𝑥∗ is the optimal 
input derived from the DEA linear programme. Allocative efficiency can take a positive or negative value, the 
absolute value is taken as a measure of the level of distortion without distinguishing between input over- or 
under-utilisation 
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substantial productivity gains have been achieved through substitution of opex with capital 
investment. The elasticity of opex with respect to labour costs has declined considerably, which 
is consistent with the substitution away from labour towards other inputs that has occurred 
within the industry. 
Bottasso and Conti (2009) examine economies of scale and technical change for the WoCs 
using a variable cost function for the period 1995–2005. Their results on total factor 
productivity indicate that the rate of technical change is much higher after the 1999 price 
review, rising to 1.6% a year in comparison to the rate after the 1994 price review which was 
close to zero. Bottasso and Conti (2009) formally test whether variable costs were significantly 
different as a result of the 1999 price review through the inclusion of an interaction term 
between the time trend and a dummy variable for the five years after the 1999 price review. 
Their estimates reveal that the 1999 price review reduced costs, although the effect was 
insignificant. Their results indicate that the improvement was partly due to labour saving 
technological progress.  
Saal and Parker (2005) examine productivity for water activities for WaSCs and WoCs through 
the application of an input distance function. Saal and Parker (2005) find an average positive 
productivity growth for water activities between 1994 and 2000 for WaSCs and WoCs. They 
note that the main contribution of the positive productivity growth is attributed to technical 
change.  
Portela et al (2011) examine productivity for the period 1993–2007 through a meta-Malmquist 
frontier for operating expenditure. The paper reports productivity improvements between 1993 
and 2005 of which most were due to technical change instead of catching up to the frontier.  
Portela et al (2011) report that over time companies’ efficiency scores are moving closer to the 
meta-frontier. The meta-frontier envelops all companies within all time periods and the         
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meta-efficiencies are therefore measured against a stationary frontier. The meta-frontier 
efficiency improved until 2002, remained relatively stable between 2002 and 2005 and began 
to decline between 2005/06 and 2006/07. Portela et al (2011) highlight that their results 
coincide with Ofwat’s statement that the improvement in relative efficiency since the 1999 
price review is striking. Towards the end of the period the year-specific frontiers are moving 
closer to the meta-frontier, therefore indicating that the main driver of productivity is 
technological change. The data is divided into four groups representing the different regulatory 
periods and the results show an improvement in productivity over the regulatory periods with 
the exception of the 2004 price review. The paper does highlight that productivity as a result 
2004 price review may have been underestimated due to the rise in electricity prices and the 
implementation of leakage control being charged to opex rather than capex.  
Overall, the studies examining the implication of privatisation and the 1994 price review report 
that privatisation did not statistically improve productivity. The results of the effect of the 1994 
price review are mixed. Saal and Parker (2000) report an improvement in TFP due to the price 
review, whereas Saal and Parker (2001) and Saal et al (2007) report an insignificant impact on 
TFP. Bottasso and Conti (2009), Erbetta and Cave (2007) and Saal and Reid (2004) all examine 
the impact of the 1994 and 1999 price review. The results from Bottasso and Conti (2009) and 
Erbetta and Cave (2007) find no statistically different impact of the 1994 price review and 
report a significant improvement as a result of the 1999 price review. On the other hand, Saal 
and Reid (2004) report that the 1994 price review has a positive impact on TFP, whereas the 
1999 price review did not have any effect of productivity. With regards to the dispersion of 
efficiency scores. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Saal et al (2007) report a fall in the dispersion 
of the efficiency scores with the least efficient firms improving and therefore implying 
convergence. This chapter will extend upon this analysis to examine and quantify whether there 
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has been any convergence in the efficiency scores from 1997 to 2011 through the estimation 
of 𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence. 
5.3 Literature Review on Convergence  
 
This section outlines the procedure for identifying whether firms’ efficiency scores have 
converged within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. The issue of 
convergence originates within the growth literature. Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Marin 
(1991, 1992) introduce the concepts of 𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence.  
𝛽-convergence examines whether firms with a low initial level of efficiency improve faster 
than those with a higher initial level of efficiency. In other words, those firms with a lower 
initial level of efficiency are catching up with those of an initial higher efficiency. Therefore, 
over time, firms’ efficiency scores should converge. This is measured by regressing the growth 
rate of efficiency on the initial level of efficiency. The concept of 𝛽-convergence has been 
applied to the analysis of efficiency by Fung (2006) and Casu and Girardone (2010).  
 
 
Source: Gluschenko (2012) 
A B 
Figure 5.1: Conditional Vs Unconditional 𝛽-convergence  
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Convergence can be measured either through absolute or conditional 𝛽-convergence. Absolute 
convergence implies that firms are converging towards the same steady state efficiency level 
as depicted by the dashed line in figure 5.1a. If absolute 𝛽-convergence is present then firms 
converge to the same steady state where the least efficient firms are improving faster than the 
relatively efficient firms. Barro (2012) suggests the use of unconditional or absolute 
convergence in the situation where firms are reasonably homogeneous in terms of long-run or 
steady-state characteristics. 
Conditional convergence depicted in figure 5.1b suggests that each firm or group of firms with 
a set of characteristics possess its own steady-state productivity level. This is measured by 
regressing the growth rate of the efficiency score on the initial level of efficiency and a set of 
characteristics.  The fixed effects model is an extreme case of conditional convergence in which 
each firm has its own steady state which it is converging towards. Gluschenko (2012) highlight 
that under conditional convergence the interpretation differs. 𝛽-convergence no longer implies 
the speed of convergence to the industry steady state level of efficiency but rather the speed of 
convergence to the firm’s own steady state efficiency. This is determined not by considering 
the distance between the most inefficient firm to the industry steady state but by the distance 
of each firm’s efficiency level to its own steady state. If conditional 𝛽-convergence is present 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) state that efficiency grows faster the further a given firm is 
from its individual steady state efficiency score. Gluschenko (2012) states that conditional 
convergence is uninformative to how growth rates of different firms relate and therefore should 
be interpreted with caution.  
There are several limitations of the application of 𝛽-convergence. Quah (1996) highlights that 
if 𝛽-convergence is present this implies that firms with a low efficiency score are growing 
faster than those with a high efficiency score. The situation may arise whereby those firms with 
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lower initial efficiency may overtake the higher efficiency firms, therefore implying a lack of 
convergence. Quah (1996) also reports that 𝛽-convergence provides no information about the 
evolution of the dispersion of the efficiency scores. Sala-i-Martin (1996) states that a negative 
coefficient for 𝛽-convergence could be the result of measurement error and random shocks 
instead of real convergence; this is known as regression towards the mean (Friedman, 1992; 
Quah, 1993). 
To overcome the shortcomings of 𝛽 -convergence, 𝜎 -convergence is also examined.                    
𝜎-convergence considers whether the dispersion (the standard deviation) of efficiency scores 
amongst firms diminishes over time. This is measured by regressing the growth rate of the 
standard deviation by the initial standard deviation. Sala-i-Martin (1996) states that                      
𝛽-convergence is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence of 𝜎- convergence. 
Fung (2006) states that if 𝛽-convergence is to measure real convergence then it has to coincide 
with 𝜎-convergence. 
Evidence of 𝛽-convergence implies that the least efficient firms are improving at a faster rate 
than the most efficient firms. This might be due to the least efficient firms catching up with the 
most efficient firms or could be due to the most efficient firm’s efficiency scores declining, or 
lagging behind. The regulatory tools utilised by Ofwat are designed to encourage catch-up to 
the frontier. Alongside the measurement of 𝛽-convergence and 𝜎- convergence, a PAM is 
estimated to measure the adjustment of the efficiency scores to the best practice frontier. This 
identifies whether firms are converging towards the frontier or whether inefficiencies are 
persistent. 
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5.4 Methodology  
 
5.4.1 Evaluating Efficiency 
Technical efficiency is calculated through the BCC DEA linear programming problem in 
equation (5.1). 𝑌 is a 𝑅 by 𝑁 matrix, where 𝑅 is the number of outputs and 𝑁 the number of 
DMU’s. 𝑋 is a 𝐽 by 𝑁 matrix of inputs. 𝜃𝑛 is the efficiency score for n-th unit which takes the 
value 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑛 ≤ 1.  As a result of the discussion in the methodology chapter, efficiency is 
examined under input-orientation and VRS. Input orientation is widely considered within the 
literature (Thanassoulis, 2000a,b; Cubbin and Tzanidakis, 1998 and Erbetta and Cave, 2007) 
as the demand level faced by suppliers is exogenous due to their legal obligation to supply 
water and sewerage services. VRS does not assume that firms are operating at their optimal 
size and therefore excludes any scale inefficiencies. Efficiency is examined under VRS as 
managers have very little control over their size, apart from mergers and acquisitions which 
are subject to review by the competition commission.  A separate frontier is calculated for each 
time period to allow for technical regress and progress.  
 
𝜃𝑛 = min
𝜃,𝜆
𝜃 
                       𝑠. 𝑡.     𝑌𝜆 ≥ 𝑦𝑛                  (5.1) 
   𝑋𝜆 ≤ 𝜃𝑥𝑛 
𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝑖 ′𝜆 = 1 
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5.4.2 Convergence 
𝛽- convergence is inferred by running the following panel data regression model: 
Δ𝜃𝑛,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽(ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡         (5.2) 
𝜃𝑛,𝑡= Efficiency of firm 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
𝜀𝑛,𝑡 is a random effect and 𝜀𝑛,𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
Δ𝜃𝑛,𝑡 = (ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡) − (ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1)  
Here  𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁  and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  and 𝛼  and 𝛽  are the parameters to be estimated. The 
dependent variable in the equation is the growth rate of efficiency. If the coefficient 𝛽 between 
the growth rate of efficiency over time and the initial level of efficiency is negative, this 
indicates that presence of 𝛽-convergence. The larger the absolute value of the coefficient 
implies a greater tendency of convergence. Arbia and Piras (2005) calculate the half-life speed 
of convergence as 𝜏 =  − ln(2)/ ln(1 + 𝛽), this calculates the time span which is necessary 
for the current disparities to be halved. Therefore, a larger absolute value of 𝛽 implies a faster 
rate of convergence and a faster half-life.  
The steady state mean efficiency in which firms are converging towards is calculated as: 
                      𝜃 = exp (
𝛼
−𝛽
)                   (5.3) 
The estimation of 𝜎 -convergence is given in equation 5.4. This evaluates whether the 
dispersion of efficiency falls over time following Parikh and Shibata (2004), Weill (2009) and 
Casu and Girardone (2010). 
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Δ𝐸𝑛,𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝜑ln (𝐸𝑛,𝑡−1) + 𝜉𝑛,𝑡       (5.4) 
Where: 
 𝐸𝑛,𝑡 =  ln (𝜃𝑛,𝑡) − ln(𝜃?̅?) , where 𝜃?̅? is the mean efficiency score at time 𝑡,   
Δ𝐸𝑛,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑛,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑛,𝑡−1  
𝜉𝑛,𝑡 is a random error and 𝜉𝑛,𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜉
2).  
A negative value for the parameter 𝜑 implies unconditional 𝜎-convergence. The exponential 
of the intercept 𝜇 indicates the average dispersion from the mean.  
To analyse the adjustment of efficiency scores to the frontier, the standard Partial Adjustment 
Model (PAM) is employed following Casu and Girardone (2010). The convergence towards 
the best practice; an efficiency score of 1 is evaluated by the following adjustment mechanism 
ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡 − ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1 =  𝛾(ln 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (5.5) 
Here, 𝜃𝑛,𝑡  and 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1  are defined as before and 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum attainable efficiency 
score i.e. unity. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 𝛾 is the adjustment parameter and measures the speed of 
adjustment towards the maximum attainable efficiency score. A positive value of 𝛾 signifies 
convergence towards the frontier whereas a negative value implies lack of convergence, or 
persistent inefficiency.  
5.5 Interpretation of Convergence  
 
𝛽-convergence can be related to the Malmquist index of productivity discussed within section 
3.5.5.8. Figure 5.1 shows a one input and one output production function for two time periods.  
Point D is the point of production in period 𝑡 and point E is the point of production in period 
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𝑡 + 1. The efficiency score in period 𝑡 is calculated by the ratio 𝑦𝑠/𝑦𝑎 and 𝑦𝑡/𝑦𝑐 for period    
𝑡 + 1. The Malmquist index decomposes productivity into technical change and efficiency 
change. Efficiency change is measured as 
𝑦𝑡/𝑦𝑐
𝑦𝑠/𝑦𝑎
. The efficiency change is reported for each 
company and each time period and the geometric mean reports the average efficiency for each 
period. Portela et al (2011) examine the geometric mean of the efficiency change for WaSCs 
and WoCs for each period. Their results find a negligible influence on the average efficiency 
over the period. 𝛽-convergence is an extension on the efficiency change to examine whether 
the least efficient companies are improving at a faster rate than the most efficient firms. The 
growth rate of efficiency for each firm is calculated as log (
𝑦𝑡/𝑦𝑐
𝑦𝑠/𝑦𝑎
). This chapter will measure 
efficiency change alongside 𝛽-convergence to examine whether the average rate of efficiency 
change differs in comparison to the rate of efficiency growth for the least efficiency company 
compared the most the most efficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  𝛽-convergence and efficiency change 
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If both 𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence are present this can be interpreted as an indicator of general 
improvement within the industry. The least efficient firms are improving at a faster rate, and 
therefore are catching up with the most efficient firms. 𝜎 -convergence indicates that the 
dispersion of efficiency scores across the firms is getting smaller over time. If the presence of 
𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence coincides with a positive coefficient for the PAM this implies that firms 
are converging towards the frontier. A negative value indicates that although the dispersion of 
firms is reduced, the level of inefficiency is persistent. Casu and Girardone (2010) state that 
the situation can be interpreted as those firms with lower initial efficiency level are catching 
up with the average and those above the mean are regressing towards the average.  
Sala-i- Martin (1996) state that 𝛽-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
𝜎-convergence and not vice-versa. Therefore there is a possibility to experience 𝛽-convergence 
without the presence of 𝜎 -convergence. The presence of 𝛽 -convergence and lack of                     
𝜎-convergence implies that those firms with lower initial efficiency levels experience a higher 
growth rate, although the dispersion of efficiency scores has not fallen. This scenario can arise 
if the least efficient firms overtake the more efficient firms.  
5.6 Estimation  
 The unconditional 𝛽-convergence in equation 5.2 is estimated by applying pooled OLS with 
robust standard errors to correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity. Unconditional 
convergence implies that the firms are converging towards the same steady state efficiency 
score. Islam (1995) highlights that there might be underlying firm heterogeneities. In the 
presence of firm heterogeneities, the 𝛽-convergence can be denoted in equation 5.6  
Δ𝜃𝑛,𝑡 =  𝛽(ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) +  𝜂𝑛 + 𝑣𝑛𝑡      (5.6) 
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Where 𝜂𝑛  is a company-specific effect to represent time-invariant firm heterogeneities. 
Equation 5.6 can be re-written as an AR(1) equation13:  
ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡 =  𝑏(ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) +  𝜂𝑛 + 𝑣𝑛𝑡     (5.7) 
Where 𝑏 =  𝛽 + 1.   
In the presence of an AR(1) model, OLS gives an estimate of 𝑏 that is biased upwards in the 
presence of company-specific effects, therefore giving a downwards estimates of the rate of 
convergence 𝛽 (Bond et al, 2001). To incorporate company-specific effects, equation 5.6 can 
be estimated by using Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE). FE controls for time-
invariant effect so that the estimated coefficients are not biased because of omitted time-
invariant characteristics. RE assumes that individual country effects are uncorrelated with the 
exogenous variables, an assumption that is sometimes violated. If the individual country effects 
are correlated with the exogenous variables then the estimates would be biased and inconsistent 
and FE would be preferred.  
To determine the correct estimation procedure a series of tests are conducted. To determine 
whether FE or RE is preferable, a Hausman test is applied. The Hausman test examines the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. 
If rejected the random effects model produced bias estimators, and therefore a FE model is 
preferred. To test for FE against the OLS model an F-test is applied which tests whether the 
fixed effects are zero. To test for RE against OLS, a Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
is applied which tests whether the cross-section variance components are zero.  
                                                          
13 The 𝛽-convergence equation is re-written as an AR(1) to estimate 𝛽-convergence using dynamic panel data 
models of Arellano and Bond (1991).  
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The application of FE or RE addresses the issue of the omitted variable bias within the OLS 
model. The inclusion of fixed effects measures conditional 𝛽 -convergence. Conditional             
𝛽-convergence estimates the rate of convergence after accounting for differences in the steady 
states across countries (Islam, 1995). Islam (1995) highlights that the rate of 𝛽-convergence is 
faster under conditional 𝛽 -convergence than unconditional 𝛽 -convergence due to omitted 
variable bias.  It is important to reiterate that Gluschenko (2012) highlights that the 
interpretation differs for conditional convergence.  
The fixed effects estimator controls for the time-invariant characteristics, but introduces an 
issue with regards to endogeneity. By construction, the lagged dependent variable in equation 
5.7 is correlated with the individual specific effect, i.e 𝐸( 𝜇𝑛|𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) ≠ 0 . Nickell (1981) 
shows that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (𝑏) is biased downwards in the 
presence of fixed effects, therefore biasing the estimate of 𝛽-convergence upwards. The bias 
tends to zero as the time span gets large, however the bias can be large in short panels. Bond 
et al (2001) state that a consistent estimate of 𝑏 is expected to lie in between the OLS levels 
and FE estimate.  
To correct for the presence of fixed effects within dynamic panel data models, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) introduce the first difference GMM estimator (GMM-DIFF) for panel data with 
large 𝑁 and finite 𝑇.  The first differencing in equation 5.8 removes the fixed effects; however 
the first differences error term 𝑣𝑛,𝑡 − 𝑣𝑛,𝑡−1 is correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1  through the term 𝑣𝑛,𝑡−1. 
Δ ln(𝜃𝑛,𝑡) = 𝑏Δ ln(𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1 ) + Δ𝑣𝑛,𝑡       (5.8) 
 Therefore, the GMM-DIFF instruments the first difference with the lagged levels. Bond et al 
(2001) highlight that the GMM-DIFF can be problematic as the lagged levels might be weak 
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instruments for the first differences. To address the issue of weak instruments the System-
GMM (SYS-GMM) introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) is applied. The SYS-GMM 
instruments the lagged dependent variable by the first difference.  
5.7 Data  
The specification of the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry was extensively 
discussed in the data chapter. The rate of convergence is analysed for the WaSCs for the period 
1996/97–2010/11. Efficiency is examined for each period under a separate frontier. A 
fundamental stage within DEA analysis is the choice of inputs and outputs. One of the 
limitations of DEA is the issue of dimensionality; this being that the convergence rate becomes 
slower as the number of inputs and outputs is increased. The issue of dimensionality reduces 
the discriminatory power of the model. Therefore a trade-off is considered between specifying 
the most accurate model whilst avoiding the problem of dimensionality. In the presence of 
panel data, this problem can be overcome by pooling the data under a common frontier; treating 
each time period as if it were a separate DMU. However, this implicitly assumes that there is 
no technological progress and/or regress. The evaluation of convergence requires separate 
technology for each time period14, therefore the minimum number of DMUs within the analysis 
is ten WaSCs. 
A one input and two output model is analysed with the input as the costs. As the inputs within 
the models are costs, efficiency can be interpreted as cost efficiency. This specification 
therefore implies that firms face the same input prices. Thanassoulis (2000a,b) models 
operating expenditure using DEA and states that companies face similar staff and material 
                                                          
14 A separate frontier is required; otherwise the speed of convergence will be biased as firms will not be 
examined against their true technology available within the period. In the presence of technological change 
firms at the beginning of the period will be relatively inefficient, as the technology is not available. 
Improvements in the efficiency score under a meta-frontier can be as a result of technical change or efficiency. 
This chapter aims to examine convergence in the efficiency score.  
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prices, therefore once differences in the environment have been taken into account the 
remaining differences in costs will relate to operating efficiency. Portela et al (2011) use one 
input, opex, to measure productivity within the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry, and therefore state that their measure of efficiency relates to cost efficiency. Portela 
et al (2011) apply a single deflation index based on RPI, and highlight that their results may be 
biased if RPI does not reflect price rises for each component of opex, for example, the fast rise 
in electricity prices. Following Erbetta and Cave (2007) all costs apart from power costs are 
deflated using RPI to 2009 prices. Power is deflated by an energy price index for the industrial 
sector derived from the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Two separate models are considered for water and sewerage activities; total and variable costs. 
Variable costs are calculated as total operating expenditure net of third party services, 
exceptional items, doubtful debts, service charge and local authority rates15.  Total costs are 
calculated as variable costs and capital costs.  
Outputs 
Two outputs are incorporated within the model: firstly the water delivered (𝑌1) and secondly, 
the equivalent population served (𝑌2). Bottasso and Conti (2003) highlight the estimation gains 
for including not only the physical quantity of outputs but also the number of properties served 
for water and sewerage16. However as the estimation of 𝛽-convergence requires a separate 
                                                          
15 These costs are deemed as non-controllable costs by Ofwat and are not incorporated within their assessment 
of efficiency. Exceptional items are by definition atypical. Third party services relate to costs incurred for output 
produced by other companies. Local authority rates and doubtful debts are considered as non-controllable. High 
levels of doubtful debts are due to the legal and regulatory decision of prohibiting the shutting off of water and 
sewerage activities when bills are not paid. Service charges are charges by the Environment Agency for water 
abstraction. 
16 The physical measure of output is applied instead of the number of properties billed, as sewerage quality is 
measured as the proportion of total load receiving sewerage treatment (BOD/Year). This is directly related to the 
measure of equivalent population served which is calculated based on the assumption that one person is 
equivalent to a load of 60g of BOD. This approach allows for a quality-adjusted measure of the physical output.  
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DEA model for each time period, a two output model is applied to avoid the problem of 
dimensionality.   
Saal and Parker (2000) highlight the importance of the including changes in quality standard 
by the regulators within the measurement of efficiency. Large capital programmes have been 
undertaken since privatisation to improve quality standards within the industry. Following Saal 
and Parker (2000) a quality-adjusted measure of output is applied to account for changes in 
quality. The quality-adjusted measure of output implicitly makes the assumption that quality 
improvements require additional inputs. Water quality is regulated by the DWI.  A quality 
index is defined as the ratio of the average percentage of each WaSCs water supply zones that 
are compliant with key water quality indicators defined by the DWI17 (𝑄𝑤). Sewerage quality 
is accounted for by calculating the proportion of the total load receiving secondary treatment 
(𝑄𝑠). Adopting the approach of Saal and Parker (2000), by applying a quality-adjusted measure 
of output, the water delivered is multiplied by the water quality index                                               
(𝑌1 = 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 × 𝑄𝑤)  and sewerage is multiplied by the sewerage quality index 
(𝑌2 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑄𝑆). 
Ofwat considers the impact of other exogenous variables which may impact upon costs within 
their assessment of efficiency, such as the source of distribution input and the company’s 
operating density18. The importance and impact of the inclusion of these additional variables 
is highlighted by Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007) and within the chapter 6 of this 
thesis. Additional operating characteristics have not been accounted for within the analysis of 
                                                          
17 The average of several key indicators are considered; taste, odour, nitrate, aluminium, iron, lead and 
pesticides 
18 Portela et al (2011) extend the quality adjusted output approach to adjust for density. This approach is not 
applied within this study. Firstly, as output is adjusted for quality and secondly, the approach violates the 
translation invariance property of DEA and therefore biases the efficiency scores.  
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convergence due to the problem of dimensionality. Table 5.1 shows a snapshot of the data used 
in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Outputs
Water Delivered Ml/Day 1,014.6 551.9 284.2 2,179.4
Equivalent Population (,000) 6,179.8 3,704.1 1,118.4 14,271.9
Inputs
Total Costs £m 648.9 303.9 220.6 1,346.7
Variable Costs £m 241.7 124.8 76.9 577.2
Operating Characteristics
Water Quality 0.967 0.026 0.836 0.995
Sewerage Quality 0.904 0.152 0.302 1
Note. 150 Observations. Costs and Input prices are
 expressed in real terms in 2009 prices
Table 5.1: Convergence Sample Descriptive Statistics 
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5.8 Results  
5.8.1 Unconditional Convergence 
 
This section outlines the results for the estimation of efficiency within the English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry for total and variable costs. The results for the estimation of               
𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence have been estimated to examine whether companies’ efficiency scores 
have converged over the period 1996/97–2010/11. Firstly, unconditional 𝛽-convergence is 
examined; the convergence to a common steady state within the industry. To account for 
regional heterogeneities, conditional 𝛽-convergence is examined through the estimation of 
fixed effects, random effects, GMM-DIFF and a GMM-SYS model. Finally, 𝜎-convergence 
and a PAM are estimated to determine whether the dispersion of the efficiency scores has 
decreased and if the efficiency scores are persistent.  
The yearly efficiency scores for total and variable costs are reported in table 5.2. The estimates 
reveal that an average inefficiency of 13% for total costs and 10% for variable costs 
respectively. An average of three companies for variable costs and four companies for total 
costs make up the frontier and are efficient. The minimum efficiency score over the period is 
59.6% for total costs and 57.6% for variable costs. The majority of companies are more 
efficient for variable costs than the total costs models with the exception of WaSC2 which 
becomes less efficient.  
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: 𝛽-convergence efficiency scores 
Table 5.2- 𝛽-convergence efficiency scores 
Total  Cost Efficiency
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC1 0.751 0.737 0.729 0.778 0.689 0.779 0.792 0.759 0.753 0.776 0.796 0.766 0.761 0.738 0.754
WaSC2 0.718 0.684 0.636 0.691 0.678 0.691 0.67 0.707 0.719 0.738 0.733 0.709 0.707 0.795 0.788
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 0.919 0.907 0.936 0.919 0.861 0.953 0.94 0.932 0.888 0.972 0.938 0.876 0.881 0.901 0.91
WaSC5 0.937 0.91 0.919 0.932 0.985 1 1 1 0.962 0.932 0.911 0.895 0.937 0.91 0.947
WaSC6 0.647 0.651 0.596 0.645 0.659 0.656 0.711 0.676 0.705 0.727 0.689 0.694 0.71 0.734 0.699
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 0.740 0.787 0.777 0.74 0.845 0.865 0.857 0.846 0.813 0.828 0.839 0.790 0.747 0.722 0.69
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.859 0.869 0.842 0.9 0.858 0.961 0.954 0.914 0.949 0.965 0.962 0.93 0.916 0.924 0.895
Average 0.857 0.855 0.843 0.861 0.858 0.890 0.892 0.884 0.879 0.894 0.887 0.866 0.866 0.873 0.868
Minimum 0.647 0.651 0.596 0.645 0.659 0.656 0.67 0.676 0.705 0.727 0.689 0.694 0.707 0.722 0.69
Std Deviation 0.133 0.133 0.153 0.135 0.14 0.135 0.127 0.128 0.121 0.114 0.116 0.12 0.123 0.115 0.125
Variable Cost Efficiency 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC1 0.799 0.819 0.778 0.808 0.673 0.798 0.839 0.81 0.777 0.8 0.842 0.873 0.837 0.824 0.812
WaSC2 0.682 0.639 0.576 0.629 0.597 0.629 0.644 0.658 0.673 0.746 0.755 0.742 0.725 0.771 0.741
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 1 1 1 0.957 0.904 0.984 0.969 1 0.894 1 1 0.952 0.925 0.949 0.889
WaSC5 0.925 0.948 0.926 0.935 0.939 0.982 0.96 0.94 0.963 0.903 0.864 0.834 0.922 0.853 0.836
WaSC6 0.656 0.732 0.679 0.718 0.789 0.74 0.727 0.692 0.721 0.785 0.729 0.753 0.851 0.848 0.709
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 1 1 0.963 0.893 1 1 0.986 0.973 0.877 0.968 0.997 0.936 0.923 0.898 0.856
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.849 0.905 0.87 0.963 0.86 0.995 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.93
Average 0.891 0.904 0.879 0.890 0.876 0.913 0.913 0.907 0.890 0.920 0.919 0.909 0.918 0.914 0.877
Minimum 0.656 0.639 0.576 0.629 0.597 0.629 0.644 0.658 0.673 0.746 0.729 0.742 0.725 0.771 0.709
Std Deviation 0.137 0.131 0.153 0.13 0.147 0.138 0.131 0.136 0.126 0.104 0.111 0.103 0.091 0.087 0.106
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The evolution of efficiency scores and the standard deviation for total costs are depicted in 
figure 5.3.The mean efficiency score over the period has increased from 85.7% in 1997 to 
86.8% in 2011. The minimum efficiency score has improved throughout the period from 64.7% 
to 69%. The standard deviation of the efficiency scores, depicted in figure 5.4 has fallen over 
the period from 0.133 and 0.125. The basic description of total cost efficiency would therefore 
indicate that there is limited convergence within the industry.   
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Figure 5.3: WaSC Total Costs Efficiency Score  
Figure 5.4: WaSC Total Costs Efficiency Score Standard Deviation 
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The evolution of the efficiency for variable cost efficiency is shown in figure 5.5. The mean 
efficiency score has decreased from 89.1% to 87.6% over the period. Although the average 
efficiency score appears to have fallen, there was a large drop in the efficiency score in 2011 
from 77.1% in 2010 to 70.9% in 2011. The minimum efficiency score has increased from 
65.6% to 70.9%. Overall the standard deviation of the efficiency scores has reduced over time 
from 0.14 to 0.11 which is depicted in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.5: WaSC Variable Costs Efficiency Score  
Figure 5.6: WaSC Variable Costs Efficiency Score Standard Deviation  
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The results for the estimation of unconditional convergence are shown in table 5.3. Examining 
convergence for total costs, the coefficient for 𝛽-convergence implies a rate of convergence of 
4.2% a year which is significant at the 10% level, implying a half-life of 16.25 years with a 
steady state efficiency score of 88%. The coefficient for variable costs implies a rate of 
convergence of 8.8% a year which is significant at the 5% level, implying a half-life of 7.49 
years. The rate of convergence is faster for variable costs than total costs. This might be due to 
the long adjustment time for the capital stock; firms may not be able to instantaneously adjust 
the capital stock to the optimal level. On the other hand this result may also be due to the 
presence of a capex bias. Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) report a 
presence of overcapitalisation which may be due to the Averch-Johnson effect. Overall the 
results indicate that the least efficient firms are catching up with the most efficient firms. On 
the other hand unconditional 𝛽-convergence ignores the presence of company-specific factors. 
The exclusion of these factors biases the efficiency scores downwards. We would expect 
company-specific factors to have a larger influence of total costs due to the different capital 
requirements in each operating area, this may explain the slower rate of convergence for total 
costs.  
Ofwat aims to encourage convergence and technical change within the regulatory process 
through setting efficiency targets based upon the rate of technical change and a catch-up factor 
to the frontier. Firms are therefore expected to improve by a given percent which represents 
technological improvements and each firm is given a specific catch-up target based on closing 
a proportion of the efficiency gap between the company and the frontier. Opex efficiency 
targets for 1999 and 2004 were set based on closing 60% of the gap within the five years of the 
price review. This therefore implies catching-up to the frontier of 12% each year if all 
companies achieve the continuing efficiency target. The variable cost convergence model 
reports a rate of 𝛽 -convergence of 8% a year. The results indicate that Ofwat has been 
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successful in encouraging convergence within the variable costs and at similar rate implied by 
Ofwat within their price review.   
 
Unconditional Convergence
Total Costs Variable Costs
Beta-Convergence
Intercept -0.00513* -0.01060***
(0.00291) (0.00395)
-0.04174* -0.08835**
(0.02499) (0.035035)
Steady State Efficiency 0.88 0.88
Half- life 16.25 7.49
R-Squared
Number of Obs 140 140
Sigma-Convergence
Intercept -0.00022 -0.00038
(0.00414) (0.00389)
-0.01381 -0.07709**
(0.02670) (0.02995)
R-Squared 0.0212 0.0514
Number of Obs 140 140
PAM
Intercept -0.00513* -0.01060***
(0.00291) (0.00395)
0.04175* 0.08836**
(0.02499) (0.03504)
R-squared 0.0243 0.0556
Number of Obs 140 140
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Robust Standard errors 
Table 5.3: Unconditional 𝛽-convergence, 𝜎-convergence and PAM 
estimates 
ln 𝐸𝑡−1 
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
ln 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
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The results from 𝛽-convergence can be compared to those reported for the efficiency change19. 
Efficiency change is measured as 𝜃𝑡+1/𝜃𝑡 where a value greater than 1 implies that a firm’s 
efficiency has improved while a value less than 1 implies that the efficiency score is decreasing. 
The geometric mean efficiency change for total and variable costs are reported in table 5.4. The 
efficiency change fluctuates throughout the period however the average of the whole period 
examined indicates a small and insignificant improvement in efficiency change. These results 
coincide with Portela et al (2011) whom report a negligible change in the average efficiency 
change of the WaSCs and WoCs over the period 1993/94–2006/07. The overall efficiency 
change indicates that there has been limited change in the average efficiency change however 
𝛽-convergence indicates that the least efficient firms are growing at a faster rate than the most 
efficient firms. Therefore the price reviews have had a larger impact on those companies who 
were inefficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
                                                          
19 Fare et al (1994) introduced a Malmquist index under VRS but Ray and Desli (1997) questioned the validity 
of the model to incorporate technical change alongside scale change. To avoid biases introduced with the VRS 
Malmquist index the efficiency change component has only been examined.  
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Quah (1996) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) highlight several limitations of 𝛽 -convergence and 
therefore suggest the estimation of 𝜎 -convergence. 𝜎 -convergence examines whether the 
dispersion of efficiency scores reduce over time. Alongside 𝜎-convergence, a PAM model is 
estimated to determine whether companies’ inefficiencies are persistent or whether they are 
converging towards the mean. Table 5.3 shows the estimation results for 𝜎-convergence and 
the PAM. The results for 𝜎-convergence indicate a negative coefficient, which is statistically 
significant for variable costs, however insignificant for total costs. The results indicate 
convergence for variable costs but there is a lack of 𝜎 -convergence for total costs. The 
coefficient for the PAM is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for both variable 
Table 5.4: Geometric Mean Efficiency Change 
WaSC Geometric Mean Efficiency Change
Total Costs Variable Costs
1997/98 1.008 1.029
1998/99 0.981 0.956
1999/00 0.997 1.025
2000/01 1.006 0.942
2001/02 1.074 1.079
2002/03 1.002 1.012
2003/04 0.992 0.982
2004/05 0.983 0.967
2005/06 1.042 1.040
2006/07 0.996 0.985
2007/08 0.951 1.018
2008/09 0.989 1.035
2009/10 1.005 1.001
2010/11 1.004 0.948
Mean 1.002 1.001
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costs and the 10% level for total costs. This result therefore concludes that companies are not 
only converging, but are also converging towards the frontier.  
The results for total costs indicate a rate of 𝛽-convergence which is significant at the 10% level 
and insignificant 𝜎-convergence. As previously discussed the lack of convergence may be as 
result of the slow adjustment time of capital and the presence of a capex bias. The lack of            
𝜎-convergence might be as a result of WaSC 6 water overtaking WaSC 2 and WaSC 8 within 
the last three years of the period.  The least efficient company has improved at a faster rate, 
implying 𝛽 -convergence. However, the least efficient company has overtaken other 
companies, implying a lack of 𝜎-convergence.  
5.8.2 Conditional Convergence  
 
 Unconditional 𝛽 -convergence assumes that all firms converge to the same steady state 
efficiency level. Conditional 𝛽-convergence incorporates time specific heterogeneities through 
the incorporation of time invariant company specific factors. Instead of implying that all 
companies’ convergence to the same steady state, the model implies that companies have 
differing steady state convergence efficiency scores depending on their characteristics. The FE 
model assumes that each company has its own steady state efficiency score.   
Conditional 𝛽-convergence has been estimated using RE, FE, GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS. 
The FE model and RE effects model are both estimated and reported in table 5.5. The results 
indicate that the rates of convergence are substantially different under the RE and FE models. 
The RE model implies a rate of convergence of 8.8% for total costs and 7.7% for variable costs. 
The estimates under RE are of a similar magnitude to those under OLS. The Breusch-Pagan 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the variance amongst entities is zero, therefore OLS 
is preferred.  
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The rate of convergence under FE is 46% a year for total costs and 54% for variable costs 
which are significant at the 1% level. This implies a half-life of 1.1 years for total costs and 
0.89 years for variable costs. This rate of convergence is significantly higher than that reported 
for the pooled OLS. A Hausman test is applied to test whether the country effects are correlated 
with the exogenous variables. The result for the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis and 
therefore indicates that RE produces biased and inconsistent estimates. An F-test is applied to 
examine the preference of OLS and FE and the null hypothesis is rejected which indicates that 
fixed effects are present and that the FE estimator is preferred.  
 
 
The steady state efficiency level for each WaSC is displayed in table 5.6. The presence of 
heterogeneities between the companies causes the convergence point to differ between the 
firms. The steady state efficiency scores for total costs range from 84% to 100%, indicating a 
Conditional Convergence
Beta-Convergence FE RE FE RE
Intercept -0.06756*** -0.00513 -0.06129*** -0.01060*
(0.01216) (0.00470) (0.00964) (0.00563)
-0.46381*** -0.04174** -0.54270*** -0.08834***
(0.07952) (0.02250) (0.07858) (0.03099)
Steady State Efficiency
Half- life 1.11 16.25 0.89 7.49
R-Squared
Number of Observations 140 140 140 140
F-Test 3.34*** 4.43***
Hausman Test 30.62*** 39.58***
B-P Test 0 0
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Total Costs Variable Costs
Table 5.5: FE and RE 𝛽-convergence 
estimates 
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
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16 percentage points difference in the efficiency score convergence level. The variable cost 
steady state efficiency level ranges from 81% to 100%. The difference within the operating 
environment influences a firm’s obtainable efficiency score by 19 percentage point. The results 
indicate that due to the company specific time invariant heterogeneities the point of 
convergence differs substantially between firms.  
 
 
 
 Gluschenko (2012) highlights that the interpretation of the rate of convergence differs when 
applying fixed effects as the rate of convergence is no longer measured by the distance of the 
most inefficient firm to the steady state efficiency score. Conditional convergence observes the 
distance from the firm’s own steady state efficiency score. Figure 5.7 plots the predicted 
convergence path for WaSC 6 and WaSC 10 estimated by FE. The graph depicts the estimated 
steady state efficiency score alongside the expected path of convergence for total costs given 
the rate of convergence for the total cost model. WaSC 6 efficiency score in 1997 is further 
away from its steady state efficiency score than WaSC 10, therefore the efficiency score grows 
at a faster rate. 
Total Cost Steady State 
Efficiency Score
Variable Cost Steady 
State Efficiency Score
WaSC 1 0.879 0.890
WaSC 2 0.856 0.812
WaSC 3 1 1
WaSC 4 0.959 0.973
WaSC 5 0.975 0.949
WaSC 6 0.839 0.855
WaSC 7 1 1
WaSC 8 0.896 0.966
WaSC 9 1 1
WaSC 10 0.962 0.984
Table 5.6: FE Conditional 𝛽-convergence steady state efficiency score 
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This chapter measures conditional convergence through the application of FE. An alternative 
is to incorporate a set of environmental variables within the measurement of conditional            
𝛽-convergence. Instead of applying the environmental variables within the measurement of 
convergence, environmental variables are incorporated to influence the efficiency scores in 
chapter 6. Environmental variables are incorporated within the measurement of efficiency as it 
is important to obtain a measure of efficiency once incorporating the differences into the 
operating environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Nickell (1981) states that the efficiency scores under FE are biased upwards due to the presence 
of endogeneity between the lagged efficiency score and the fixed effects term. Bond et al (2001) 
state that a consistent estimate of 𝑏 in equation 5.7 is expected to lie in between the OLS levels 
Figure 5.7: Estimated FE Conditional Convergence Path 
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and FE estimate. To address the bias, a GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS model is applied. The 
results from GMM-DIFF are displayed in table 5.7 whereby equation 5.7 is estimated therefore 
the dependent variable is 𝜃𝑡, the rate of convergence is calculated as 𝜆 =  𝛽 − 1.  
A crucial assumption of the validity of GMM is that the instruments are exogenous. The 
Hansen test has the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous. The null 
hypothesis for the Hansen test is not rejected, therefore implying that the instruments are 
exogenous. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residual. There is first-order but no second-
order autocorrelation, therefore the model specification is correct. It is important that second-
order autocorrelation is not present as it will detect autocorrelation in levels. 
The GMM-DIFF takes first differences to eliminate the fixed effects and instruments the first 
difference with the lagged levels. GMM-DIFF implies a rate of convergence of 45% for total 
costs and 59% for variable costs. The rate of convergence is significantly different to the rate 
implied by OLS but is within a similar range of that implied by the FE model. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) highlight that the lagged levels may be weak instruments and therefore propose 
the use of the SYS-GMM. Roodman (2009) shows that using too many estimates can produce 
biased results in GMM estimation. Roodman (2009) highlights that the minimum standard is 
to have the number of instruments lower than the number of individuals. GMM-SYS results 
are displayed within Appendix 2 as the number of instruments is greater than the number of 
groups of companies. The GMM-SYS model reports significant convergence at a rate of 11% 
for total costs and 12% for variable cost. However these results are incorporated as robustness 
check and do suffer from a lack of instruments.  
 
151 
 
 
 
5.8.3 Impact of Regulation  
 
Up to now we have examined if the firms efficiency scores have converged over the period 
examined. The influence of the price reviews upon the rate of convergence can be examined 
through the inclusion of regulatory dummies. The impact of the 2004 price review on the rate 
of convergence is examined. It would be desirable to examine the influence of the 1999 price 
review, however due to the differencing in the GMM-DIFF this reduces our panel and therefore 
we are not able to distinguish the influence of the 1999 price review. To examine the influence 
of the 2004 price review we incorporate an interactive dummy variable (𝐷04) which takes a 
value of 1 after the 2004 review. Equation 5.8 incorporates the influence of the 2004 price 
review within unconditional 𝛽-convergence.   
Δ𝜃𝑛,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽(ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1) + 𝛿(ln 𝜃𝑛,𝑡−1 × D04) + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡         (5.8) 
Total Costs Variable Costs
GMM-DIFF GMM-DIFF
Intercept
0.5455493*** 0.4086844*
(0.1033028) (0.1983891)
Convergence Speed -0.4544507 -0.5913156
Number of Observations 140 140
Sargan Test 26.11** 34.79***
AR(1) -2.42** -1.97**
AR(2) 6.77 0.22
Half life 1.14 0.77
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Estimations are perfomed by xtabond2 in STATA by Roodman (2009)
Table 5.7: GMM-DIFF estimate 
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
 
152 
 
A negative coefficient for 2004 dummy for OLS and FE would indicate that the 2004 price 
review has increased the rate of convergence.  
 
 
The results for variable and total costs for OLS and FE are reported in table 5.8 and for        
GMM-DIFF in table 5.9. Note that the dependent variable in GMM-DIFF is the log of the 
efficiency score in period 𝑡  as in equation 5.9 instead of the growth rate of efficiency. 
Examining the results for total costs, the interactive dummy is insignificant for both 
unconditional and condition 𝛽-convergence, therefore indicating that the 2004 price review 
had no influence in changing the rate of convergence for total costs. The influence of the 2004 
price review for variable costs is insignificant for unconditional 𝛽-convergence. The FE model 
indicates that the 2004 price review is significant at increasing the rate of convergence. 
However accounting for endogeneity applying the GMM-DIFF the influence is not significant. 
Overall the results indicate that the 2004 price review had no influence increasing the rate of 
𝛽-convergence for total costs. The results for variable costs indicate that the 2004 price review 
Convergence 2004 Regulatory Dummy 
Beta-Convergence OLS FE OLS FE
Intercept -0.05257 -0.07454*** -0.01094*** -0.07573***
(0.03460) (0.01318) (0.00391) (0.01001)
0.02821 -0.49053*** -0.07982* -0.59456***
(0.04115) (0.08172) (0.04661) (0.07661)
0.02821 -0.04372 -0.02583 -0.17289***
(0.04115) -0.03247 -0.06218 (0.04831)
R-Squared 0.0297 0.2197 0.0574 0.3363
Number of Observations 140 140 140 140
F-Test 3.58*** 6.22***
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Total Costs Variable Costs
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
 
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 × 𝐷04 
 
Table 5.8: Convergence 2004 Regulatory Dummy 
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had no influence on unconditional 𝛽-convergence and a limited influence for conditional 𝛽-
convergence, although the results are not robust.  
 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
 
The regulatory framework encourages technical change and convergence within the industry 
through an industry efficiency challenge and a company specific catch-up factor. Convergence 
is encouraged through the measurement of relative efficiency and efficiency targets are based 
on closing a proportion of the gap to the frontier. This chapter aims to examine whether the 
regulatory policy has been effective in encouraging convergence in the efficiency scores 
towards the frontier.  
The WaSC efficiency scores are estimated through the application of DEA for total and 
variable costs. To account for improvements in quality over the period a quality-adjusted 
measure of output is incorporated. This chapter draws upon the growth literature to estimate 
𝛽- and 𝜎-convergence to determine whether the least efficient firms are growing faster than 
GMM-DIFF 2004 Regulatory Dummy 
Beta-Convergence
0.47248* 0.33432*
(0.25015) (0.16706)
-0.02798 -0.07983
(0.10591) (0.07397)
Number of Observations 130 130
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Total Costs Variable Costs
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 × 𝐷04 
 
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
 
Figure 5.9: GMM-DIFF 2004 Regulatory Dummy 
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the more efficient firms. It also examines whether the dispersion of efficiency scores has 
reduced. The results highlight the presence of unconditional 𝛽-convergence within the industry 
for both total and variable costs, with companies converging to the same steady state with the 
least efficient firms growing at a faster rate than the more efficient firms. The rate of 
convergence for total costs is only significant at the 10% level and the rate of convergence is 
slower than that of variable costs. The estimate of 𝜎-convergence for variable costs implies a 
significant reduction in the dispersion of efficiency scores. The results for total costs imply a 
lack of 𝜎-convergence. The lack of 𝜎-convergence may be as a result of a capex bias, the slow 
adjustment rate of capital or not accounting for the differences in the companies’ operating 
environments. Chapter 7 will incorporate capital as an intertemporal factor of production to 
account for capital long life and to examine the presence of a capex bias. The PAM indicates 
that the efficiency scores are converging towards the frontier.  
The chapter aimed to examine whether Ofwat has been effective in encouraging convergence. 
The chapter reports convergence over the period, however we are unable to confirm whether 
convergence would have occurred in the absence of privatisation and the introduction of 
regulation. The chapter does find that the 2004 price review had no influence on the rate of 
convergence for total costs and limited evidence of a faster rate of convergence for variable 
costs. Although the chapter cannot identify whether convergence is a result of the introduction 
of regulation it does find that there is convergence within the industry with the rate of 
unconditional 𝛽-convergence for variable costs that is of a similar magnitude to that implied 
within the price review.  
The chapter compares convergence to the average efficiency change within the industry. 
Efficiency change implies that there is a negligible amount of efficiency change over the 
period. These results coincide with those of Saal et al (2007) and Portela et al (2011) who 
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examine efficiency change within the industry through a parametric assessment of water and 
sewerage activities and non-parametric assessment of water activities for WaSCs and WoCs 
respectively. This research therefore expands on the literature to find that although there is no 
change amongst the average firm efficiency change, the least efficient firms are growing at a 
faster rate than the most efficient companies.  
Conditional 𝛽-convergence is examined to incorporate companies’ heterogeneities through the 
estimation of fixed effects. The fixed effects model allows for companies to have their own 
steady state efficiency. The steady state convergence scores differ significantly between 
companies which highlights the significant differences within their operating environments. To 
address the issue of endogeneity within the fixed effects model, a GMM-DIFF estimator is 
applied. The rate of convergence when incorporating company specific heterogeneities is faster 
than estimated by unconditional convergence. The discovery of significant differences within 
companies’ operating environments poses the following research question of how to 
incorporate these differences within the measurement of efficiency by DEA.  
The following chapter investigates the influence of environmental variables upon firm’s 
efficiency scores and the importance of controlling for differing operating environments within 
the measurement of efficiency using DEA. Environmental variables are assessed within the 
measurement of DEA to allow for the environmental variables to influence the frontier and 
therefore influence the efficiency score. 
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6. Incorporating the environment: three-stage DEA approach 
6.1 Introduction  
 
DEA is an effective tool utilised by firms and regulators to determine the level of managerial 
inefficiency.  The basic DEA model measures the efficiency of a DMU based upon the 
effectiveness of managers to transform inputs into outputs. However, Avkiran and Rowlands 
(2008) highlight that the performance of an operational unit depends as much on managerial 
efficiency as on the operational environment and measurement noise. The methodology of 
DEA makes the implicit assumption that firms are homogeneous; assuming that firms 
undertake the same activities in the same operating environments (Golany and Roll, 1989). 
WaSCs operate under different operating characteristics which are outside of managerial 
control, known as non-discretionary or environmental variables. Non-discretionary variables 
can influence the production function, increasing or decreasing the maximum attainable output 
level if the environmental variables are favourable or unfavourable respectively. Failure to 
account for the differences in the operating environments may create biased results which can 
lead to unreliable economic decisions from management and the regulators. 
Littlechild (1988) highlight that there are substantial differences between the ten RWAs (now 
WaSCs) with respect to size, condition of assets and environmental standards. Ofwat 
acknowledges differences within companies’ operating environments by incorporating non-
discretionary variables alongside key cost drivers.  The operating characteristics of the firms 
vary substantially across the industry in terms of density, source of abstraction and topography.  
Quality within the industry is regulated by the DWI, NRW and the EA for water and sewerage 
activities, who have imposed increasingly strict compliance standards. Since privatisation the 
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industry has invested £98 billion of capital investment to improve quality standards (Ofwat, 
2012). Saal and Parker (2000) highlight the importance of incorporating quality standards for 
understanding cost differentials amongst firms and over time within the English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry.  
There are several common approaches in which environmental variables can be incorporated 
in DEA: quality-adjusted measure of output, one-stage approach and a two-stage approach. 
The one-stage model makes the distinction between controllable variables and non-controllable 
variables. The one-stage model suffers from the issue of dimensionality as the number of 
environmental variables increase. The two-stage approach estimates the efficiency of the 
controllable inputs and applies a second stage regression to identify the influence of non-
discretionary variables on the efficiency scores or inputs slacks. This approach identifies 
whether the environmental variables are favourable or unfavourable, increasing or decreasing 
the efficiency score. Within the estimation of DEA for the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry, Maziotis et al (2013) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) incorporate quality 
variables through a quality-adjusted measure of output. Erbetta and Cave (2007) also examine 
the influence of additional non-discretionary variables through a second stage SFA regression.  
The two-stage approach does not calculate the efficiency score once controlling for 
environmental variables20. This chapter extends upon the current literature for the measurement 
of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry by applying a three-
stage approach introduced by Fried et al (1999, 2002) extended by Tone and Tsutsui (2009) 
and Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010). The methodology enables the measurement of efficiency 
whilst controlling for the differences in firms’ operating environments. The three-stage 
                                                          
20 The error term of the second stage regression can be interpreted as the level of inefficiency after controlling 
for environmental variables. However the error term has a two-sided distribution and a true measure of 
efficiency should have a one-sided distribution.  
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approach introduced by Fried et al (1999, 2002) extends upon the two-stage model by adjusting 
inputs, depending on whether firms operate within favourable or unfavourable environments. 
The final stage re-runs the DEA problem to obtain environmentally adjusted efficiency scores. 
Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) apply a bootstrap truncated second stage regression proposed by 
Simar and Wilson (2007) to correct for the presence of serial correlation amongst the DEA 
efficiency scores. Tone and Tsutsui (2009) highlight that the adjustment procedure of Fried et 
al (1999, 2002) violates the translation invariance property, therefore biases the efficiency 
scores. Their paper introduces an alternative procedure for adjusting the input variables. As 
well as highlighting the importance of incorporating environmental variables, the chapter also 
examines the impact of the price reviews. It also examines the question of whether different 
price reviews have been effective in improving efficiency or reducing input slacks. The impact 
of privatisation and the 1994 price review has been examined by Saal and Parker (2000), Saal 
and Parker (2001) and Saal et al (2007). Saal and Reid (2004), Erbetta and Cave (2007) and 
Bottasso and Conti (2009) examine the impact of the 1994 and 1999 price reviews. This chapter 
extends upon current research to examine the impact of both the 1999 and 2004 price reviews 
upon efficiency. 
The chapter will firstly review the relevant literature for the incorporation of environmental 
variables within efficiency estimates for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry 
and the empirical literature of the impact of privatisation and regulation. The different 
methodologies for incorporating environment variables are outlined and the proposed 
methodology. The data and variables used within the model are outlined followed by the 
results.  
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6.2 Incorporating non-discretionary variables  
 
The efficiency of a DMU measures a manager’s ability to transform inputs into outputs. The 
ability to do so depends on managerial efficiency and other factors outside of managerial 
control. The theoretical importance of controlling for non-discretionary variables within the 
measurement of efficiency is outlined within the methodology chapter. The ignorance of the 
non-discretionary variables can bias the measurement of efficiency depending upon whether 
firms operate within a favourable or unfavourable environment (Ray, 1988). As DEA assumes 
homogeneity it is important to ensure that non-discretionary variables which influence the 
production function are incorporated within the analysis. The following section outlines several 
approaches to incorporate non-discretionary variables in the measurement of efficiency 
through DEA. 
Environmental variables have been included within DEA for the measurement of efficiency 
through several different methodologies. Environmental variables are defined as those factors 
outside of the control of management such as population density. Several authors21 incorporate 
the proportion of leakage and the measurement of water and sewerage quality as non-
discretionary variables. Although leakage and quality can be influenced by management, these 
are incorporated as non-discretionary variables due to the leakage targets imposed by Ofwat 
and quality standards imposed by the DWI and EA. The following section will outline the 
methodologies employed for the incorporation of non-discretionary variables for the 
measurement of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry and 
international water utilities.  
                                                          
21 Saal and Parker (2000,2001), Saal and Reid (2004), Saal and Parker (2005), Saal et al (2007), Erbetta and 
Cave (2007), Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Saal et al (2011). 
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6.2.1 Quality-Adjusted Output 
 
Saal and Parker (2000) was the first study to account for changes in quality in the English and 
Welsh water and sewerage through a quality-adjusted measure of output for the estimation of 
a translog cost function to measure productivity within the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry. The quality-adjusted measure of output (𝑌𝑄) is calculated by multiplying 
the level of output (𝑌) by a quality index (𝑄) which takes a value between 0 and 1 as in 
equation (6.1)  
𝑌𝑄 = 𝑌 × 𝑄        (6.1) 
The application of a quality-adjusted measure of output implicitly makes the assumption that 
an improvement in the measure of quality requires additional inputs. An increase in quality 
increases the quality-adjusted measure of output, therefore holding efficiency constant an 
increase in output requires additional inputs. Using a quality-adjusted measure of output 
requires the interpretation that firms desire to produce the output at a given quality. This is a 
reasonable assumption within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry due to 
minimum quality standards. Saal and Parker (2000) highlight the importance of adjusting for 
changes in quality standards through the impact on the interaction terms between water and 
sewerage activities, finding an improvement in the quality of one output may reduce the cost 
of producing the other. The quality-adjusted measure of output is applied within the English 
and Welsh water and sewerage industry by Saal and Parker (2001) and Saal et al (2007) within 
the parametric approach.  Maziotis et al (2013) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) apply this within 
the non-parametric approach. Portela et al (2011) extend the approach to account for the 
differences in density by including an adjusted measure of billed properties alongside the 
output variable for billed properties. The measure of billed properties is multiplied by an 
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adjustment factor. The adjustment factor is based upon the residual from the regression of the 
number of billed properties on the length of main22. To ensure the adjustment factor is positive 
a constant is added23.  
The incorporation of environmental variables through an adjusted measure of output has the 
advantage of allowing for quality to be incorporated directly within the frontier whilst not 
requiring additional constraints within the DEA problem. Additional constraints within the 
DEA problem can lead to dimensionality problems and therefore reduce the discriminatory 
power of the model. On the other hand, the methodology has the disadvantage of assuming the 
directional impact of the environmental variables a priori. The methodology only allows for 
the inclusion of several environmental variables and those which impact the output variables 
under input-orientation. The incorporation of non-quality variables can lead to difficulties in 
the interpretation.  
6.2.2 One-Stage Approach  
 
Within the parametric methodology environmental variables can be incorporated directly 
within the frontier to determine the impact of environmental variables upon efficiency. 
Environmental variables can be incorporated on the right hand side of the cost function (input 
distance function) to influence costs (inputs). Under output-orientation, environmental 
variables can be incorporated on the right hand side to influence the level of outputs. This 
methodology allows for the influence and significance of the environmental variables upon 
                                                          
22 Adjusted billed properties= billed properties*(standardized regression residual+ constant). Standardized 
residual is the raw residual divided by the estimated standard error of the residual. A positive residual indicates 
that the company has more billed properties than expected, therefore operate within a highly dense operating 
area.  
23 This approach violates the translation invariance property however Portela et al (2011) find that the 
comparison of the results with and without the adjusted output for density is negligible except for one highly 
urbanised company.  
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costs (inputs) to be determined. This approach is applied by Bottasso and Conti (2009), Saal 
and Reid (2004), Saal and Parker (2005) and Saal et al (2007) for the estimation of a translog 
cost function and Saal et al (2011) who estimate a quadratic cost function. The translog cost 
function is shown in equation (6.2) where TC represents total costs, 𝑊 the input prices, 𝑌 the 
output variables and 𝑍  is a vector of environmental variables which are included as                    
non-interactive variables within the cost function.  
ln 𝑇𝐶 =  𝛿 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑗
ln 𝑊𝑗 +  ∑ 𝜒𝑟
𝑟
ln 𝑌𝑟 +
1
2
∑ ∑ γ
jv
ln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑊𝑣
𝑣𝑗
+ ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑗𝑟 ln 𝑊𝑗 ln 𝑌𝑟
𝑟𝑗
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑟,𝑧
𝑧
ln 𝑌𝑟 ln 𝑌𝑧
𝑟
+ ∑ 𝜓𝑗
𝑗
ln 𝑍𝑗     (6.2) 
 
Saal et al (2007) highlight the advantage of incorporating environmental variables as fully 
interactive variables to allow for the environmental variables to influence the measurement of 
both the cost function and the measurement of productivity. However, the incorporation of the 
environmental variables as fully interactive variables significantly increases the number of 
parameters to be estimated, and therefore decreases the degrees of freedom.  
Environmental variables can be incorporated directly within the DEA frontier as either input 
or output variables. The measurement of efficiency under input (output) orientation examines 
the radial contraction (expansion) of all inputs (outputs). The assumption of radial contraction 
or expansion for non-discretionary variables makes little sense as by definition managers do 
not have full control over these variables (Fried et al, 1999).  To overcome the problem of 
radial contraction (expansion) of inputs (outputs), Banker and Morey (1986) hold the level of 
the environmental variables fixed and non-discretionary variables are incorporated as 
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uncontrollable variables. Uncontrollable variables enter the DEA model to influence the 
frontier, however, are held constant for the calculation of radial efficiency.  
The inclusion of an additional input enables the production of additional outputs holding 
efficiency constant. Including an environment variable (𝑧) as an input in equation (6.3) implies 
more outputs can be produced; therefore the environmental variable is assumed to be 
favourable.  
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆 𝜃 
                           𝑠𝑡     −𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0                     (6.3)   
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0  
𝑧𝑛 ≥ 𝑍𝜆  
𝜆 ≥ 0 
 
On the other hand, environmental variables can be incorporated as an output variable. The 
inclusion of additional outputs requires additional inputs holding efficiency constant. If the 
environmental variables are included as output variables in equation (6.4), additional inputs are 
required, therefore the environmental variable is assumed to be unfavourable.  
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𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆 𝜃 
                        𝑠𝑡     −𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0                        (6.4)  
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝑧𝑛 ≤ 𝑍𝜆  
𝜆 ≥ 0 
 
If one is unsure of the directional impact of the environmental variables, then the environmental 
variables can be included in an equality form in equation (6.5). The inclusion of the 
environment variables using an equality form ensures that firms are only compared with a 
(theoretical) frontier that has the same environment. This approach is advantageous as it does 
not require the directional impact of the environmental variables to be assumed a priori. 
However the approach substantially reduces the reference set therefore biases the efficiency 
scores upwards (Coelli et al, 2005). 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆 𝜃 
                 𝑠𝑡     −𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0                 (6.5)  
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝑧𝑛 = 𝑍𝜆  
𝜆 ≥ 0 
165 
 
Picazo-Tadeo et al (2008) apply the one-stage DEA model to analyse the importance of 
including quality within the Spanish water utilities.  Quality is incorporated within the frontier 
as a non-controllable variable. The model makes two assumptions; firstly that a lack of quality 
is a bad output and secondly that there is a trade-off between quantity and quality. The 
efficiency scores are compared for the conventional DEA and for the quality-adjusted DEA for 
Spanish water utilities. Their results indicate that there is a trade-off between quality and 
quantity. The maximum attainable quantity firms could potentially reach is reduced when 
accounting for quality. The paper compares the efficiency scores before and after adjusting for 
quality and performs several tests; t-test, Wilcoxon test and the Spearman’s rank test.  The 
results reveal that the technical efficiency scores and their distribution are statistically different 
when controlling for quality, however their ranks do not statistically change.  
The all-in-one method is advantageous as it allows for the environmental variables to impact 
directly upon the frontier. If several environmental variables are considered within the analysis 
the additional constraints can reduce the dimensionality of the model which reduces its 
discriminatory power.  Another drawback of incorporating quality directly within the frontier 
is that it makes the implicit assumption of the directional impact of the environmental variables. 
This approach is not suitable if the researcher wants to determine whether environmental 
variables are favourable or unfavourable, such as the impact of regulatory regimes.  
The drawbacks of the one-stage approach within the non-parametric framework has led to the 
evaluation of the significance and directional impact of the environmental variables upon the 
firm’s efficiency scores through the application of a second stage regression. 
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6.2.3 Two-Stage Approach 
 
To overcome the problems of the one-stage model, Ray (1988) introduces a two-stage model 
to determine the directional impact of the environmental variables by regressing the efficiency 
scores on a set of environmental variables. The second stage regression aims to explain 
differences in the efficiency scores by features of the operating environment (Fried et al, 1999). 
The second stage regression is shown in equation 6.6 where 𝜃 is a vector of efficiency scores 
for 𝑁 firms. The Farrell efficiency score takes a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 
implies the firm is technically efficient. 𝑍 is a vector of environmental variables and  𝛽 is a 
vector of coefficients to be estimated and 𝜀  is the error term. The estimated 𝛽  coefficients 
indicate the directional impact of the environmental variables upon the efficiency score. A 
positive coefficient indicates that the environmental variables impact positively on the 
efficiency score and therefore operates under a favourable environment. On the other hand, a 
negative coefficient implies that the environmental variable reduces the efficiency score, and 
therefore the operating environment is unfavourable.  
𝜃𝑛 =  𝑧𝑛𝛽 +  𝜀𝑛    (6.6) 
The approach is advantageous as it can incorporate categorical and continuous variables whilst 
allowing several variables to be incorporated simultaneously. However, the use of a second 
stage regression implies the separability condition 𝑦𝑡 = ℎ(𝑧𝑡) × 𝑓(𝑥𝑡)  for the production 
function (Ray, 1988). The separability condition implies that the non-discretionary variables 
act like Hicks neutral technical change. Therefore, the environmental variables impact on the 
maximum attainable outputs, but do not affect the optimal choices between the discretionary 
inputs. For the second stage regression of the environmental variables on the efficiency scores, 
the separability condition implies that the environment variables cannot affect the support of 
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the input and output variables within the first stage DEA problem. The environmental variables 
affect the distribution of inefficiencies, affecting their mean and variance.  
The second stage regression has been estimated by OLS by Ray (1991) and Sexton et al (1994) 
and Stanton (2002). The dependent variable, the Farrell efficiency score, is bounded between 
0 and 1, therefore several authors (Anwandter and Ozuna, 2002; Tupper and Resende, 2004 
and Garcia-Sanchez, 2006) use a Tobit regression. The Tobit regression is distributed 
according to the normal distribution but its likelihood function reflects the fact that the 
dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1.  
The second stage regression allows the directional impact and the significance of the 
environmental variable upon efficiency to be realised. Anwandter and Ozuna (2002) apply a 
second stage Tobit regression to examine the impact of environmental variables within the 
Mexican Water utilities. Alongside the environmental variables Anwandter and Ozuna (2002) 
include a series of dummy variables to determine whether public sector reforms in the Mexican 
water utilities have improved efficiency. Regulatory dummies within the second stage 
regression are insignificant, therefore indicating that the public sector reforms had no impact 
upon the efficiency scores. 
The error term of the second stage regression can be interpreted as the efficiency score once 
controlling for environmental variables. However, this is a two-sided distribution and a true 
measure of efficiency score has a one-sided distribution. Tupper and Resende (2004) examine 
the impact of environmental variables for the Brazilian water and sewerage industry. The paper 
applies an adjustment procedure to ensure that the efficiency scores are bounded between 0 
and 1. The residuals are adjusted by the adjustment process in equation (6.7), where 𝜀𝑛 is the 
residual from the Tobit regression and 𝜃𝑛
𝐴𝐷𝐽
 is the adjusted efficiency score for firm 𝑛.   
𝜃𝑛
𝐴𝐷𝐽 =  𝜀𝑛 + (1 − maxn=1,…,N 𝜀𝑛)    (6.7) 
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The adjusted efficiency score can be interpreted as the efficiency score once controlling for the 
environmental variables. However, this methodology suffers from the problem associated with 
COLS, whereby the parallel shift makes the assumption that the structure of the production 
technology is the same for the industry average and the frontier.  
Fried et al (1999) extend on the two-stage approach by regressing total radial and non-radial 
input slacks instead of the efficiency scores on the environmental variables. The total radial 
and non-radial input slacks represent the excess level of inputs, where the slacks are zero if the 
firm is efficient and positive for the excess utilisation of inputs. The interpretation of the second 
stage coefficients varies whereby a positive coefficient indicates that the environmental 
variables impacts positively on the input slacks, which indicates that the environmental variable 
is unfavourable. On the other hand a negative coefficients indicates that the environmental 
variables are favourable, which reduces the input slacks. Fried et al (1999) estimate separate 
regressions for each input slack, therefore allowing the impact of the environmental variables 
to differ between inputs. 
One of the downfalls of DEA is that the model does not allow for the incorporation of noise. 
To allow for the decomposition of the DEA efficiency score into managerial efficiency, 
environmental effects and statistical noise, Fried et al (2002) employ a second stage SFA model 
for each 𝑗 input which takes the form. 
𝑠𝑛𝑗 = 𝑓
𝑗(𝑧𝑛; 𝛽
𝑗) + 𝑢𝑛𝑗 + 𝑣𝑛𝑗      (6.8) 
Where 𝑠𝑛𝑗denotes the slacks for input 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, , . , 𝐽 and firm 𝑛, 𝑛 = 1, , . , 𝑁 and  𝑓
𝑗(𝑧𝑛; 𝛽
𝑗) is 
the deterministic feasible slack frontier, 𝑧 is the vector of environmental variables and 𝛽 is the 
vector of coefficients to be estimated. SFA allows for the error term to be decomposed into two 
components 𝑣𝑛𝑗~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣𝑛
2 ) which is a two sided normal distributed error reflecting statistical 
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noise and a one-sided error term 𝑢𝑛𝑗 ≥ 0 reflecting managerial efficiency. The researcher must 
make distributional assumptions with regards to the error term representing inefficiency; 
common distributions are half-normal, truncated normal and gamma distribution.  
Erbetta and Cave (2007) measure cost efficiency for the WaSCs in the English and Welsh water 
and sewerage industry using DEA. The paper examines the impact of environmental variables 
through a quality-adjusted measure of output (Saal and Parker, 2000) and a second stage SFA 
regression based upon the methodology of Fried et al (2002). The first stage is to calculate the 
efficiency score and obtain the technical efficiency slacks and the absolute value of the 
allocative inefficiency slacks24. The absolute value of the allocative inefficiency slack therefore 
does not represent an over- or under-utilisation of inputs but rather a mere distortion. The 
second stage regresses the slacks for each input relating to technical and allocative efficiency 
separately using a SFA model in equation (6.8). Separate regressions are applied for each input 
to allow for the impact of the environmental variables to differ for each input. The coefficient 
on the environmental variables indicates the directional impact of the environmental variables 
on the excessive input slacks. A positive coefficient indicates a positive relationship between 
the environmental variables and excess input slacks, indicating that the environmental variable 
is unfavourable. Erbetta and Cave (2007) SFA results report that the one-sided managerial 
inefficiency term dominates noise. Therefore, once accounting for differences in the 
operational characteristics and the presence of noise, firms still utilise inputs differently. The 
technical over-utilisation of inputs and allocative distortion is a function of the technical 
efficiency error term 𝑢𝑛𝑗 . Erbetta and Cave (2007) model technical inefficiency and the 
absolute value of allocative inefficiency. As the absolute value of allocative efficiency is taken, 
                                                          
24 Allocative efficiency represents the over or under-utilization of inputs measured as 𝑇𝐸𝑛𝑥𝑛 − 𝑥𝑛
∗ , where 𝑇𝐸𝑛  is 
the technical efficiency score and 𝑥𝑛
∗  is the optimal inputs under cost efficiency. This measure is negative, 
positive or zero for underutilisation, overutilization and optimal use respectively. The absolute value of the 
allocative efficiency represents the mere distortion.  
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this approach does not allow for the overall measurement of cost efficiency score once 
accounting for the differences in the operating environment.  
Although Tobit, OLS and SFA regressions are common within the literature Simar and Wilson 
(2007) state that the inference obtained from the second stage regression is invalid due to 
complicated, unknown serial correlation among the efficiency estimates. The actual efficiency 
score 𝜃𝑛  in equation 6.6 is unknown and is therefore estimated through DEA using the 
observed data pairs (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)  to estimate 𝜃𝑛  for all 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁  yielding a set of estimates 
{𝜃𝑛}𝑛=1
𝑁
. 
The actual technical efficiency in the second stage regression is replaced by the estimated 𝜃𝑛. 
𝜃𝑛 =  𝑧𝑛?̂? +  𝜉𝑛 ≥ 1     (6.9) 
 
Simar and Wilson (2007) note that 𝜃𝑛 are serially correlated in a complicated and unknown 
way. The estimation of technical efficiency depends on all the observations and consequently 
so must the error term 𝜉𝑛 in the second stage regression. Moreover 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑦𝑛 are correlated 
with 𝑧𝑛, the environmental variables; otherwise there would be no motivation for the second 
stage regression. Hence this implies that the error term 𝜉𝑛 is correlated with 𝑧𝑛. To overcome 
the problem of serial correlation Simar and Wilson (2007) denote two algorithms; algorithm 
#1 allows the correct standard errors and algorithm #2 additionally corrects for the bias of the 
DEA estimates. As the inverse of the Farrell efficiency scores are bounded at 1. Algorithm #1 
applies a bootstrapped truncated regression with left truncation at 1 to obtain correct standard 
errors.   
Renzetti and Dupont (2009) measure the technical efficiency of water municipals in Canada 
and evaluate the impact of environmental variables. The paper computes technical efficiency 
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through a three-stage DEA approach proposed by Fried et al (1999). The first stage evaluates 
the efficiency scores applying DEA whilst the second stage evaluates the influence of the 
environmental variables through a second stage regression. Their work compares the use of a 
second stage Tobit regression and the bootstrapped truncated regression algorithm #1 proposed 
by Simar and Wilson (2007) to correct for the presence of serial correlation. Their results 
indicate that the coefficients for the bootstrapped truncated regression and tobit regression are 
similar, however the bootstrapped truncated regression has a higher number of coefficients 
which are significant.  
The contribution of Simar and Wilson (2007) allows for the estimation of a second stage 
regression with correct inference. However, the second stage regression only allows for the 
directional impact and significance of the environmental variables to be analysed. To allow for 
the incorporation of the impact environmental variables estimated in the second stage 
regressions, Renzetti and Dupont (2009) and Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) apply a 3rd stage 
introduced by Fried et al (1999,2002) to adjust the input data relative to whether firms operate 
within a favourable or unfavourable environment. 
6.2.4 Three-Stage Approach 
 
The three stage approach introduced by Fried et al (1999, 2002) allows for the impact of the 
environmental variables to be reflected within the DEA scores. The efficiency scores and input 
slacks are estimated within the first stage by DEA. The impact of the environmental variables 
is examined through a second stage regression for each input slack in equation (6.10).  𝑠𝑛𝑗 is 
the total input slacks for input 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝐽  and firm 𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁  and Z is a vector of 
environmental variables and 𝑣 is a iid error term. 
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𝑠𝑛𝑗 = 𝑓
𝑗(𝑧𝑛; 𝛽
𝑗) + 𝑣𝑛𝑗      (6.10) 
The third stage adjusts the firm’s inputs 𝑥𝑛𝑗  by the amount in which they operate under a 
favourable or unfavourable environment based upon the predicted slack 𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗 from the second 
stage regression following Fried et al (1999) in equation 6.11. One can adjust the inputs 
downwards for those firms which operate under unfavourable conditions. The amount by which 
they have been disadvantaged is revealed within the second stage regression. If a firm is 
significantly disadvantaged it is possible that the inputs may be adjusted so far downwards that 
they may become negative. Therefore, an alternative approach is to adjust the input variables 
upwards for those firms operating under relatively favourable environments. Inputs are 
adjusted upwards relative to the firms operating under the most unfavourable environment. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛{𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗}  is the most unfavourable operating environment as they have the highest 
predicted slacks. The firms with a relatively unfavourable operating environment have their 
inputs adjusted by a relatively small amount, whilst those with favourable operating 
environments are adjusted upwards by a relatively large amount. Adjusting the inputs upwards 
provides a performance target that managers can reach regardless of their operating 
environment (Fried et al, 1999).  
𝑥𝑛𝑖
𝐴 =  𝑥𝑛𝑖 + [𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛{𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗} − 𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗]     (6.11) 
The DEA model is re-run with the adjusted input variables allowing for the impact of the 
environmental variables to influence the shape of the frontier and to obtain an environmental 
adjusted DEA score.  
Fried et al (1999) apply a second stage OLS regression whilst Fried et al (2002) apply a second 
SFA model to account for noise. However, neither second stage regression, OLS or SFA model 
address the issue of serial correlation highlighted by Simar and Wilson (2007). Cordero- 
173 
 
Ferrera et al (2010) combine the two approaches of Simar and Wilson (2007) and Fried et al 
(1999) to allow for both the correct inference and environmental adjusted DEA scores.  
To allow for the correct inference for the second-stage regression in the three-stage approach, 
Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) apply the second stage bootstrap truncated regression introduced 
by Simar and Wilson (2007). However, the dependent variable is the radial and non-radial input 
slacks instead of the efficiency scores. The inverse of the Farrell efficiency score is bounded at 
1, whereas the input slacks are bounded at 0. Therefore Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) apply a 
bootstrap truncated regression with left truncation at 0 instead of left truncation at 1 which is 
applied for the efficiency scores. Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) then follow the adjustment 
procedure of Fried et al (1999) to obtain environmentally adjusted DEA scores.  
Tone and Tsutsui (2009) demonstrate that the adjustment procedure of Fried et al (1999, 2002) 
violates the translation variance property of DEA due to the addition of the constant which 
relates to the company operating under the most unfavourable conditions. The translation 
invariance property is that the efficiency score is biased if a constant is added to each DMU for 
an input (output) under an input (output) orientation model. Tone and Tsutsui (2009) 
demonstrate that the addition of the constant skews the distribution and recommend an 
alternative adjustment process which is discussed in the methodology. This chapter applies the 
methodology of Fried et al (1999) extended by Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) and Tone and 
Tsutsui (2009) to obtain efficiency scores once controlling for differences in the operating 
environment. A detail outline of the approach is provided within the methodology.   
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6.3 Privatisation and Regulation 
 
The second component of the chapter is to examine the impact of regulation upon efficiency. 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry was privatised in 1989 and subject to 
price-cap regulation. The price caps are determined every five years through Price Reviews 
(PR), the first price review was undertaken by the government in 1989 and subsequent reviews 
(from 1994 onwards) were undertaken by Ofwat. Two key aims of privatisation and regulation 
are to improve economic efficiency and to encourage investment to improve quality. A body 
of literature has emerged to determine whether privatisation and regulation has been an 
effective tool for encouraging efficiency improvements. The literature for the measurement of 
productivity and efficiency was outlined in chapter 5. The following section will provide a brief 
review of the literature examining the influence of the difference price reviews.  
Overall, the empirical literature concludes that privatisation has had little or no impact on 
efficiency and productivity and that the industry has experienced improvements in productivity 
due to the imposition of price-cap regulation. The studies examining privatisation and the 1994 
price review find mixed results. Saal and Parker (2000) report that privatisation had no impact 
on productivity whereas the 1994 price review reports significant improvements. On the other 
hand Saal and Parker (2001) and Saal et al (2007) report no statistically significant difference 
due to the 1994 price review. However, when examining the 1994 and 1999 price review the 
literature Erbetta and Cave, 2007 and Bottasso and Conti, 2009 conclude that the 1999 price 
review brought around significant improvements in productivity and efficiency in comparison 
to the 1994 review, with the exception of Saal and Reid (2004).  Portela et al (2011) is the only 
study known to examine the 2004 price review and state that that review may have impacted 
negatively upon the efficiency scores.  
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This chapter acknowledges the differences in the operating conditions when measuring 
efficiency and also contributes to the existing literature about the impact of different regulatory 
regimes by determining whether the 1999 and 2004 price review had a significant impact on 
reducing input slacks.  
6.4 Methodology 
 
Incorporating non-discretionary variables within the measurement efficiency using DEA is 
based upon the methodology of Fried et al (1999), Simar and Wilson (2007), Cordero-Ferrera 
et al (2010) and Tone and Tsutsui (2009). Firstly, the methodology of measuring efficiency 
through the application of DEA is outlined. Secondly, a second-stage bootstrapped truncated 
regression is applied to evaluate the impact of the environmental variables upon the efficiency 
scores. Finally, the adjustment procedure of Tone and Tsutsui (2009) is examined to adjust the 
input slacks by the amount in which firms operate under a favourable environment.  
The efficiency scores are measured using DEA under VRS and input-orientation as output is 
demand derived and managers have limited control over their operating size as described within 
the methodology chapter. The BCC DEA linear programming problem to measure technical 
efficiency is denoted in equation 6.12.  
Here 𝑁 (𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁) denotes the number of DMUs, 𝑥𝑗 the 𝑗-th input (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽)and 𝑦𝑟 the 
𝑟-th output (𝑟 = 1, . . , 𝑅), 𝜆 is the vector of weights and 𝜃 is the radial contraction of inputs to 
the convex frontier; the efficiency scores.  
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𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆 𝜃 
                   𝑠𝑡     −𝑦𝑛 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0                    (6.12)  
𝜃𝑥𝑛 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝐼𝜆′ = 1 
 
The efficiency is examined over the period 1996/97–2010/11 in which the data is pooled and 
is examined under a meta-frontier, described in section 3.6.5.9. The meta-frontier assumes the 
construction of a single frontier, therefore implying no technological change over the period. 
A meta-frontier is examined as the number of DMUs within the sample is limited, therefore to 
avoid the dimensionality problem the data is pooled over the period. Although the meta-frontier 
does not assume technical change, the impact of technical change and regulatory regimes is 
examined within the second stage regression. An alternative approach is the application of a 
moving average window analysis, however distinguishing the impact of regulatory regimes is 
difficult as the frontier is changing between the periods which will include the influence of 
regulation.  
The DEA linear programme measures the Farrell efficiency score 𝜃  which takes a value 
between 0 and 1. A value of 1 indicates that the firm is efficient and therefore is on the frontier, 
while a value less than 1 indicates that the firm is inefficient. The amount in which management 
should reduce inputs by to be efficient is calculated as (1 − 𝜃)𝑥, the radial slacks. As outlined 
in the methodology chapter this ignores the presence of any non-radial slacks. Fried et al (1999, 
2002), Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) and Tone and Tsutusi (2009) use total radial and non-radial 
excess inputs slacks within the second stage regression which are measured as  
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𝑠𝑛𝑗 = 𝑥𝑛𝑗 − 𝑋𝑛𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽     (6.13) 
Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) highlight the importance of controlling for non-radial slacks due 
to the additional information obtained which can be extremely useful when accounting for the 
potential sources of production inefficiencies.  
To account for the impact of environmental variables on the input slacks, a second stage 
regression is employed. To enable the adjustment of input variables for differences in the 
operating characteristics, input slacks are regressed upon the environmental variables instead 
of the efficiency scores. Separate equations are examined for each input to allow for the impact 
of the environmental variables to differ for each input. The dependent variable in equation 6.14 
is the total input slacks 𝑠𝑛𝑗  for 𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁  DMUs and 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 inputs. The independent 
variable is a vector of environmental variables 𝑧𝑛.   
𝑠𝑛𝑗 =  𝑓
𝑗(𝑧𝑛;  𝛽
𝑗) + 𝜉𝑛𝑗 ≥ 0       𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽    (6.14) 
As discussed previously, Simar and Wilson (2007) propose the use of a bootstrapped truncated 
regression to account for serial correlation in the efficiency scores. As the input slacks are a 
function of the estimated efficiency scores, the issue of serial correlation is still present within 
the second stage regression. Therefore, a bootstrap truncated regression is applied to obtain 
correct standard errors.  
Simar and Wilson (2007) apply a truncated bootstrap regression for the environmental 
variables on the firm’s efficiency score. The inverse of the Farrell efficiency is greater than or 
equal to 1, therefore by construction is truncated with a lower limit of 1. As the efficiency 
scores are truncated at 1 Simar and Wilson (2007) apply a left truncated regression at             
(1 − 𝑍𝛽). To correct for the presence of serial correlation whilst using slacks Cordero-Ferrera 
et al (2010) note that the input slacks are greater than or equal to 0, therefore are left truncated 
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at 0. Instead of the truncation point at (1 − 𝑍𝛽) for the regression of the efficiency scores, the 
point of truncation is – 𝑍𝛽  for the input slacks. Following Simar and Wilson (2007) and 
Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010), the steps for each of the 𝑗 truncated regression are: 
1. The computation of 𝑠𝑛𝑗 for each input variable 𝑗 and for all 𝑛 decision making units 
using the original data. 
Run steps 2-4 for each 𝑗 input equations 
2. Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimation ?̂? of 𝛽 as well as an 
estimate of ?̂?𝜀 of 𝜎𝜀 from 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑧𝑛, 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑛, considering it is a truncated regression 
at zero.  
3. The computation of 𝐿  (e.g. 𝐿 = 2000 ) bootstrap estimates for ?̂?∗  and ?̂?𝜀
∗  in the 
following way : 
3.1.For each 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁  draw from 𝜀𝑛  from the 𝑁(0, ?̂?𝜀
2)  distribution with 
truncation at −𝑧𝑛?̂?𝑛. 
3.2.Compute 𝑠𝑛
∗ = 𝑓(𝑍𝑛, 𝛽𝑛) + 𝜀𝑛again for each 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁. 
3.3.Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of 𝑠𝑛
∗  
on 𝑧𝑛, yielding a bootstrap estimates (?̂?
∗, ?̂?𝑢
∗). 
4. Use the bootstrap values and original estimates ?̂?  and ?̂?𝜀  to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of 𝛽 and 𝜎𝜀. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) also propose a second algorithm which allows for the adjustment of 
the bootstrap bias as well as the estimation of the second stage regression with correct 
inference. Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) apply Simar and Wilson (2007) algorithm #1 as it 
performs better in small samples than algorithm #2. Simar and Wilson (2007) highlight that 
when the number of inputs and outputs equal 1, 2 or 3 a sample size of 400 is required in order 
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for the Root-Mean Square Error (RMSE) of algorithm #2 to be lower than algorithm #1. The 
RMSE measures the difference between the predicted model and the observed values. 
Algorithm #1 is applied to avoid additional biases due to the small sample size.  
Separate regressions are considered for each 𝐽  input to allow for the impact of the 
environmental variables to differ for each input. Fried et al (1999) apply a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) to allow for the error terms to be correlated as the slacks are derived from 
the first stage DEA. Fried et al (2002) use SFA within their estimation but highlight that the 
errors are probably not 𝑖𝑖𝑑. They acknowledge the estimation gains from using SUR but note 
this is not yet possible with the composite error term. To my knowledge, SUR is not applicable 
for a bootstrap truncated regression.    
The coefficients within the second stage regression allow for the determination of the 
magnitude and directional impact of the environmental variables on the input slacks. The total 
input slacks take a value greater than or equal to 0, and an efficient firm has 0 input slacks. A 
positive coefficient on the environmental variables indicates that the environmental variable is 
unfavourable as it leads to additional input slacks. On the other hand a negative coefficient 
indicates that the environmental variable reduces input slacks, and therefore operates in a 
favourable environment. Given the environmental operating characteristics of the firms the 
predicted slacks are obtained, 𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗.  
The third stage is to adjust the input variables by the amount in which are operating under a 
relatively favourable or unfavourable environment to ensure firms are compared when 
controlling for environmental differences. Fried et al (1999) adjust the inputs by adding a 
constant representing the difference between the predicted slack of the firm and the most 
unfavourable operating environment in equation 6.15. Tone and Tsutusi (2009) highlight that 
Fried et al (1999) adjustment process violates the translation invariance property as the addition 
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of the constant skews the distribution. Tone and Tsutsui (2009) suggest the following input re-
adjustment: 
𝑥 𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐴 =  
𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 −  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴 (𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴 −  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴 ) +  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛     (6.15) 
Where 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛{𝑥𝑛𝑗} ,    𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑥𝑛𝑗} ,   𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛{𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴}  and 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴 =
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴}   
Where 𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴 =  𝑥𝑛𝑗 −  𝑧𝑛?̂?
𝑗 −  𝑣𝑛𝑗 
Tone and Tsutsui (2009) highlight that adjustment process has the following properties: 
1. 𝑥 𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐴 increases in 𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴 . The re-adjusted data has the same ranking with the adjusted data. 
𝑥 𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐴 is a linear transformation of 𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝐴  with a positive coefficient, the coefficient and 
constant term are constant with the respective input item.  
2. At 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 , 𝑥 𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴𝐴 attains the maximum value 𝑥 𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴𝐴 =  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 
3. At 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴 , 𝑥 𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐴𝐴 attains the minimum value 𝑥 𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴𝐴 =  𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 
They highlight that the re-adjusted dataset {𝑥 𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐴} remains within the range [𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥] and 
that the maximum and minimum values are the same between {𝑥 𝑛𝑗
𝐴𝐴} and {𝑥𝑛𝑗}. They state that 
these properties are desirable as the inputs remain within the same range, which they find 
impacts upon the translation invariance property for the DEA scores. The adjustment process 
of Tone and Tsutsui (2009) adjusts the inputs both upwards and downwards, and the firm which 
has the most favourable environment has its inputs adjusted upwards by the largest amount.  
 The final stage re-runs the original DEA with the adjusted input values. This approach 
therefore allows for the identification of whether environmental variables impact upon the 
input slacks but also allows for adjusted-DEA scores to be calculated. 
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6.5 Data 
 
This section will outline the data used within the paper and the definitions of the variables 
considered. The data is available for the period 1996/97–2010/11 for the ten WaSCs.   
6.5.1 Definition of Variables  
 
The functions undertaken by WaSCs are the abstraction, treatment and distribution of water 
followed by the collection, treatment and disposal of sewerage. Previously highlighted within 
chapter 2, the measurement of efficiency is analysed at the activity level and under a joint 
specification for water and sewerage activities. Efficiency modelled at the activity level allows 
for cost interactions between water and sewerage activities.  
A four output model is analysed with two outputs measuring the physical volume of water and 
sewerage, the amount of potable water delivered (𝑌1) and the equivalent population served 
(𝑌2). The equivalent population served is a proxy for the physical output considered by Ofwat 
within their efficiency analysis. Garcia and Thomas (2001) and Stone and Webster (2004) 
highlight the estimation gains for including not only the physical quantity of outputs but also 
the number of properties served for water and sewerage. Therefore, alongside the physical 
outputs the number of water properties served (𝑌3) and the number of sewerage properties 
served(𝑌4) are also used.  
To account for changes in quality requirements, a quality-adjusted measure of the physical 
inputs is applied. Adopting the approach of Saal and Parker (2000) as applied in chapter 5 the 
quality-adjusted measure of output is calculated as the water delivered is multiplied by the 
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water quality index (𝑌1 = 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 × 𝑄𝑤) and the equivalent population served is 
multiplied by the sewerage quality index (𝑌2 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑄𝑆).  
Three inputs are considered within the model: labour, capital and other. Labour costs are 
obtained from the statutory accounts following Saal et al (2011) rather than the June Return 
following Erbetta and Cave (2007) as the figures from the June Return only relate to direct 
staff costs and therefore ignore any indirect costs such as head office functions. The staff costs 
from the statutory accounts are not a perfect measure as they may include other group activities.  
Capital costs are calculated as the sum of depreciation (including IRC25) and the opportunity 
cost of capital. The opportunity cost of capital is calculated as the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC), applying assumptions made by Ofwat at each price review multiplied by the 
company’s RCV. This measure is used following Saal et al (2011) and Maziotis et al (2013) 
rather than the MEA value as in other studies 26  as the RCV reflects the actual amount 
companies have spent rather than the value of an equivalent asset today. MEA has previously 
been used as it is reported separately for other water and sewerage activities whereas the RCV 
is reported for the WaSC.  
Total costs are calculated as the sum of capital costs and operating expenditure net of third 
party services, exceptional items, doubtful debts, service charge and local authority rates27. 
Other costs are therefore calculated as total operating costs less labour costs and capital costs. 
Following Erbetta and Cave (2007) all costs apart from power costs are deflated using RPI to 
                                                          
25 IRC is the infrastructure renewal charge, is a charge on infrastructure assets which acts as a depreciation.  
26 Saal and Parker (2000), Stone and Webster (2004), Saal and Reid (2004), Saal and Parker (2005), Saal et al 
(2007) and Bottasso and Conti (2009). 
27 These costs are deemed as non-controllable costs by Ofwat and are not incorporated within their assessment 
of efficiency. Exceptional items are by definition atypical. Third party services relate to costs incurred for output 
produced by other companies. Local authority rates and doubtful debts are considered as non-controllable. High 
levels of doubtful debts are due to the legal and regulatory decision of prohibiting the shutting off water and 
sewerage activities when bills are not paid. Service charges are charges by the Environment Agency for water 
abstraction.  
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2009 prices and power is deflated by an energy price index for the industrial sector derived 
from the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI).  
Efficiency under input-orientation can either be measured under technical efficiency or cost 
efficiency. Technical efficiency examines the proportional reduction of all inputs to the 
frontier. Cost efficiency examines the optimal level of inputs given input prices and the frontier. 
Cost efficiency incorporates allocative efficiency and inputs can either be at their optimal level, 
under-utilised or over-utilised. The ratio of the actual input and the optimal input derived from 
cost efficiency can take a value of greater than, less than or equal to 1. Under cost efficiency, 
the dependent variable within the second stage regression represents the optimal, under- or 
over-utilisation of inputs. The interpretation of the directional impact of the environmental 
variable will depend on whether the input is over- or underutilised, which varies between firms. 
The interpretation of the impact of environmental variables on these input slacks is not as 
intuitive as those relating solely to technical efficiency, which represents the over-utilisation 
of inputs28,29. The use of costs instead of a quantity measure of inputs within the measurement 
of technical efficiency allows for the interpretation of the efficiency scores as cost efficiency. 
This approach has the drawback that prices are not assumed to be exogenous as they are in the 
application of a cost function DEA model. Thanassoulis (2000a, b) and Portela et al (2011) 
examine technical efficiency applying a cost measure for input. Thanassoulis (2000a) states 
that companies face similar staff and material prices. Therefore, after accounting for the level 
of output and the different operating environment, the remaining cost differentials will reflect 
                                                          
28 An application of the adjustment of cost efficiency slacks is applied within chapter 7 for the measurement of 
dynamic efficiency. The measurement of dynamic efficiency requires the measurement of cost efficiency to 
highlight the impact on allocative inefficiency when ignoring intertemporal links of capital within the production 
process.  
29  Erbetta and Cave (2007) apply a cost function measure of DEA in which they examine the impact of 
environmental variables upon both the technical and allocative efficiency. The paper takes the absolute value of 
the allocative inefficiency and over- or under-utilisation of inputs to determine the influence of environmental 
variables. The paper does not allow for the final stage adjustment of the DEA scores for the DMUs in the three-
stage approach.  
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managerial inefficiency. Overall, the methodology of using costs within the assessment of 
technical efficiency within DEA allows for the appropriate incorporation of environmental 
variables. It also determines the impact of the different regulatory periods whilst the results are 
comparable with Ofwat’s assessment of relative efficiency.  
6.5.2 Quality Variables  
 
Environmental variables are incorporated to control for differences in the operating 
environment faced by the WaSCs. This allows for those companies that operate under a 
relatively unfavourable (high cost) environment to be analysed on a level playing field. The 
environmental variables were discussed extensively in section 4.4.8. The first environmental 
variable is the proportion of distribution input abstracted from rivers to take into account the 
differences in the resources and treatment (Z1). The second environmental variable is the 
density of a company’s water operations which is calculated as the total water population 
divided by the length of mains (Z2). Similarly, sewerage density is calculated by the total 
sewerage population divided by the length of sewers (Z3). The proportion of trade effluent (Z4) 
is calculated as the volume of trade effluent divided by the volume of waste water returned. 
The proportion of leakage relative to distribution input (Z5) is incorporated. Alongside the 
environment variables, a time trend is included to account for technological progress or regress. 
A negative coefficient is expected due to technological progress over the period examined. 
Regulatory dummies are included to examine whether regulation has impacted on the economic 
environment. Two regulatory dummies are included for the price review in 1999 and 2004: 
Reg99 and PR04 respectively. Reg99 and Reg04 take the value of 1 for the five years after the 
price review in 1999 and 2004 respectively. The coefficient for the second stage regression will 
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be negative if the regulatory price review has been effective in improving efficiency. Table 6.1 
presents a snapshot of the data used in this chapter. 
 
 
6.6  Results 
This section will outline the results for the incorporation of non-discretionary variables within 
DEA for the analysis of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. 
The BCC DEA model under input-orientation is applied within the first stage. This DEA model 
calculates efficiency by examining the level of radial contraction of inputs given outputs and 
the feasible technology, assuming that WaSCs operate within a homogeneous operating 
environment. However, WaSCs operate under different environmental characteristics and the 
impact of the environmental variables on the excess input slacks is analysed through a second-
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Outputs
Water Delivered Ml/Day 1,014.6 551.9 284.2 2,179.4
Equivalent Population (,000) 6,179.8 3,704.1 1,118.4 14,271.9
Water Properties (,000) 1,854.1 985.7 492.9 3,538.8
Sewerage Properties (,000) 2,198.0 1,331.0 586.7 5,426.5
Inputs
Labour Costs £m 104.5 53.2 34.7 217.0
Capital Costs £m 407.3 188.1 137.6 813.9
Other Costs £m 137.2 77.7 15.3 370.0
Operating Characteristics
Water Density 150.89 45.11 100.65 283.41
Sewerage Density 172.00 18.68 131.80 225.86
% of DI from Rivers 0.39 0.20 0.00 0.78
Proportion of Trade Effluent 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.18
Proportion of Leakage 0.23 0.05 0.15 0.38
Water Quality 0.97 0.03 0.84 1
Sewerage Quality 0.90 0.15 0.30 1
Note. 150 Observations. Costs are expressed in real terms in 2009 prices
Table 6.1: Three-Stage DEA Sample Descriptive Statistics 
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stage bootstrapped truncated regression. Based upon the firm’s environmental operating 
characteristics, its predicted slacks are estimated. Finally, the inputs are adjusted relatively to 
the amount in which they operate under a favourable environment and the DEA programme is 
repeated. The adjustment mechanism for inputs is proposed by Tone and Tsutsui (2009) who 
expand on the work of Fried et al (1999, 2002) to overcome the problem of the violation of the 
translation invariance property. The DEA scores under the first and third stage are compared 
to determine whether adjusting for environmental variables impacts on the both the efficiency 
scores and ranks of WaSCs.  
6.7.1 1st Stage Efficiency Scores  
 
The results from the first stage DEA model are reported in table 6.2; whilst figure 6.1 depicts 
the range of efficiency scores alongside the average. The efficiency scores range from 1 to 0.74 
with a mean efficiency score over the whole period of 0.94, which therefore indicates a mean 
inefficiency of 6%.  The efficiency scores differ from those calculated for the measurement of 
beta-convergence in chapter 5. Firstly, the number of firms which are deemed as efficient under 
𝛽-convergence is higher; this is because a separate frontier is analysed within each time period. 
Secondly, the model suffers from a dimensionality problem, reducing the discriminatory power 
of the model. The efficiency scores also differ due to the inclusion of labour and capital as a 
separate input within the measurement of three-stage DEA.   
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Table 6.2 First Stage DEA Efficiency Scores  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC 1 0.801 0.747 0.738 0.793 0.757 0.802182 0.822 0.813 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.913 0.802 0.827 0.867
WaSC 2 0.762 0.790 0.797 0.885 0.884 1 0.994 0.951 0.904 0.885 0.875 0.911 0.793 0.857 1
WaSC 3 0.994 1 1 1 1 1 0.970 0.980 0.984 1 0.974 1 0.941 1 1
WaSC 4 1 0.973 0.952 0.973 0.955 1 0.999 1 0.976372 1 0.920 0.978 0.934 1 1
WaSC 5 0.992 0.967 0.964 0.992 0.995 0.994 0.978 0.957 0.951 0.930 0.898 0.890 0.931 0.928 0.956
WaSC 6 0.905 0.824 0.831 0.863 0.950 0.884 0.857 0.837 0.882 0.962 0.916 0.936 0.953 1 0.954
WaSC 7 1 1 0.982125 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.958 0.945 0.982 1 1
WaSC 8 0.948 0.930 0.913 0.945 1 1 0.973 0.969 0.891 0.900 0.863 0.908 0.904 0.926 0.964
WaSC 9 0.994 1 0.977995 1 1 1 0.996 0.999 1 0.992 0.948 1 1 1 1
WaSC 10 0.871 0.875 0.862 0.944 0.997 1 0.998 0.995 1 0.955 0.929 0.938 0.921 0.961 0.925
Average 0.927 0.911 0.902 0.939 0.954 0.968 0.959 0.950 0.941 0.944 0.910 0.942 0.916 0.950 0.967
Standard Deviation 0.089 0.095 0.090 0.071 0.079 0.069 0.064 0.069 0.064 0.061 0.047 0.039 0.069 0.064 0.044
Minimum 0.762 0.747 0.738 0.793 0.757 0.802 0.822 0.813 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.890 0.793 0.827 0.867
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The minimum efficiency score has increased from 0.76 in 1997 to 0.87 in 2011. The average 
and minimum efficiency scores have generally improved over the period 1997-2011. The 
dispersion of efficiency scores has fallen over the period; the standard deviation has fallen from 
0.09 to 0.044. These results coincide with those from chapter 5 and Saal et al (2007) which 
show that regulation has been effective in encouraging the least efficient WaSCs to catch up to 
the frontier. Figure 6.1 depicts that the average efficiency score improved after 1999 however 
started to deteriorate in 2003 and reached the lowest average in 2007. Portela et al (2011) find 
that companies are moving closer towards to the meta-frontier until 2002 when they become 
relatively stable and start to decline in 2006 and 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of the efficiency scores over the whole period are displayed in figure 6.2. This 
shows the typical distribution expected when a small proportion of the firms are inefficient, 
and the density increases as the efficiency score increases. 
 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of First Stage DEA Efficiency Score 
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6.7.2 2nd Stage Bootstrap Regression  
 
The DEA model incorporates input and outputs to determine the level of efficiency and excess 
input slacks. To account for the influence of non-discretionary variables upon the production 
possibility set, a second stage regression is applied30. The bootstrap truncated regression with 
left truncation at – 𝑍𝛽 in equation 6.14 determines the impact of the environmental variables 
on the excess levels of inputs. The results from the second stage bootstrapped truncated 
                                                          
30 Company-specific heterogeneities are controlled for by the environmental variables. Fixed effects are not 
incorporated within the second stage regression as the time-invariant component could capture persistent 
inefficiencies.  
Figure 6.2 First Stage DEA Scores Kernel Density Estimate 
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regression for each input with 2,000 iterations following that amount used by Simar and Wilson 
(2007)31 are displayed in table 6.3.  
Water and sewerage density have been incorporated alongside a squared term; the estimates 
reveal a negative first order term and a positive second order term. This indicates that as density 
increases input slacks are reduced until this is exhausted at a sufficiently high level of density 
and firms require additional resources. Overall, those firms operating in a very rural and very 
urban environment require higher inputs, and therefore are considered to be operating within a 
relatively unfavourable environment32. The first and second order coefficients for sewerage 
density for all inputs are significant at least at the 10% level. This indicates that slacks decrease 
as density increases up to a certain threshold and then slacks begin to increase. The coefficients 
for water density are insignificant. Previous literature reports that high water density is 
characterised by a favourable operating environment (Bottasso and Conti, 2003; Erbetta and 
Cave, 2007). Saal and Parker (2005), Bottasso and Conti (2009)33 and Saal et al (2011) allow 
for the non-linear relationship between water density and inputs/costs in which both report that 
very rural and dense operating characteristics are unfavourable. The results for the impact of 
sewerage density are less consistent in the literature. Erbetta and Cave (2007) for labour slacks 
and Tupper and Resende (2004) report a positive impact on slacks therefore indicating that 
urban areas are unfavourable, although the impact is insignificant. On the other hand, Saal and 
Reid (2004) report a negative impact on slacks whilst Saal et al (2011) find a negative first 
order term and positive second order term.  
                                                          
31 Simar and Wilson (2007) state that more accurate estimates can be achieved with the larger amount of 
replications. Simar and Wilson (2007, pp. 44) apply 2,000 replications. 5,000 replications were examined but 
produced little or no change in the standard errors.  
32 For the capital stock the optimal density is 250.5 and 172.9 for water and sewerage respectively. Taking the 
average density for the firms over the period the optimal water density is only reached for WaSC 7. For 
sewerage density, firms within the dataset are exhibited on all components of the curve, both the decreasing and 
increasing component.  
33 Bottasso and Conti (2009) find that the increase in costs as density increases, the congestion effect becomes 
significant at levels of density not experienced within their sample for WoCs.  
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The coefficient for the proportion of DI from rivers is positive for all inputs and significant for 
labour and capital inputs. This therefore indicates that a higher proportion of DI from rivers is 
unfavourable as it leads to additional slacks. This implies that the additional treatment costs 
associated with river abstraction out weights the lower abstraction costs. This result is 
consistent with those reported from Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Cherchye et al (2013)34. An 
alternative to incorporating the DI from rivers is to include the proportion of DI from boreholes. 
Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007) Saal et al (2011) find that a higher proportion of 
abstraction from boreholes reduces input requirements35.  
The proportion of total waste water which is trade effluent has a positive and significant 
coefficient for all input slacks. The results conclude that treating trade effluent requires 
additional inputs, therefore reflecting the relative intensity of treating trade effluent. These 
results coincide with those of Saal et al (2007) who report that a higher proportion of trade 
effluent requires higher input requirements. Erbetta and Cave (2007) find an insignificant 
relationship between labour and other input slacks and trade effluent however report a negative 
and significant relationship for capital. This indicates a higher proportion of trade effluent 
reduces slacks which indicates better performance.  
The influence of leakage is negative and significant for labour and capital inputs. This result 
indicates that higher leakage reduces input slacks and therefore is favourable. The expected 
influence of the impact of leakage is ambiguous as Erbetta and Cave (2007) argue a higher 
proportion of leakage indicates a deteriorating asset condition, and therefore is more costly to 
operate. However, Cherchye et al (2013) argue that higher leakage may be as a result of a lack 
                                                          
34 Alongside the proportion of DI from rivers, Cherchye et al (2014) incorporate the proportion of DI from 
boreholes in which they find a higher proportion of borehole is favourable. The proportion of DI from boreholes 
was also considered alongside rivers however the influence was not significant.  
35 The proportion of DI from boreholes was included however was insignificant and therefore the proportion of 
DI from rivers was incorporated.  
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of capital expenditure on fixing leaks. Erbetta and Cave (2007), Saal et al (2007) and Saal et al 
(2011) report that a higher proportion of leakage increases costs. On the other hand               
Cherchye et al (2013) report mixed results. These results report that a high proportion of 
leakage is a result of a lack of capital maintenance expenditure, therefore indicating the 
environment is favourable.  
Finally, the impact of the time trend and regulatory dummies on input slacks is examined. The 
time trend is negative for labour slacks and other slacks, which indicates a reduction in labour 
slacks over the period, although it is insignificant. The impact of the time trend for capital 
inputs is positive. The results therefore indicate a more intensive use of capital inputs over the 
period.  The positive coefficient may be due to the presence of a capex bias due to the       
Averch-Johnson effect and the nature of the industry which is focused on capex solutions to 
meet future demand. Erbetta and Cave (2007) report a significant and positive influence of time 
for technical efficiency, suggesting a more intensive input requirement over the period. Erbetta 
and Cave (2007) report a negative time trend for the absolute value of the allocative 
inefficiency, highlighting an improvement in the optimal combination of inputs.  
To examine whether the different regulatory periods has influenced the input slacks, two 
dummy variables have been incorporated for the 1999 and 2004 price review. The regulatory 
dummies relating to the 1999 and 2004 price review are negative for all input slacks. The main 
impact of the price review was to decrease input slacks, however the results are only significant 
for labour and capital inputs for the 1999 price review. The influence of the 1999 price for 
other inputs was insignificant, therefore to determine whether the overall effect of the 1999 
price review was significant, the environmental variables are regressed upon total slacks36.  
                                                          
36 All inputs are incorporated in monetary values and therefore can be summed. This approach is not applicable 
if inputs are not in the same unit of measurement. The regression of total input slacks allows for the 
incorporation of radial and non-radial slacks. A second-stage bootstrapped truncated regression was also 
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Column 4 in table 6.3 reports the bootstrapped truncated regression for total slacks which 
reveals a negative and significant influence of the 1999 price review. Therefore, the overall 
influence of the 1999 price review resulted in a significant reduction of slacks and therefore 
improved efficiency within the industry. The coefficient for the 2004 price review is 
insignificant for all inputs and the total input slacks, indicating the review had no influence on 
improving the efficiency score.  
Erbetta and Cave (2007) report that the 1999 price review was statistically significant in 
reducing slacks, however the 1994 review was statistically insignificant. They state that this 
might be due to change in the regulatory policy in 1999. Portela et al (2011) examine 
productivity and report increasing productivity in the period 1993–2005. Portela et al (2011) 
find an improvement in the meta-frontier until 2002 which coincides with Ofwat’s statement 
that the improvement in the efficiency scores as a result of the 1999 price review is striking. 
The paper also reports that productivity fell after 2005 and continued to fall until 2007. This 
period coincides with the 2004 price review, although they do highlight that the result may be 
due to the price review alongside other factors such as an increase in electricity and fuel prices.  
The 1999 price review was a particularly tough review which was the only review to date to 
impose a negative 𝐾  factor whereas the 2004 review imposed a 𝐾  factor greater than that 
imposed at privatisation. Overall, this chapter contributes to the literature by reporting that the 
1999 price review brought significant efficiency improvements, whereas the impact of the 2004 
price review was statistically insignificant. The results found within this chapter coincide with 
the industry experience of the impact of the price review with Sir Ian Byatt, the former director 
                                                          
estimated for the radial efficiency score, and the results hold that the influence of the 1999 price was negative 
and significant.  
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general stating that the 1999 price review was tough whereas the 2004 review was generous 
(Utility Week, 2014).  
 
 
 
Independent Variable Labour Slack Other Slack Capital Slack Total Slacks
Constant 462.089*** 1322.556* 1637.001*** 2281.979***
(147.086) (687.598) (597.111) (708.942)
Water Density -1.557 -6.673 -2.201 -4.868
(1.292) (4.485) (3.292) (4.662)
(Water Density)2 0.004 0.018 0.004 0.012
(0.004) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016)
Sewerage Density -3.661** -10.855* -16.998** -21.972***
(1.432) (6.580) (7.299) (8.118)
(Sewerage Density)2 0.010*** 0.032* 0.049** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.019 (0.021) (0.023)
Leakage -288.947*** -304.465 -785.674** -842.138**
(103.506) (305.456) (317.993) (401.879)
Proportion of DI from 
Rivers 25.680* 93.344 185.083** -842.137**
(14.771) (70.858) (73.813) (401.879)
Proportion of Trade 
Effluent 433.457*** 1270.763** 1829.951*** 2130.455***
(138.918) (593.109) (546.859) (642.287)
t -0.051 -1.888 11.634*** 9.460***
(0.645) (3.256) (3.615) (3.378)
Reg99 -16.211** -23.735 -67.421** -79.161**
(6.689) (27.039) (26.839) (31.597)
Reg04 -1.663 -0.942 -5.859 -11.159
-4.932 (22.214) (18.125) (21.535)
Note: Estimates marked within (***) are significant a the 1% level; 
estimates marked within (**) are significant at the 5% level; estimates
marked with (*) are significant at the 10% level.
Dependent Variable 
Table 6.3: Second Stage Bootstrapped Truncated Regression 
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6.7.3 3rd Stage Adjusted DEA Scores 
 
The 3rd stage adjusts the DEA scores by the amount in which WaSCs operates under a 
favourable or unfavourable environment. Applying the adjustment procedure of Tone and 
Tsutsui (2009) in equation 6.15 table 6.4 reports several descriptive statics for the adjusted 
inputs variables. The adjusted inputs using the Tone and Tsutsui (2009) method remain within 
the same range of the initial resources. The adjustment process varies the mean and standard 
deviation of the inputs.  
 
 
The DEA is re-run using the adjusted inputs and the adjusted efficiency scores are displayed in 
table 6.5 and depicted in figure 6.3. The minimum efficiency score has fallen from 73.8% 
within the first stage adjustment to 62.9% in the final stage. The average efficiency score has 
also decreased from 93.9% to 87.0% after the 3rd stage adjustment. This indicates that several 
firms were deemed relatively efficient as they were operating within a favourable environment, 
once controlling for this their efficiency score fell. The efficiency scores from the 1st stage 
regression show a clear trend over time however after accounting for the environmental 
variables, technological progress and the influence of the price review the trends in the 
efficiency scores has dampened.  
 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Other 137.21 77.73 15.30 370.02 166.09 82.45 15.30 370.02
Labour 104.48 53.22 34.68 217.05 97.41 45.88 34.68 217.05
Capital 407.30 188.05 137.57 813.88 406.87 171.62 137.57 813.88
Initial Resources Tone and Tsutusi (2009)
Table 6.4: Adjusted Inputs Descriptive Statistics  
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Table 6.5- Third Stage Environmental Adjusted DEA Scores   
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC 1 0.773 0.840 0.869 0.843 0.774 0.795 0.804 0.805 0.867 0.870 1 0.846 0.820 0.867 0.837
WaSC 2 0.948 0.944 0.963 0.849 0.888 0.937 0.846 0.814 0.913 0.863 0.871 0.879 0.708 0.776 0.870
WaSC 3 0.806 0.822 0.851 0.829 0.822 0.815 0.791 0.784 0.857 0.807 1 0.851 0.780 0.842 0.851
WaSC 4 1 0.931 1 1 0.957 0.977 0.878 0.891 0.988 0.892 0.866 0.851 0.873 0.987 1
WaSC 5 0.729 0.884 1 0.769 0.748 0.815 0.755 0.757 0.995 0.902 1 0.810 0.835 0.977 1
WaSC 6 0.843 0.798 0.798 0.744 0.844 0.762 0.763 0.757 0.874 0.850 0.900 0.956 0.908 0.969 0.971
WaSC 7 1 0.984 0.972 0.951 0.956 0.919 0.890 0.928 0.922 1 0.878 0.899 0.909 1 1
WaSC 8 1 1 0.881 0.894 0.943 1 0.924 0.892 0.865 0.830 0.850 0.834 0.778 0.826 0.801
WaSC 9 0.629 0.740 0.748 0.650 0.723 0.817 0.712 0.766 0.901 0.823 0.847 0.812 0.810 0.851 0.893
WaSC 10 0.976 0.913 0.916 0.826 0.861 0.943 0.900 0.910 1 0.948 0.881 0.812 0.792 0.855 0.802
Average 0.870 0.886 0.900 0.835 0.852 0.878 0.826 0.830 0.918 0.879 0.909 0.855 0.821 0.895 0.902
Standard Deviation 0.133 0.084 0.086 0.101 0.086 0.086 0.072 0.068 0.057 0.060 0.064 0.046 0.063 0.080 0.083
Minimum 0.629 0.740 0.748 0.650 0.723 0.762 0.712 0.757 0.857 0.807 0.847 0.810 0.708 0.776 0.801
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Figure 6.4 shows the kernel density function of the efficiency scores for the 1st and 3rd stage 
DEA. After controlling for the differences in the environmental operating characteristics, the 
dispersion of the efficiency scores widens. The number of firms which make up the frontier 
has decreased from 43 to 22. This indicates again that several firms appear relatively efficient 
because they operate within favourable operating environments relative to the other firms. To 
test whether the DEA efficiency scores are significantly different for the 1st and 3rd stages a 
Wilcoxon-rank sum test is applied alongside a Spearman’s rank correlation test and Pearson 
correlation. The Wilcoxon-rank sum test is a non-parametric test with the null hypothesis that 
the two samples are from the same population. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the distributions are the same at the 5% level with 𝑧 = −6.992. The result 
therefore indicates that the efficiency scores are significantly different when controlling for the 
differences in environmental characteristics.   
As well as using the Wilcoxon-Rank Sum test to determine whether there is a relationship 
between the first and third stage DEA, a Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation 
Figure 6.3 3rd Stage DEA Efficiency Score 
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test is applied. The Pearson coefficient for the pooled sample between the 1st and 3rd stage is 
0.149 and is significant at the 10% level. The result therefore indicates that there is a weak 
correlation between the unadjusted and environmental adjusted DEA scores. This indicates that 
once controlling for the environment the relative efficiency scores vary significantly. The 
results indicate that three WaSCs; WaSC 3, WaSC 5 and WaSC 9 have an average reduction 
in their efficiency score by 15, 9 and 21 percentage points respectively once controlling for 
differences in their operating environments. This would therefore indicate that these firms 
operate within a relatively favourable environment and when controlling for this their 
efficiency scores are reduced.  
On the other hand WaSC 1 has experienced an increase in its average efficiency score over the 
period, highlighting that it operates in an unfavourable environment, and when controlling for 
environmental differences their efficiency scores improve. The remainder of the firms have 
experienced a smaller change in their average mean efficiency between 1 and 6 percentage 
points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 1st and 3rd Stage Kernel Density Estimate 
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Table 6.6- First and Third Stage DEA Efficiency Score Rank    
1st Stage Efficiency Score Rank
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC 1 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 9 10 10
WaSC 2 10 9 9 8 9 1 5 8 7 9 8 8 10 9 1
WaSC 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 8 5 4 1 1 1 4 1 1
WaSC 4 1 4 5 5 7 1 2 1 5 1 5 3 5 1 1
WaSC 5 5 5 4 4 6 8 6 7 6 7 7 10 6 7 7
WaSC 6 7 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 9 5 6 6 3 1 8
WaSC 7 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 1
WaSC 8 6 6 6 6 1 1 7 6 8 8 9 9 8 8 6
WaSC 9 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 1 1 1
WaSC 10 8 7 7 7 5 1 3 4 1 6 4 5 7 6 9
3rd Stage Adjusted Efficiency Score Rank
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
WaSC 1 8 7 7 5 8 9 6 6 8 5 1 6 5 5 8
WaSC 2 5 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 3 10 10 6
WaSC 3 7 8 8 6 7 7 7 7 10 10 1 4 8 8 7
WaSC 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 4 3 4 8 5 3 2 1
WaSC 5 9 6 1 8 9 7 9 9 2 3 1 10 4 3 1
WaSC 6 6 9 9 9 6 10 8 10 7 7 4 1 2 4 4
WaSC 7 1 2 3 2 2 5 3 1 4 1 6 2 1 1 1
WaSC 8 1 1 6 3 3 1 1 3 9 8 9 7 9 9 10
WaSC 9 10 10 10 10 10 6 10 8 6 9 10 8 6 7 5
WaSC 10 4 5 5 7 5 3 2 2 1 2 5 9 7 6 9
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The results so far examine whether the incorporation of the environmental variables have 
influenced the value of the efficiency score. The following section examines whether the ranks 
of the companies have altered once accounting for the environment. The Spearman’s Rank 
correlation test is the measure of statistical dependencies between the two datasets analysing 
the differences in their ranks. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the first 
stage DEA results and Tone and Tsutsui (2009) adjusted efficiency scores have a correlation 
coefficient for the pooled sample of 0.189. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The 
results therefore conclude that there is a weak correlation between the firm’s efficiency scores 
when controlling for the environmental variables.  
Table 6.6 reports the ranks of the efficiency scores under the first stage DEA and the Tone and 
Tsutsui (2009) adjusted DEA scores. The ranks vary substantially between the 1st and 3rd stage 
efficiency scores; WaSC 2 was 8th to 10th within the industry with the exception of 2002 and 
2011. Once adjusting for the environmental variables the ranks increased to mainly 5th over the 
period with the exception of 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, WaSC 3 made up the frontier 
over the period 1998–2002 and once accounting for the environment their efficiency score 
reduced to 6th to 8th. These results therefore confirm that it is not only the relative efficiency 
scores that are changing; the influence of adjusting for the environmental variables influences 
the ranks for the WaSCs.  
The results highlight from a methodological viewpoint the importance of incorporating 
environmental variables within the measurement of efficiency. If environmental variables are 
not incorporated the efficiency scores will be biased depending on whether firms operate within 
a favourable or unfavourable environment.  The results highlight that within the first stage 
DEA, several firms make up the frontier because they operate within a favourable environment. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter employs a three-stage DEA model introduced by Fried et al (1999) and extended 
by Cordero-Ferrera et al (2010) and Tone and Tsutsui (2009) to account for the differences in 
firms operating environment when measuring efficiency. DEA makes the implicit assumption 
of homogeneity; however WaSCs operate in different geographical locations which have 
different operating characteristics which can influence the production function. Ray (1988) 
highlights the theoretical importance of controlling for environmental variables as this can 
influence production function, therefore making firms look efficient or inefficient if they 
operate within a favourable or unfavourable environment respectively.  
Non-discretionary variables in the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry have been 
incorporated extensively through the parametric approaches. However DEA is advantageous 
as it does not require any assumptions with regards to its functional form. Erbetta and Cave 
(2007) produce input-specific efficiency measures applying DEA, this chapter contributes to 
the literature by producing an overall company measure of efficiency once account for 
differences in operating characteristics. Within the literature there is a large amount of evidence 
of the influence of the 1994 and 1999 price review. Portela et al (2011) report limited evidence 
of deteriorating efficiency as a result of the 2004 price review. The second contribution of this 
chapter is to examine if the 1999 and 2004 price review has significantly influence the 
efficiency score.  
The impact of the 1999 and 2004 price reviews are examined in which the results indicate that 
the 1999 price review had a significant impact on improving efficiency, whereas the 2004 price 
review did not have a significant influence. The 1999 price review is thought to be a particularly 
tough price review imposing large efficiency challenges on firms whereas the 2004 review is 
considered as relatively lax.  
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The second stage regression implies a separability condition; therefore the environmental 
variables influence the distribution of the input slacks and do not influence the optimal 
combination of inputs. An extension of this chapter would be to examine conditional DEA 
introduced by Darario and Simar (2005) which conditions the efficiency scores on a set 
environmental variable. 
The final stage adjusted the input slacks for the different operating environments and repeats 
the DEA model to obtain environmental adjusted DEA efficiency scores to account for whether 
firms operate within a relative favourable or unfavourable operating environment.  The 
efficiency scores are compared between the first and third stage. The results highlight a large 
change in both the efficiency scores and ranks for several firms. The adjusted DEA scores 
highlight the importance of controlling for environmental variables within the measurement of 
efficiency using DEA. When firms are examined on a level playing field the distribution and 
ranking of their efficiency scores vary substantially. The number of firms which make up the 
frontier decreased from 43 to 22, and therefore several firms were deemed efficient due to 
operating within a favourable environment. The chapter highlights the importance of 
controlling for environmental variables; the exclusion of environmental variables can 
significantly impact the managerial or regulatory decisions. 
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7. Dynamic Efficiency 
7.1  Introduction 
The English and Welsh water and sewerage sector is a long-life capital intensive industry, 
characterised by natural monopolies. The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry is 
characterised by quasi-fixed inputs such as mains, sewers and treatment works which cannot 
be adjusted to their optimal level instantaneously. The static DEA model measures efficiency 
assuming that all inputs can be adjusted to their optimal level instantaneously, firms may face 
adjustment costs. The static model does not take into account decisions companies make today 
to influence the production in the future. Firms face a trade-off between increasing output 
production today or investing in capital to increase production in future periods. To account 
for the intertemporal nature of capital dynamic DEA is examined. 
The aims of the chapter are twofold: firstly to compare the conclusions from static and dynamic 
DEA highlighting the inefficiencies that arise out of a dynamic framework, and secondly to 
investigate the presence of a preference for capital expenditure  known as the capex bias. Ofwat 
(2011b) defines the capex bias as the view that companies within the industry have an 
inappropriate preference for expenditure on capital assets over day-to-day operational 
expenditure. The 2014 price review to set prices for 2015–2020 is partly designed around 
eliminating the presence of the perceived capex bias. CEPA (2012) state that the bias is 
believed to exist for three reasons. Firstly, there are the different financial incentives created 
by examining capex and opex separately. Secondly, the presence of what is termed as the 
Averch-Johnson effect; which arises if the allowed rate of return is higher than the true cost of 
capital (Averch and Johnson, 1962). Opex is recovered within the period; however capex is 
added to the Regulatory Capital Value (RCV) which earns a return based upon Ofwat’s 
assumptions of the cost of capital. Thirdly, the culture of the sector is one that is focused on 
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capex solutions and infrastructure to meet future demand. Through examining dynamic DEA 
this chapter aims to examine the presence of the perceived capex bias. 
DEA is used to measure efficiency within a dynamic context by examining the presence of 
quasi-fixed capital. A dynamic perspective of the measurement of efficiency is required as 
investment today does not only influence today’s production, but also future periods. 
Intertemporal effects are incorporated through the inclusion of capital as an output in the 
current period production as well as an input from the previous period’s production. Firms face 
an installation cost investing in quasi-fixed inputs; the more resources that are utilised in 
installing additional quasi-fixed inputs, less are available for the production of output.  Firms 
therefore face a trade-off between increasing output today or producing capital to increase 
outputs in the subsequent period (Geymueller, 2009). The chapter allows overall efficiency to 
be decomposed into a dynamic component and a static component. This approach determines 
the level of efficiency due to variable inputs and the inefficiency due to quasi-fixed inputs.  
The chapter takes a three stage approach by including environmental variables37 within the 
dynamic framework to ensure firms are compared on a level playing field. Input slacks ratios 
are obtained from the dynamic DEA which are then regressed upon the environmental 
variables. The predicted slack ratios are used to adjust the input variables upwards for those 
firms operating in a relatively favourable environment. The DEA is repeated including the 
adjusted inputs to obtain efficiency scores when accounting for differences in the operating 
environments.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the regulatory 
environment; Section 3 briefly reviews the extant literature; Section 4 outlines the methodology 
                                                          
37 Fried et  al (1999, 2002) 
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to measure dynamic efficiency; Section 5 outlines the sample data and variable definitions; 
Section 6 presents and discusses the results and Section 6 concludes the paper.   
7.2 Literature Review  
 
A common theme running throughout the literature of efficiency within the English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry is the treatment of capital. Capital can be modelled either as part 
of a variable cost function or a long run cost function where the latter assumes that firms have 
the ability to adjust all inputs in the long run to their optimal level. Within the variable cost 
function, capital is incorporated as a quasi-fixed input, therefore capital is not considered as a 
control variable and cost minimisation is only related to variable inputs. Saal and Reid (2004) 
model capital as a quasi-fixed factor as the technology used within the industry is indivisible 
and associated with a long service life and therefore it is difficult to vary capital stock in the 
short-term. In addition, WaSCs face legal obligations to connect customers to the service as 
well as investment programmes agreed with the DWI and EA to meet increasing quality 
standards. Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti (2009) estimate a variable cost 
function for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry and the coefficient on the 
quasi-fixed input implies a tendency of overcapitalisation which is a common finding in the 
literature of public utilities (Caves et al, 1981 and Cowing and Holtman, 1983). Bottasso and 
Conti (2009) state that overcapitalisation can be interpreted as the Averch-Johnson effect due 
to the presence of rate of return regulation alongside the capital intensive nature of the industry 
and the presence of investment to meet future demand.  Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso 
and Conti (2009) state that the presence of overcapitalisation could result in a misspecified 
total cost function where the assumption is that firms can instantaneously vary the level of 
capital. Saal and Parker (2000) and Erbetta and Cave (2007) consider a total cost function 
through the use of parametric and non-parametric specifications respectively. Erbetta and Cave 
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(2007) find an initial under-utilisation of capital and over-utilisation of labour which 
diminishes over the period. Saal and Parker (2000) report capital-augmenting and labour-
saving technological change over the period considered. This result is not surprising as one of 
the goals of privatisation was to expand capital investment in the industry. Indeed Saal and 
Parker (2001) examine total factor productivity and find substantial capital growth in the post-
privatisation period.  
The pioneering work of Farrell (1957) measures efficiency as the distance between an 
observation and an estimated ideal referred to as an efficient frontier. Cooper et al (2006) 
defines DEA as a non-parametric technique which uses mathematical linear programming to 
create a piece wide surface or frontier over the data. Traditionally DEA is studied within a 
static context, therefore inputs and outputs were considered for a given period.  The static 
model implies that all inputs can be adjusted to their optimal level within the given period and 
there are no links between time periods. The Malmquist index allows for the evolution of 
efficiency over time to be measured38 and is used to explain changes between two consecutive 
time periods. The Malmquist index allows for the decomposition of the intertemporal 
efficiency change into a catch-up and innovation (frontier-shift) effect.   
The static model is based on the firm’s ability to instantaneously adjust the factors of 
production and ignore the intertemporal linkage of production decisions (Silva and Stefanou, 
2003). However, Emrouznejad and Thanassoulis (2005) make the case for the presence of an 
intertemporal relationship: 1) The existence of a stock of capital whose useful service life and 
the effects of investment extend over several periods; 2) The presence of lagged outputs which, 
in addition to contemporaneous effect of the inputs, depends on the inputs used in the previous 
periods and 3) The production of intermediate outputs.   
                                                          
38 See Fare et al (1994) 
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Nemoto and Goto (2003) argue that the assumption of static optimisation results in biased 
measurements of inefficiency if quasi-fixed inputs exist. They show that the allocative 
inefficiency in particular will be overstated to the extent that quasi-fixed inputs are not 
instantaneously adjusted to their optimal levels. The weakness of the static theory of production 
to describe how some inputs gradually adjust has led to the development of dynamic models.
  
Sengupta (1995) was perhaps the first to introduce dynamics through the adjustment costs of 
quasi-fixed inputs. Fare and Grosskopf (2000) introduce dynamics through the use of network 
DEA considering capital as an intermediate outputs. Nemoto and Goto (1999, 2003) propose a 
model of dynamic DEA using a cost function which is closely related to adjustment-cost theory 
of investment and therefore provides a nonparametric alternative to the parametric Euler 
equation. The model augments the conventional DEA by treating quasi-fixed inputs at the end 
of one period as if they were outputs in the period and essentially inputs in the subsequent one 
as depicted in figure 7.1. The firm therefore faces a trade-off, whether to myopically increase 
output or to increase quasi-fixed inputs to increase future production.  
Geymuller (2009) extend Nemoto and Goto (2003) by solely considering technical efficiency 
in the absence of input prices. Tone and Tsutusi (2010) consider a slacks-based approach which 
considers both radial and non-radial efficiency. Their model allows for the inclusion of 
desirable, undesirable, discretionary (free) and non-discretionary (fixed) variables. The model 
however does not allow for the breakdown of overall efficiency to account for the inefficiencies 
relating to static and dynamic components. Ouellete and Yin (2008) propose a dynamic DEA 
model which allows for the inclusion of quasi-fixed inputs when investment decisions are 
outside of the control of the firm and are rather controlled by a higher authority. Silva and 
Stefanou (2007) develop a dynamic efficiency model which takes into account interdependence 
of production decisions whilst allowing for temporal efficiency measurements. Capital is 
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treated as a quasi-fixed factor and is managed as an asset where rapid expansion or contraction 
of the stock of capital is accompanied by adjustment costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model of Nemoto and Goto (2003) is applied to the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry to incorporate the intertemporal nature of capital. Firstly, the capital within the 
industry has a long asset life and span over several periods. Secondly, the firms face a                   
trade-off between the performance in the current period and investing in capital to meet future 
demand and to improve the quality of outputs and productivity.  
7.3  Methodology 
This section outlines the dynamic DEA model by Nemoto and Goto (2003) which will be 
applied to the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. This uses  𝑁  DMUs 
(𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁), 𝐽 variable inputs (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽), S quasi-fixed inputs (𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆) producing 𝑅 
outputs (𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅) . The DEA model is shown in equation 7.1 where 𝛾𝑡  is a constant 
discount factor, 𝑥𝑡 denotes the variable inputs used in period 𝑡, and 𝑘𝑡 denotes the quasi-fixed 
Source: Fare and Grosskopf (2000) 
Figure 7.1: Production Process 
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at the end of period 𝑡. 𝑤𝑡, 𝑣𝑡 are price vectors of variable inputs and quasi-fixed inputs in period 
𝑡 respectively. 𝑦𝑡  denotes the outputs produced in period 𝑡 and 𝑖 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones to 
impose the convexity constraint under Variable Returns to Scale (VRS). VRS specification is 
examined to obtain a pure measure of managerial inefficiency excluding any scale 
inefficiencies as WaSCs do not have control over their operating size, unless the regulator 
permits mergers (Thanassoulis, 2000a). Overall efficiency (OE) examines the cost minimising 
level of quasi-fixed and variable inputs given prices whilst incorporating the quasi-fixed inputs 
as an intertemporal factor of production.  
?̂?(?̅?0) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
{𝑥𝑡,𝑘𝑡,𝜆𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇
∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 (𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡
′𝑘𝑡−1)  
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑋𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇  
                  𝐾𝑡−1𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝑘𝑡−1 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                  𝐾𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ 𝑘𝑡 ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 − 1 
                  𝑌𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ 𝑦𝑡  ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                 𝑖′𝜆𝑡 = 1 ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
𝑘0 =  ?̅?0 ,       𝑥𝑡 ≥ 0 , 𝑘𝑡 ≥ 0 ,   𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0 ,   𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇           (7.1)   
The bar over the variables represents fixed levels of variables. The difference between this 
DEA model and the static model is the inclusion of the capital stock at time t as an output. 
Nemoto and Goto (2003) highlight that overall efficiency is calculated by: 
𝑂𝐸 = ?̂?(?̅?0) 𝐶⁄       (7.2) 
Here 𝐶 is the discounted sum of actual costs over the period considered. Overall efficiency can 
be decomposed into dynamic and static efficiency; static efficiency can then be decomposed 
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into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Static efficiency is calculated holding the 
quasi-fixed inputs fixed and examining the optimal level of variable inputs given input prices. 
The difference between overall efficiency and static efficiency is dynamic efficiency. Static 
efficiency can be written formally as the linear programming problem in equation 7.3. 
𝐶𝑆𝐸 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
{𝑥𝑡,𝜆𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇
∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 (𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡
′?̅?𝑡−1)  
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑋𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇  
                  𝐾𝑡−1𝜆𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑡−1 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                  𝐾𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ ?̅?𝑡 ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 − 1 
                  𝑌𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ 𝑦𝑡  ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                 𝑖′𝜆𝑡 = 1 ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
𝑥𝑡 ≥ 0 ,    𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0 ,   𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇               (7.3)  
Static efficiency (SE) and dynamic efficiency (DE) are then calculated by equation 7.4 and 7.5. 
𝑆𝐸 = 𝐶𝑆𝐸 𝐶⁄       (7.4) 
𝐷𝐸 = ?̂?(?̅?0) 𝐶𝑆𝐸⁄    (7.5) 
Nemoto and Goto (2003) highlight that dynamic efficiency includes forecast errors for input 
prices and demands for outputs in the future.  
Static efficiency can be broken down into allocative and technical efficiency. Technical 
efficiency is obtained by examining the radial contraction of variable inputs by solving the 
following linear programming problem: 
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𝐶𝑇𝐸 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
{𝜃𝑡,𝜆𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇
∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 (𝜃𝑡𝑤𝑡
′?̅?𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡
′?̅?𝑡−1)  
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑋𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≤ 𝜃𝑡𝑥?̅? ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇  
                  𝐾𝑡−1𝜆𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑡−1 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                  𝐾𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ 𝑘?̅? ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 − 1 
                  𝑌𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥ 𝑦𝑡  ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
                 𝑖′𝜆𝑡 = 1 ,                                      𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
𝑥𝑡 ≥ 0 ,    𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0 ,   𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇               (7.6)  
The radial contraction 𝜃𝑡 is allowed to vary over the periods. Since the quasi-fixed inputs are 
exogenously given at the actual levels there are no restrictions across the periods. Therefore 
the LP programme can be reduced to T single period problems that are independent of one 
another. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as  
𝑇𝐸 =  𝐶𝑇𝐸/𝐶 
Allocative efficiency (AE) can be calculated as  
𝐴𝐸 = 𝐶𝑆𝐸/𝐶𝑇𝐸   
AE reflects the costs that could be saved if variable inputs were adjusted to the optimal level 
along the short-run isoquant. The relationship for overall efficiency can be decomposed as  
𝑂𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸. 𝐴𝐸. 𝐷𝐸 
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The measurement of inefficiency in the period 𝑡 for variable inputs 𝜏𝑡
𝑥  and for quasi-fixed 
inputs 𝜏t
𝑘 follows as: 
𝜏𝑡
𝑥 = 𝛾𝑡𝑤𝑡
′(𝑥𝑡 −  𝑥𝑡
∗) 𝐶⁄        𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇; 
𝜏𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛾𝑡𝑣𝑡
′(𝑘𝑡−1 −  𝑘𝑡−1
∗ ) 𝐶⁄        𝑡 = 2,3, … , 𝑇;        (7.8) 
Where 𝑥𝑡  and 𝑘𝑡  are evaluated at the observed values, 𝑘𝑡
∗  and 𝑥𝑡
∗  are the optimal values of 
capital and variable inputs at time 𝑡. 𝐶 is the discounted sum of actual total costs over the 
planning period. Positive (negative) values of 𝜏𝑡
𝑥 and 𝜏𝑡
𝑘 indicate excess (short) usage of inputs. 
The equations measure the inefficiencies according to the normalised deviations of 
observations along from the optimal input usage.  
Dynamic DEA is compared to static DEA where all inputs are considered as variable therefore 
implying that they can be instantaneously adjusted to their optimal level. Static cost efficiency 
(𝐶𝐸𝑆) is obtained by the following linear programme: 
𝐶𝐸𝑆 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑡,𝑘𝑡,𝜆𝑡
∑ 𝛾𝑡(𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
′𝑘𝑡−1)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑋𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≤  𝑥𝑡 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝐾𝑡−1𝜆𝑡 ≤  𝑘𝑡−1,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝑌𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥  𝑦𝑡  ,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝑖′𝜆𝑡 = 1 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0 , 𝑥𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑘𝑡 ≥ 0,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇       (7.9) 
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𝑂𝐸𝑆 = 𝐶𝐸𝑆/𝐶      (1.10) 
Cost efficiency can be decomposed into allocative and technical efficiency by equation (7.12). 
Static technical efficiency (𝑇𝐸𝑆) is measured through the following linear programme: 
𝑇𝐸𝑆 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃𝑡,𝜆𝑡
∑ 𝛾𝑡𝜃𝑡(𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
′𝑘𝑡−1)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑋𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≤  𝜃𝑡𝑥𝑡 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝐾𝑡−1𝜆𝑡 ≤  𝜃𝑡𝑘𝑡−1,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝑌𝑡𝜆𝑡 ≥  𝑦𝑡  ,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
𝑖′𝜆𝑡 = 1 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0 ,     𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇        (7.11) 
Static allocative efficiency (𝐴𝐸𝑆) is defined as 
𝐴𝐸𝑆 = 𝑂𝐸𝑆 𝑇𝐸𝑆⁄      (7.12) 
As DEA implies homogeneity the second part of this paper incorporates environmental 
variables within the dynamic DEA framework through the use of the three stage approach 
based upon Fried et al (1999). The first stage generates the efficiency scores and the input 
slacks. The second stage accounts for the effect of the environmental impact upon the slacks 
through a second stage regression. The third stage adjusts inputs variables to create a level 
playing field before repeating the DEA analysis.  Input variables are adjusted upwards for those 
firms that operate under relatively favourable environments.  The firms with a relatively 
unfavourable operating environment have their inputs adjusted by a relatively small amount, 
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while those with favourable operating environments are adjusted upwards by a relatively large 
amount. Adjusting the inputs upwards provides a performance target managers can reach 
regardless of their operating environment (Fried et al, 1999). 
Fried et al (1999, 2002) consider the impact of environmental variables on technical efficiency 
while Blank and Valdmanis (2005) extend their work to consider the impact of environmental 
variables on cost efficiency through cost efficiency slacks for each firm and time period. The 
cost slack ratio is the ratio of the optimal input 𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑡
∗  for the 𝑗th variable input, 𝑛th DMU and 𝑡th 
time period and the actual variable input defined by equation 7.13. The cost slack ratio for 
quasi-fixed inputs is defined in equation 7.14 for the 𝑠th quasi fixed input, 𝑛th DMU and 𝑡th time 
period. The cost slack ratios are greater than, less than or equal to 139. A value greater than 1 
implies an over utilisation of input, a value less than 1 implies an underutilisation of inputs and 
a value equal to 1 implies an efficient use of inputs.  
𝑆𝑗𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑡
𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑡
∗       (7.13) 
𝑆𝐾𝑠𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑘𝑠𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑛𝑡
∗       (7.14)             
To determine the impact of environmental variables the input slack ratios are regressed on the 
environmental variables. The slack ratios are centred on their means and do not have a mass of 
observations at one point meaning that this approach avoids the censoring problem when using 
efficiency scores within the second stage regression. To ensure that the predicted slack ratios 
take positive values only a log transformation of the dependent variable is taken.  The data for 
each time period is pooled and regressed upon M environmental variables                                  
                                                          
39 Fried et al (1999, 2002) consider both the radial and non-radial slacks whereas this approach only considers 
radial slacks.  
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𝑄𝑛𝑡 =  [𝑄1𝑛𝑡,…,𝑄𝑀𝑛𝑡], 𝑛 = 1, . . , N, 𝑡 = 1, , , . , 𝑇 separately for each input slack
40 . Simar and 
Wilson (2007) highlight the presence of serial correlation amongst the efficiency scores 
generated by DEA which leads to incorrect inference within the second stage regression. To 
correct for the presence of serial correlation this chapter applies a second stage bootstrapped 
regression based on Simar and Wilson (2007) as outlined in chapter 641.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑗𝑛𝑡) =  𝑓
𝑗(𝑄𝑛𝑡; 𝛽
𝑗) +  𝑢𝑗𝑛𝑡     (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽    𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇   𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁)     (7.14) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐾𝑠𝑛𝑡) =  𝑓
𝑠(𝑄𝑛𝑡; 𝛽
𝑠) +  𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑡      (𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆    𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1   𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁)    
Where 𝑓𝑗(𝑄𝑛𝑡; 𝛽
𝑗) and 𝑓𝑠(𝑄𝑛𝑡; 𝛽
𝑠)  are deterministic feasible slack frontiers, parameter 
vectors 𝛽𝑗  and 𝛽𝑠  are to be estimated. The interpretation of the coefficients depends upon 
whether the resource is under or over-utilised. If the resource is over-utilised and takes a value 
greater than 1, a negative coefficient will imply moving to the optimal level of resources. 
However, if the input is under-utilised a negative coefficient will imply that the environmental 
variable is unfavourable, moving away from the optimal utilisation of inputs.  
The predicted slacks are obtained and the inputs are adjusted using the methodology of Blank 
and Valdmanis (2005) for each WaSC and time period42. The inputs are adjusted upwards using 
equation 7.15 in which the least favourable set of environmental conditions are used as a base43. 
                                                          
40 Fried et al (2002) highlight that as the slacks are obtained from the first stage DEA model when considering 
separate equations, the error components are probably not independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). It 
would be preferable to stack the regressions and estimate via SUR allowing the error terms to be correlated 
across inputs. Due to the timing difference within the dynamic DEA this has not be considered here.  
41 Simar and Wilson (2007) apply a bootstrap truncated regression as the inverse of the Farrell efficiency scores 
are bounded at 1. A bootstrap regression is applied as the cost slack ratios can take any value greater than, less 
than or equal to 1. 
42 Regression for capital slacks is run for the period 1997-2010 as the linear programme does not return an 
optimal value of the capital stock for the beginning of 1997 and the end of 2011. Using the coefficients 
obtained, predicted slacks are obtained for the beginning of 1997 and 2011 and capital is adjusted using the 
same methodology. 
43 The reciprocal of the ratio from Blank and Valdmanis (2005) is used so the maximum slack, considered as the 
most unfavourable environment is the highest over utilisation of inputs. Inputs are adjusted upwards by the 
amount in which firms operate under a favourable environment.   
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𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗 =  𝑥𝑗
𝑛𝑡 (
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑡(?̂?𝑗𝑛𝑡)
?̂?𝑗𝑛𝑡
)      𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝐽;  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇;  𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁  (7.15) 
𝑘𝑠𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗 =  𝑘𝑠
𝑛𝑡 (
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑡(𝑆?̂?𝑠𝑛𝑡)
𝑆?̂?𝑠𝑛𝑡
)      𝑠 = 1, . . , 𝑆;  𝑡 = 0, … , 𝑇;  𝑛 = 1, . . , 𝑁                 
 
Where  Ŝjnt  are the predicted slacks of resource 𝑗  for firm 𝑛  at time 𝑡  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛𝑡(?̂?𝑗𝑛𝑡) 
represent the firm with the most unfavourable conditions. Firms operating within a favourable 
environment have their inputs adjusted upwards by a relatively larger amount whereas those 
with unfavourable environment have their inputs adjusted upwards by a relatively smaller 
amount.  The final stage re-runs the dynamic DEA programme using the adjusted inputs to 
control for environmental differences.  
7.4  Data 
This section describes the data used within the chapter and the definitions of the variables 
considered. The data is available for the period 1996/97–2010/11 for the ten WaSCs. Within 
the panel there were three mergers of WaSCs with the smaller WoCs44.  
7.4.1 Definition of Variables  
For the application of this methodology for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry, 
two physical outputs will be considered for water and sewerage activities: water delivered and 
the equivalent population served. To take into account changes in quality within the industry 
the output measures are adjusted by a quality index following Saal and Parker (2000). Water 
                                                          
44 Mergers occurred in April 2000 between Hartlepool Water and Anglian Water, Northumbrian Water and 
Essex and Suffolk Water and finally the merger between Yorkshire Water and York Waterworks. As capital 
from the merged entity  is incorporated over time, to avoid the acquisition of capital being treated as investment, 
the data for the pre-merged companies has been aggregated 
217 
 
input is measured as (𝑌1) =  𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 × 𝑄𝑤where 𝑄𝑤 is a measure of water quality 
and Sewerage output is measured as (𝑌2) = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑄𝑠 , where 𝑄𝑠  is a 
measure of sewerage quality. Two outputs have only been incorporated due to the limited 
number of DMUs. 
Three inputs are considered within the model: labour, capital and other. Staff costs and the 
number of full time employees are obtained from companies’ statutory accounts. The price of 
labour is calculated as the total labour costs divided by the number for full time equivalent 
employees.  
The value of the capital stock is measured by the MEA value. Capital costs are calculated as 
the sum of depreciation (including IRC45) and the opportunity cost of capital. The opportunity 
cost of capital is calculated as the WACC applying assumptions made by Ofwat at each price 
review multiplied by a company’s RCV. Capital price is calculated as capital costs divided by 
the capital stock. 
Other costs are therefore calculated as total operating costs less labour costs and capital costs. 
Other costs comprise of a composite of other goods and therefore, following Saal et al (2011), 
the price of other goods has been proxied by the price index relating to the price of inputs 
bought for the distribution and purification of water collected by the ONS. A measure for the 
physical amount of other inputs is calculated as other costs divided by the price of other costs.  
The model is a 2 variable input, 1 quasi-fixed input and 2 output model for 10 DMUs per 
period46.  
                                                          
45 IRC is the Infrastructure Renewal Charge. This is a charge on infrastructure assets which acts as a 
depreciation.  
46 The model suffers from a dimensionality issue, therefore the efficiency scores are biased upwards, although 
the relative positions stay the same. The chapter seeks to examine the relative differences of the inefficiencies 
between variable and capital inputs and the comparison of static and dynamic DEA.  
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7.4.2 Quality Variables  
To account for the differences in operating environments several environmental variables are 
incorporated within the analysis. The first environmental variable is the proportion of 
distribution input abstracted from rivers to take into account the differences in the resources 
and treatment (Z1). The density of a company’s water operations is calculated as the total water 
population divided by the length of mains (Z2). Similarly, sewerage density is calculated by 
the total sewerage population divided by the length of sewers (Z3). The level of leakage is 
controlled by calculating the proportion of leakage relative to distribution input (Z4). Finally, 
the proportion of trade effluent (Z5) is calculated as the volume of trade effluent divided by the 
volume of waste water returned.  
 
  
Table 7.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Outputs
Water Delivered Ml/Day 1,014.6 551.9 284.2 2,179.4
Equivalent Population (,000) 6,179.8 3,704.1 1,118.4 14,271.9
Water Properties (,000) 1,870.4 979.2 492.9 3,538.8
Sewerage Properties (,000) 2,198.0 1,331.0 586.7 5,426.5
Input Quantities
Capital Stock £m 23,229.9 13,400.8 7,030.2 49,129.9
Employees 2,943.3 1,401.7 1,157.0 5,894.0
Other 184.4 111.4 15.3 491.2
Inputs Prices
Capital Price £ 0.019 0.004 0.010 0.030
Labour Price £m 0.035 0.004 0.024 0.045
Other Cost Deflator 0.782 0.140 0.651 1.052
Operating Characteristics
Water Density 150.893 45.114 100.648 283.411
Sewerage Density 172.001 18.675 131.798 225.861
% of DI from Rivers 0.393 0.203 0.000 0.781
Trade Effluent 0.074 0.035 0.025 0.175
Proportion of Leakage 0.227 0.049 0.147 0.379
Water Quality 0.967 0.026 0.836 0.995
Sewerage Quality 0.904 0.152 0.302 1
Note. 150 Observations. Costs and Input prices are
 expressed in real terms in 2009 prices
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7.5  Results 
 In the first instance, the results are considered for the implication of modelling dynamic versus 
static DEA. The results from the dynamic DEA allows for the decomposition of efficiency into 
dynamic, static, technical and allocative inefficiencies. The optimality conditions and trends 
for the average efficiency are considered over the period. Secondly, the implication of firms 
operating environments is examined. The results from the second stage regression allow for 
the assessment of whether differing operating characteristics are favourable or unfavourable 
for the firms. Finally, the static and dynamic DEA will be re-estimated and the results are 
compared against the original DEA to examine the impact on firms’ efficiency scores when 
taking into account their operating environment.   
The planning period within the model covers the period 1996/97–2010/11, thus ?̅?0 corresponds 
to the initial capital stock at the beginning of 1997 and 𝑘𝑇 is the terminal capital stock at the 
end of 2011. Table 7.2 reports the efficiency scores calculated under variable returns to scale 
for both the dynamic and static efficiency model. The application of a cost function implies 
input orientation; firms reduce their inputs given the amount of outputs. Input-orientation is the 
assumption mostly considered within the literature (Thanassoulis, 2000a,b; Cubbin and 
Tzanidakis, 1998 and Erbetta and Cave, 2007) as the demand level faced by suppliers is 
exogenous. Overall efficiency (𝑂𝐸)  for dynamic DEA can be decomposed into static 
efficiency (𝑆𝐸), technical efficiency (𝑇𝐸), allocative efficiency (𝐴𝐸) and dynamic efficiency 
(𝐷𝐸). The results for the 𝑂𝐸 reports the efficiency score when firms can adjust both variable 
and quasi-fixed capital whilst taking into account the intertemporal nature of capital. Static 
efficiency within the dynamic context considers the efficiency when firms can only consider 
the reduction of variable inputs and capital is held as fixed. 𝑂𝐸 scores range from 77.8% to 
100%. The results for the SE are higher than those for OE, which indicates that given the level 
of quasi-fixed inputs firms are between 91.6% and 100% efficient. Dynamic efficiency is 
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calculated as the ratio of 𝑂𝐸 and 𝑆𝐸. Dynamic inefficiency ranges from 0% to 21.9% and these 
results imply that firms are relatively efficient with regards to the variable inputs and that the 
quasi-fixed inputs are the major source of overall inefficiency.  
The static model allows for the contraction of both variable and quasi-fixed inputs without 
taking into account the intertemporal nature of quasi-fixed inputs. 𝑂𝐸𝑆 indicates that firms are 
between 73.9% and 100% efficient. These results are all less than or equal to OE but of a similar 
magnitude with the differences ranging between 0 and 5.4%. The OES is decomposed into 𝑇𝐸𝑆 
and 𝐴𝐸𝑆, and these results show that within the static model the main source of inefficiency is 
due to the wrong factor mix (𝐴𝐸𝑆). The relative magnitude of the overall efficiency scores 
under dynamic and static DEA are of a similar magnitude. The dynamic DEA allows for an 
extension of the static DEA to incorporate capital over time and to examine the overall and 
efficiency holding capital fixed. The results indicate that the firms are relatively efficient with 
regards to variable inputs and the majority of the inefficiencies are due to the over utilisation 
of capital inputs.  
  
 
Figures 2(a-f) demonstrate the deviations over time of dynamic overall inefficiency measured 
by deviations from the optimality condition τt
x and  τt
k in equation 7.8. Five of the firms are 
OE SE TE AE DE OES TES AES
WaSC1 0.894 0.932 0.938 0.994 0.959 0.870 0.956 0.910
WaSC2 0.778 0.916 1.000 0.916 0.849 0.739 0.992 0.746
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC6 0.859 0.965 0.985 0.979 0.890 0.804 0.959 0.838
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 0.779 0.998 1 0.998 0.781 0.761 0.993 0.767
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.932 0.997 1 0.997 0.935 0.917 0.995 0.922
Dynamic Static
Table 7.2: Dynamic and Static Efficiency Score 
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showed below; the remaining five are efficient over the whole period and therefore do not have 
deviations from optimality.  
 
 
Figure 7.2a       Figure 7.2b 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2c 
 
Figure 7.2d        Figure 7.2e 
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    Figure 7.2f 
A common finding is the over utilisation of capital inputs. The deviations in variable inputs 
from the optimal seem more volatile over the period, whereas quasi-fixed inputs are 
persistently overused. For WaSC 1 and WaSC 2 it can be seen that there has been a considerable 
improvement in the efficiency of variable inputs over the period considered, whereas quasi-
fixed remain persistently overused. Dynamic DEA incorporates the intertemporal nature of 
capital within the evaluation of efficiency. Figure 7.3 compares the optimal deviation of capital 
from the actual value 𝜏𝑡
𝑘 for the dynamic and static DEA. The static DEA implies that firms 
should substantially reduce the level of capital in the first five years of the period in comparison 
to the dynamic case. The path of capital under dynamic DEA is a lot smoother in comparison 
to static DEA. This is expected as the static DEA does not take into account the capital needed 
for the future period and the adjustment cost of capital. WaSC 1, WaSC 2 and WaSC 6 
experience large differences in the optimal value of capital determined by the static and 
dynamic DEA. The difference between the static and dynamic DEA reduces over the period. 
This is because output increases over the time period, and therefore the additional capital is 
required to produce output. One limitation within the model is that the final stage DEA is 
effectively a static DEA model and therefore we expect the results to converge. The results 
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highlight the need to account the intertemporal nature of capital when measuring efficiency as 
the static DEA model will underestimate the optimal value of capital. 
 
  Figure 7.3a      Figure 7.3 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 7.3c 
 
  Figure 7.3d      Figure 7.3e 
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We now turn to the incorporation of environmental variables within the dynamic DEA. Slacks 
are obtained from the dynamic cost function and the static cost function and are regressed upon 
a number of environmental variables to take into account the impact of operating conditions on 
efficiency. Five environmental variables are considered within the analysis, namely water and 
sewerage density, the proportion of trade effluent, the proportion of leakage and the proportion 
of DI from boreholes. Table 7.3 shows the coefficients and standard errors of the regressions:  
 
Table 7.3: Slack Regression. Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
All companies over-utilise the capital inputs but the interpretation of the coefficients for labour 
and other inputs is more complex as some companies over-utilise these inputs whilst others 
under-utilise them. The coefficient for the proportion of DI obtained from rivers for capital 
Independent Variable Labour Slack Other Slack Capital Slack
Intercept -0.6333 -0.6840*** -0.4360***
(0.1601) (0.2244) (0.0565)
Water Density 0.0001 -0.0028*** -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Sewerage Density 0.0009 0.0063** 0.0022***
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0004)
Leakage -0.6475 0.6177 -0.0605
(0.03462) (0.4204) (0.1684)
Proportion of DI from Rivers 0.0302 0.0365 0.0032
(0.0780) (0.1125) (0.0388)
Proportion of Trade Effluent -0.5368 0.4362 2.4011***
(0.3158) (0.4793) (0.2798)
Note: Estimates marked within (***) are significant a the 1% level; 
estimates marked within (**) are significant at the 5% level; estimates
marked with (*) are significant at the 10% level.
Dependent Variable 
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inputs have a positive coefficient. Capital is over-utilised by firms; the positive value would 
therefore imply that those with a higher proportion of DI from rivers operate under a relatively 
more unfavourable operating condition. Rivers require more power with regards to treatment 
than the other sources of abstraction. The coefficient for water density for capital is negative 
which implies a higher density is favourable; however this result is statistically insignificant. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for sewerage density for capital is positive; therefore it 
implies that operating in an urban environment is unfavourable.  A squared term for capital 
was incorporated, however was insignificant, therefore remove for the final specification. 
WaSCs with a higher proportion of trade effluent operate within an unfavourable operating 
environment, which is indicated through the positive coefficient for capital. This result is 
intuitive as trade effluent may require a higher level of treatment, therefore imposing higher 
costs upon the companies. Leakage has a negative coefficient for capital slacks, which indicates 
that utilities with higher leakage operate under a favourable environment; this may be due to a 
lack of capital maintenance expenditure, although the coefficients are insignificant. These 
results are consistent with those reported in chapter 6, with the exception of density.  
The predicted efficiency scores are generated from the regressions and the actual variables are 
adjusted upwards by the amount in which they operate under a favourable environment relative 
to the most unfavourable using equation 7.15. Summary statistics are reported in table 7.4 for 
the inputs before and after adjustments for environmental factors. The results indicate a higher 
mean for all input variables and the standard deviation between inputs increases when taking 
into account the differing operating environments.  
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The DEA efficiency scores are recalculated with the adjusted data and the dynamic and static 
efficiency results are shown in table 7.5 below.  
 
 
As with the unadjusted results, the DEA scores highlight the finding that most of the 
inefficiencies are due to dynamic efficiency. All of the efficiency scores increase when taking 
into account differences in the operating environment. The incorporation of environmental 
variables decreases the average overall efficiency score by 0.023 points and the maximum 
increase is 0.095 points. 
The largest increase in efficiency scores relates to the dynamic component. This implies that 
the environmental variables have the largest effect in equalising the playing field for quasi-
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Employees 2943.3 1401.7 1157.0 5894.0 3268.0 1586.7 1241.6 6812.3
Other Inputs 184.4 111.4 15.3 491.2 237.8 173.9 17.8 877.8
Capital 23229.9 13400.3 7030.2 49129.9 27344.0 16130.7 9408.2 83262.7
Initial Resources Adjusted Resources
OE SE TE AE DE OES TES AES
WaSC1 0.889 0.948 0.958 0.990 0.937 0.875 0.960 0.911
WaSC2 0.859 0.958 0.989 0.969 0.897 0.828 0.984 0.841
WaSC3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC6 0.883 0.977 0.991 0.986 0.904 0.844 0.981 0.860
WaSC7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC8 0.874 0.998 1 0.998 0.876 0.863 0.997 0.866
WaSC9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WaSC10 0.976 0.997 0.997 1 0.979 0.969 0.998 0.971
Dynamic Static
Table 7.4: Environmental Adjusted Data Description   
Table 7.5: Environment Adjusted Dynamic and Static DEA Efficiency Scores  
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fixed inputs. This is to be expected as a proportion of the differences in companies capital will 
be explained through the differences in the exogenous operating conditions.  
When accounting for the environmental variables there are no changes in the firms’ rankings. 
However, the dispersion of efficiency is reduced with the range falling from 22% to 14%. There 
are several potential reasons why the ranks of the firms do not vary when accounting for 
quality. Firstly, as separate frontiers are examined for each period and capital is incorporated 
over time, there is less volatility amongst the efficiency scores. Secondly, due to the adjustment 
process, the dependent variable in the second-stage regression is the under and over-utilisation 
of inputs and the least efficient environment is assumed to be with the highest predicted over-
utilisation of inputs. It would be advantageous to develop an adjustment process to examine 
the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency separately whilst generating an environmental 
adjusted DEA efficiency score. Overall, the results indicate that when taking into account 
intertemporal relationships the main contributor to overall inefficiency is the dynamic 
efficiency. The optimality conditions highlight the persistent over-use of quasi-fixed inputs. 
These results are consistent with those of Stone and Webster (2004) and Bottasso and Conti 
(2009) who also find a presence of over capitalisation within the industry. According to 
Bottasso and Conti (2009), our findings can be interpreted as the result of an Averch-Johnson 
effect. This is due to the presence of rate of return regulation, as well as the nature of the 
industry where infrastructure is built to meet future demand.  
When examining the trends of inefficiencies over the period there appears to be a large 
improvement of the efficiency of variable inputs, whereas the inefficiencies of the capital stock 
are more persistent. This could be as a result of the differing incentive rates between opex and 
capex and rate of return regulation, which overall indicate a presence of capex bias. The 
inclusion of environmental variables allows firms to be considered when taking into account 
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differences in the operating environment. The inclusion of environmental variables increases 
the majority of efficiency scores, dampening the magnitude of the perceived capex bias.  
To account for the cost of the capex bias to the industry, table 7.6 reports the monetary saving 
per property if the capex bias is eliminated. This is calculated as the difference between total 
operating costs and the operating costs if capital was at its optimal value. This is derived from 
the dynamic DEA equation after adjusting for environmental variables and divided by the 
number of properties shown in equation 7.16.  
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑘𝑡 =
(𝛾𝑡(𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡
′𝑘𝑡−1
∗ ) − 𝛾𝑡(𝑤𝑡
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡
′𝑘𝑡−1))
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
            (7.16) 
The result for equation 7.16 reported in table 7.6 indicates that the cost of the over-utilisation 
of capital per property served ranges from zero to £36. The cost is negative for WaSC 10 for 
the period 1998–2000 and this indicates that the firm under-utilises capital in those periods 
when accounting for the operating environment. Table 7.7 shows the percentage of total costs 
which is attributed to the over-utilisation of capital. The cost of the over-utilisation of capital 
for WaSC 8 is equivalent to 17% of its total costs. The cost of excess capital for the average 
WaSC is £8.85 per property which is equivalent to 4.5% of total costs. If Ofwat were able to 
eliminate the presence of the capex bias this could reduce average total costs by 4.5%, which 
would have major implications on customers’ bills.  
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
WaSC1 33.4 22.9 18.6 11.8 12.8 0.5 5.2 5.5 7.1 6.6 13.2 13.2 10.4 9.9 12.2
WaSC2 28.8 23.4 16.0 10.4 13.4 17.2 19.6 17.8 23.7 24.6 30.5 23.9 17.2 18.6 20.3
WaSC3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WaSC4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WaSC5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WaSC6 36.2 29.0 22.2 19.6 16.5 15.2 11.9 9.8 9.8 11.3 9.6 10.1 6.5 6.0 15.3
WaSC7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WaSC8 33.9 29.2 36.6 38.2 35.0 35.5 33.4 33.7 37.1 34.9 32.0 32.3 32.2 37.1 34.4
WaSC9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WaSC10 18.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 3.9 5.4 5.6 7.0 6.6 11.3 10.0 9.8 11.3 6.3
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
WaSC1 11.8% 8.3% 8.2% 5.3% 6.1% 0.3% 3.1% 3.4% 4.7% 4.5% 8.7% 8.8% 7.9% 8.0% 6.4%
WaSC2 8.0% 6.6% 5.5% 3.8% 5.2% 6.7% 7.9% 7.6% 10.5% 11.1% 13.4% 11.0% 10.0% 11.4% 8.5%
WaSC3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WaSC4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WaSC5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WaSC6 14.7% 12.5% 11.7% 11.5% 10.0% 9.8% 7.9% 7.1% 7.6% 8.6% 7.0% 7.6% 5.9% 5.6% 9.1%
WaSC7 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WaSC8 13.2% 10.7% 14.9% 16.6% 16.1% 17.2% 17.2% 17.9% 19.9% 19.1% 17.9% 18.6% 20.7% 24.2% 17.4%
WaSC9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
WaSC10 6.6% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2% 0.0% 2.1% 3.0% 3.4% 4.4% 4.2% 7.2% 6.7% 7.5% 9.1% 3.8%
Table 7.6- Cost of the over-utilisation of capital £ per property billed 
Table 7.7 - Proportion of the cost of over-capitalisation to total costs  
7.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated the effect of dynamic DEA in the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry. A two output model has been constructed for the ten WaSCs within the 
industry for the period 1996/97–2010/11. Environmental variables have been considered 
within the analysis in order to account for those firms that operate under relatively favourable 
or unfavourable environments.  
The estimates show that the main estimated inefficiencies are due to the quasi-fixed inputs. The 
overall inefficiencies within the industry range from 0 to 22%. The optimality conditions show 
the persistent over-utilisation of quasi-fixed inputs. Our results indicate that the inefficiencies 
from variable inputs have improved over the period, whereas those from capital stock remain 
persistent. These results are consistent with the Averch-Johnson effect created by the presence 
of rate of return regulation. Overall the results infer the presence of a capex bias within the 
industry.  
The incorporation of environmental variables allows for firms to be considered on a level 
playing field. The effect of adjusting the input slacks for those operating in unfavourable 
conditions improves the efficiency scores of the majority of firms. The environmental variables 
impact significantly upon capital differences within the industry, thereby reducing the 
magnitude of any capex bias. The presence of the capex bias drives the heart of the regulator 
by not encouraging the optimal use of inputs. The presence of a capex bias leads to 
intergeneration distortions for consumers bills. A pound spent on opex is fully recovered in the 
year in which it is spent whereas for a pound spent on capex only a proportion is recovered as 
capex is added to the regulatory capital value and only the rate of return and an element for 
depreciation charge is recovered from customers annually for the life of the asset. An 
inappropriate preference for capex reduces costs to be recovered within the current period and 
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hence lowers consumer costs in the short term at the expense of higher bills for future 
generations. The elimination of the capex bias could reduce the average WaSCs total costs by 
4.5%, equivalent to £8.85 for each property billed. Therefore the presence of the capex has 
implications for the consumer’s bill, influencing the K factor within the price cap. This model 
suffers from a dimensionality problem, therefore the efficiency scores are biased upwards. 
Therefore the estimate of the impact of the capex bias is a best case estimate. Within the 2014 
price review Ofwat aims to eliminate the capex through by equalising out the incentives rate 
for opex and capex by earning a rate of return based on a proportion of the total expenditure 
instead of solely capital expenditure.  
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8. Overview and Implications  
8.1 Overview 
 
This study explores the impact of regulation upon the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry. The motivation arose as a direct result of the nature of the industry which is 
characterised by a series of regulated regional monopolies in which the majority of consumers 
cannot choose their supplier. The research set out to answer five research questions.  
Research Question 1: Did the 1999 and 2004 price reviews improve efficiency? 
Research Question 2: Did the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry exhibit 
convergence in terms of efficiency performance in the period 1997–2011? 
Research Question 3: How can the measure of efficiency using DEA incorporate                       
non-discriminatory factors to allow differences in the local environment?  
Research Question 4: How should long-life and indivisible capital stock be treated in the 
measurement of efficiency?  
Research Question 5: Is there a capex bias within the industry? 
Question 1 is answered in chapter 6 which finds that the 1999 review significantly improved 
efficiency whereas the 2004 review had no impact. Question 2 is examined in chapter 5 which 
reports a significant rate of convergence to a common steady state efficiency level for variable 
costs at a comparable rate implied by price review. Chapter 6 applies a three-stage DEA 
approach to allow for the incorporation of environmental variables in DEA to address question 
3.When accounting for the differences in the operating environments, the efficiency score and 
ranks of the WaSCs vary significantly. To answer question 4, chapter 7 applies a dynamic DEA 
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model that highlights the importance of incorporating the intertemporal nature of capital. 
Finally, question 5 is answered in chapter 7 which reports a persistent over-utilisation of capital 
over the period, finding the presence of a capex bias.  
8.2 Implications 
 
There is a large body of literature within the industry that examines the effectiveness of 
privatisation and regulation. This thesis contributes to the literature by examining the 
convergence in efficiency scores, the impact of the 1999 and 2004 price reviews, and the 
presence of a capex bias. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Saal et al (2007) report an 
improvement in the minimum efficiency scores after privatisation. Saal et al (2007) and Portela 
et al (2011) both examine the average efficiency change within the industry, reporting a 
negligible impact as a result of regulation. This thesis contributes towards the literature by 
finding that the rate of growth of the efficiency scores is significantly larger for inefficient 
firms, implying convergence within the industry. Within the price review, Ofwat sets higher 
efficiency targets for those firms which are deemed as inefficient. Oxera (2005) highlights that 
within Ofwat’s 2004 assessment of efficiency, a substantial number of companies are in the 
top efficiency bands compared with ten years earlier where the spread of relative efficiencies 
was much larger. The 8% a year rate of 𝛽 -convergence implied by unconditional                           
𝛽-convergence is of a similar magnitude to that implied within the regulatory framework. The 
results conclude that the regulatory framework has been effective in encouraging convergence 
within the industry. However, regulation has had only a minor influence on the average 
efficiency change.  
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This thesis contributes to the literature by examining whether the 1999 and 2004 price reviews 
have been significant in improving efficiency. To knowledge, Portela et al (2011) is the only 
study to examine the 2004 review in which they indicate that productivity has fallen over the 
period of the 2004 review. However, it does not determine whether this is due to the price 
review. The results presented here indicate that that 1999 price review significantly reduced 
the over-utilisation of inputs, whereas the impact of the 2004 price review was insignificant. 
Utility Week (2014) interviewed Sir Ian Byatt, the former director general of Ofwat, who 
assessed the price reviews to date and stated “1994, tough; 1999, tough; 2004, generous; 2009, 
not as tough as it could have been had people known what would happen to interest rates”. The 
findings that the 1999 price review induced significant improvements in efficiency and the 
2004 price review had no effect on efficiency coincide with the industry’s perceptions of the 
strengths of the price reviews.  
There are a number of advantages associated with the application of DEA to the water and 
sewerage industry. The principle advantage of DEA is that it does not require assumptions with 
regards to the functional form. Another is that it can decompose overall inefficiency into its 
technical and allocative components. This thesis illustrates the use of a three-stage DEA model 
for the measurement of efficiency within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry. 
The three-stage DEA incorporates non-discretionary variables within the measurement of 
efficiency to account for differences in the WaSCs’ operating environments. The 2014 price 
review applies a totex approach to measuring efficiency through a triangulation approach of 
random effects and COLS models for the measurement of efficiency to predict the future 
baseline expenditure. The findings of this study suggest that the three-stage approach could be 
used in conjunction with the parametric approach or as a robustness check within the price 
review.  
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The final contribution is the identification of the perceived capex bias within the industry. The 
capex bias is the preference of capital expenditure over operating expenditure. The presence of 
a perceived capex bias is acknowledged by Ofwat (2011b). CEPA (2012) highlight that the 
capex bias may be a result of differing incentive rates, the Averch-Johnson effect and the 
culture of the industry which is focused on capital solutions. If the capital inefficiencies were 
eliminated this would amount to an average reduction of the total costs by 4.5%.  
8.3 State of play 
 
The measurement of efficiency is a key component within the price review for determining the 
level of expenditure an efficient company is required to finance its functions. Ofwat measures 
comparative efficiency to determine the level of inefficiencies, and therefore the amount in 
which costs can be reduced for the next five years. Efficiency is examined within this thesis to 
examine the historical trends and to examine whether regulation has been effective in 
encouraging efficiency and the correct combination of inputs. Although the techniques 
employed within this thesis and those of Ofwat differ in terms of the methodology, the level at 
which efficiency is examined and inputs and outputs, a top level comparison can be made.  
Ofwat examined operating efficiency through a series of functional level OLS models. In PR94 
efficiencies ranged from band A to band E, where band E is 35% away from the frontier 
whereas in PR09 the banding ranged from A to C, 30% from the frontier.  The level of 
inefficiencies reported within the variable DEA function in chapter 5 range from 34.5% from 
the frontier in 1997 to 29.1% in 2011, which are of a similar magnitude of those reported by 
Ofwat. These results are also consistent when taking into account differences within the 
operating environment, although the rankings of companies differ when accounting for the 
operating characteristics. The measurement of 𝛽 -convergence reports a reduction in the 
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dispersion of the efficiency scores and convergence, with the least efficient firm catching up 
with the most efficient firm. The catch-up factor within the price reviews is determined by 
closing 60% of the gap towards the frontier company, equivalent to 12.5% a year. 
Unconditional 𝛽-convergence implies a rate of convergence of 8.8% a year which implies that 
the regulation has been effective at encouraging convergence at a similar rate. The results of 
convergence are consistent with those reported by Ofwat who report an improvement in the 
efficiency scores over the price reviews. Ofwat state that as a result of the 1999 and 2004 price 
review there was a clustering towards the best performance. As a result of the 1999 price review 
in 2004 all of the companies are in the top three relative efficiency bands compared with half 
in 1999 (Ofwat, 2004)  
The results are this thesis are consistent with Ofwat’s view of a perceived capex bias (Ofwat, 
2011). Ofwat’s current approach to determining the required revenue is to examine the opex 
and capex separately. Opex is recovered pound for pound whereas capex is added to the 
regulatory capital value which earns a rate of return. CEPA (2012) denote that the difference 
incentives between opex and capex and the Averch-Johnson effect as a result of the rate of 
return regulation has led to a preference towards capital expenditure within the industry. Ofwat 
(2011b) highlight the presence of a perceived capex bias, therefore the 2014 price review is 
partly designed around eliminating the capex bias through a total expenditure (totex) approach. 
The totex approach examines opex and capex together and companies earn a rate of return on 
a percentage of the totex, equalising the incentive rates between opex and capex. The 
application of dynamic DEA reveals an over-utilisation of capital and a reduction in the over-
utilisation of other inputs, indicating a capex bias. Although the model is able to distinguish 
that there is a persistent over-utilisation of capital within the industry it is unable to determine 
whether this is due to financial incentives or as a result of companies’ preference for capital 
solutions. To determine the extent of which the capex bias is as a result of the financial 
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incentives it would be desirable to re-examine the presence of the capex bias at the end of the 
2014 price review period. If Ofwat’s approach to the eliminating the capex bias has been 
successful one would expect the over-utilisation of capital to fall over the period. However if 
the over-capitalisation of capital is still prevalent then the capex bias may exist as a result of 
the nature of the industry preferring capital solutions.  
8.4 Future Research 
A limitation of the three-stage DEA is the separability condition in the second-stage regression. 
The separability condition only allows for the environmental variables to impact the 
distribution of inefficiencies, which effects their mean and variance. The separability condition, 
however, does not influence the optimal choices between the discretionary inputs. Badin et al 
(2012) highlight that the environmental variables may influence the distribution of the 
efficiency scores, and influence the shape of the frontier, or the environmental variables may 
be completely independent. To allow for the environmental variables to influence both the 
shape of the frontier and the distribution of the efficiency scores, Cazals et al (2002) and 
Darario and Simar (2005) introduce conditional DEA. Conditional DEA measures efficiency 
where the input and output set may depend on the value of environmental variables. The 
research could be extended by applying conditional DEA for the measurement of efficiency 
within the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry and contrasting the results found 
within the three-stage DEA approach.  
The current approach to modelling efficiency determines the level of efficiency for each firm 
for each time period. In a perfectly competitive environment firms cannot exist in the presence 
of long-run technical efficiencies. Tsionas (2006) states that technical inefficiency may be as a 
result of factors under the influence of the firm that cannot be adjusted without incurring 
adjustment costs. If the adjustment cost is sufficiently high, this may result in persistent 
 238 
 
technical efficiency. Chapter 7 highlights the persistent over-utilisation of capital inputs over 
the period. Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2012) propose a model that decomposes the overall error 
term into a noise component, a persistent technical efficiency component, a short-run technical 
efficiency and a firm specific random effects component to capture heterogeneity. The 
decomposition of the error term is informative for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry to separate the company-specific effects and the persistent inefficiency. This allows 
the regulator to analyse the level of inefficiency which can be eliminated with relative ease.  
The measurement of dynamic DEA implies that there is a preference for capital expenditure 
over operating expenditure. The 2014 price review aims to eliminate the potential capex bias 
by using a totex approach. The efficient level of expenditure is examined for operating 
expenditure and capital expenditure together as much is feasible. This should level out the 
incentive rates between opex and capex. Within the 2014 price review, companies earn a rate 
of return on a proportion of their total operating expenditure rather than on capital expenditure. 
For future research, it would be of interest to examine the impact of the changes in the 
regulatory framework in eliminating the capex bias or whether the capex bias exists due to the 
nature of the industry building for future demand.  
Dynamic DEA examines relative efficiency, the results therefore imply that five of the WaSCs 
have a capex bias relative to the frontier companies. This result would therefore indicate that 
five of the companies do not exhibit a capex bias. As the regulatory incentives are the same 
amongst the firms then one may expect that the frontier companies exhibit a capex bias. 
Therefore it is expected that the absolute capex bias will be larger than the relative capex bias. 
It would be of interest for future research to determine the level of the absolute capex bias. 
Alongside measuring the absolute capex bias, the thesis can be extended to reduce the issue of 
dimensionality. Dynamic DEA exhibits a dimensionality problem as the data is required to be 
examined for each period to take into account the intertemporal nature of capital. The 
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dimensionality issue biases the efficiency score upwards, therefore biasing the estimation of 
the capex bias downwards. An extension of this work would be to examine a window analysis 
approach whereby several years of data are pooled together and examined under a meta-frontier 
and the window is rolled forwards. This approach would reduce the dimensionality problem, 
however it makes the implicit assumption that the capital stock remains fixed over the length 
of the window.  
The future of the industry faces substantial change due to the facilitation of Ofwat for upstream 
and downstream competition. Within the PR14 price review, Ofwat is facilitating the 
introduction of retail competition for non-household customers by 2017, following the 
introduction of retail competition in Scotland. The introduction of competition introduces 
scope for additional research to evaluate firstly whether non-households switch their suppliers, 
and secondly the effectiveness of competitive pressure to stimulate efficiency improvements, 
and therefore lower bills.  
8.5 Take home message  
 
There are three take home messages from this study: 
 Firstly, the elimination of the capex bias could reduce the average company’s costs by 
4.5% a year 
 Secondly, the three-stage DEA model should  be implemented within the price review 
as a robustness check of existing methods 
 Thirdly, the modelling of the optimal level of capital for efficiency analysis is best 
determined within a dynamic framework. 
 
Appendix1:Literature Summary 
 
Study Data Sample Inputs Ouputs Environmental/Non-Discretionary 
Hunt and Lynk 
(1995) 
English and Welsh water 
and sewerage Industry   
Operating Expenditure, 
Labour Costs 
Distribution Input, Trade Effluent, 
Environmental Services 
 
Cubbin and 
Tzanidakis 
(1998) 
English and Welsh water 
and sewerage Industry   
Opex Water Delivered, Length of Mains, 
Proportion of distribution to non-
households 
Proportion of water delivered to non-
households 
Thanassoulis 
(1999) 
English and Welsh water 
and sewerage Industry   
Opex less power costs 
 
Properties, Length of Mains, Water 
Delivered 
 
Ashton (2000a) English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry  
 
Labour, consumables, 
other 
Number of connected households  
Saal and Parker 
(2000) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry  
 
Labour, consumables, 
other 
Number of connected households  
Garcia and 
Thomas (2001) 
55 French Water 
Municipals 
Labour, Electricity, 
Materials and Other 
Volume sold to final customers, Water 
losses 
Number of customers, number of 
municipals served, Network length, 
production capacity, stocking, 
pumping capacity 
Saal and Parker 
(2001) 
English and Welsh water 
and sewerage industry. 
WaSCs 
Labour, Capital and 
Other Costs 
Water supply population and 
population connected to sewerage 
treatment work. 
 
Thanassoulis 
(2002) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
Sewerage OPEX Length of Sewers, Area served, 
capacity of pumping in the sewerage 
network 
 
Stone and 
Webster (2004) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
Labour, Power, Capital 
and Other  
Volume of water delivered, Properties 
connected for water supply, number of 
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properties connected for sewerage, 
Equivalent population served 
Tupper and 
Resende (2004 
Brazil water industry Labour Expenses, 
Operational costs, Other 
operational Costs  
 
Water Produced, Treated Sewage, 
Population served water, Population 
served-treated sewage 
Water Density, Sewerage Density, 
Water loss, 
Woodbury and 
Dollery (2004) 
73 Australian Water 
municipals 
Management Costs, 
Maintenance and 
operation costs, energy 
and chemical costs, 
capital replacement 
costs 
Number of assessment, Annual water 
consumption 
Water Service index, Population, 
properties per km of mains, location, 
large seasonal variations, rainfall, 
percentage of residential assessment, 
water is filtered or not, groundwater is 
used 
Aubert and 
Reynuad (2005) 
Wisconsin Water Utilities Labour, energy, 
chemicals, operation 
supplies and expenses 
and maintenance, 
capital 
Volume of water, Number of customers 
served 
Dummies for firms which purchase 
water from another utility and use 
surface water, average depth of 
pumping wells, dummies for rate of 
return regulation and hybrid regime. 
 
 
Coelli and 
Walding (2005) 
Australian Water 
Companies 
Operating Expenditure, 
Capital (Length of 
Mains) 
Number of properties connected, 
volume of water delivered 
 
Saal and Parker 
(2005) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
Capital stock, opex   Water supply, water connections Network density, Aph, water quality, 
Dummy variable for WaSCs 
Garcia- 
Sanchez (2006) 
Spanish Water 
Municipals 
Total Staff, Treatment 
Plants, Pipes 
Water Supplied, Connections, controls 
or analyses carried out. 
Population, tourist index, number of 
houses, average people per house,  
meter squared of greenbelt, economic 
activity, average temperature, 
municipals area and population 
density 
Erbetta and 
Cave (2007) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
(WaSC) 
Capital, Labour, Other Potable and non potable water* DWI 
Quality , Water properties, Sewerage 
Proportion of boreholes, Water Loss, 
Water Density, Sewerage Density, 
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properties, Physical amount of waste 
water*River quality 
 
Proportion of trade effluent, Reg94, 
Reg99 
 
 
Saal et al 
(2007) 
English and Welsh water 
and sewerage Industry. 
WaSCs 
MEA, Employees, other 
costs 
Water Population* DWI Quality, 
Sewerage Population* (Weighted 
average Bathing water and river 
quality), Water supplied, Equivalent 
Population 
% Underground water, Trade Effluent, 
Bathing Water Intensity, % Metered 
Properties 
Picazo-Tadeo et 
al (2008) 
38 Spanish Water 
municipals 
Delivery network, 
sewer network, 
labour(number of 
workers), operational 
costs 
Population served, water delivered and 
treated sewage 
 
unaccounted-for water 
Bottasso and 
Conti (2003) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Opex, labour  
 
Water Delivered, length of main, 
average pumping head, proportion of 
river sources on total sources 
Average Pumping Head, Share of 
water delivered to non-households, 
Population density, Distribution  
Input, MEA, proportion of river 
sources on total sources 
Saal and Reid 
(2004) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Labour, Other, MEA 
Water, MEA Sewerage 
Water Delivered, Equivalent 
Population Served 
 
Drinking Water Quality, Population 
receiving secondary sewerage 
treatment, Properties with water 
pressure below the reference level, 
Water Properties, Sewerage 
Properties, Sewerage Density, Water 
Density 
Bottasso and 
Conti (2009) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
(WoCs Only) 
 
Labour, capital, other Water Delivered, Connected Properties, 
area size of WoC 
Aph, Distribution input from River, 
Water Quality, % of properties did not 
experience pressure problems and % 
of properties that did not experience 
service interruptions. 
Bottasso and 
Conti (2011) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Labour, Other, Capital 
 
Water Delivered, Equivalent 
Population served. 
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Saal et al 
(2011) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Capital, Labour, Energy 
and Other 
DI, Water Connected Properties, 
Sewerage Connected Properties, 
Equivalent Population 
Water Density, Sewerage Density, DI 
from Boreholes, per capita water 
consumption, Distribution loss, Water 
Quality, Sewerage Quality 
 
Portela et al 
(2011) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Opex Number of billed Properties, Adjusted 
distribution input surface water, 
Adjusted distribution input non-surface 
water, Number of sources, Number of 
billed properties adjusted 
 
Maziotis et al 
(2012a) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry 
Capital, Labour and 
other 
Quality Adjusted Water Properties, 
Quality Adjusted Sewerage Properties 
 
Maziotis et al 
(2012b) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry.  
Capital, Labour and 
Other 
Water connected properties, Sewerage 
connected properties 
 
Maziotis et al 
(2013) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Capital, Labour, Other Quality Adjusted Water Connected 
Properties, Quality Adjusted Sewerage 
Connected Properties 
 
Water Quality, Sewerage Quality 
Cherchy et al 
(2013) 
English and Welsh Water 
and Sewerage Industry   
Resources, power, 
capital, labour and other 
Water Properties, Sewerage Properties, 
Volume of Water, Volume of Sewerage 
Service area, Leakage, Prop of River 
water, Prop of ground water, Bulk 
supply imports, bulk supply exports, 
Water Connections, Sewerage 
Connections 
 
Appendix 2- SYS-GMM 
This appendix reports the results for the SYS-GMM of Blundell and Bond (1998) model in 
chapter 5 for equation 5.7. The SYS-GMM is a dynamic panel model which overcomes the 
problem of weak instruments in the GMM-DIFF model. However, due to data limitations the 
number of groups is less than the number of instruments, therefore the results are not robust.  
 
 
 
 
Total Costs Variable Costs
GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
Intercept -0.0156 -0.0144073
-0.0136 -0.0092708
0.8869*** 0.8775684***
(0.0870) (0.0707451)
Convergence Speed -0.1131 -0.1224
Number of Observations 140 140
Sargan Test 31.00 37.04**
AR(1) -2.54** -2.36**
AR(2) 0.65 6.77
Half life 5.78 5.31
Notes: Significant levels *, 10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard erros in parentheses. 
Estimations are perfomed by xtabond2 in STATA by Roodman (2009)
ln 𝜃𝑡−1 
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